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This thesis contributes to the development of a ‘neo-Aristotelian’ ontology of powers
that accommodates quantum phenomena. It o↵ers a number of philosophical ob-
jections to ‘Super-Humean’ metaphysics, and constructs a sequence of models that
aim to improve upon it, using the metaphysical toolbox constructed in Part I.
In Part II, I explore how quantum entanglement challenges the ‘classical’ con-
ception of the world as consisting of particles (or fields) with intrinsic physical prop-
erties (Chapter 3). I consider the metaphysical model o↵ered by Super-Humeanism,
which accommodates entanglement by combining a ‘primitive ontology approach’ to
quantum mechanics with ontic structural realism (Chapter 4). According to Super-
Humeans, the world is made of matter points constituted by distance relations. I
raise three objections to its structuralist conception of matter. I then propose an
alternative semi-Humean model, ‘Bohmian power structuralism’, which overcomes
these objections through an ontology of ‘power-atoms’ with multi-track causal pow-
ers (Chapter 5). But its Humean conception of laws can be challenged. A second
model, ‘power monism’, enriches the primitive ontology to include a ‘cosmic power’
that transforms the power-atoms into a cosmic whole, and supports an Aristotelian-
essentialist conception of laws (Chapter 6). This model overcomes the di culties
with power structuralism, but is susceptible to Hawthorne’s ‘extrinsicality’ argu-
ment, excluding consciousness from the physical world.
In Part III, I consider the emergence of thermochemical properties within macro-
scopic (or mesoscopic) quantum systems. Metaphysical models that incorporate
only finite degrees of freedom, like Super-Humeanism, cannot accommodate in-
trinsic properties like temperature and chemical entropy, which are represented in
physics in the ‘thermodynamic limit’ (Chapter 7). I o↵er an additional argument
against adopting a reductionist approach based on Putnam’s ‘permutation argu-
ment’ (Chapter 8). Finally, I outline a third model, ‘power pluralism’, in which the
world consists of: a substrate of ‘power-gunk’, and ‘substantial powers’ that elicit
substances from the power-gunk (Chapter 9). In this model, quantum-entangled
microscopic particles are potential parts of macroscopic (or mesoscopic) substances,
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Nature and the old Aristotelianism
The fact, however, that there was this misunderstanding and misuse of
the substantial forms should not bring us to throw away something whose
recognition is so necessary in metaphysics.
– Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics
§1.1. Hylomorphism
What is the world made of? If it is made out of something, then are there many
things, or is there really just one thing, from which everything else is made? If
there are many things, what unites those di↵erent things to make one world, and
how should we account for how they change?1
Philosophical questions about the nature of matter and the possibility of change
did not begin with the ‘scientific revolution’ of the seventeenth century, nor with the
advent of ‘modern philosophy’. In fact, in seeking to make sense of contemporary
quantum mechanics, both pioneering physicists, like Werner Heisenburg, and mod-
ern philosophers of science, like Nancy Cartwright, have found themselves reaching
as far back as the metaphysics of Aristotle for inspiration, whose philosophy was
shaped in turn by Plato and the musings of the pre-Socratics.2
The degree to which Nancy Cartwright’s philosophy of science, with its appeal
to ‘Aristotelian powers’,3 or anything that I shall propose in this thesis, represents
an authentic recovery of any part of Aristotle’s philosophy of nature, is something I
must leave to others to decide. I take my thesis to be an exercise in metaphysics and
the philosophy of science, rather than a treatise on ancient philosophy. Nonetheless,
I have found myself turning toward parts of Aristotle’s metaphysics, or at least
toward metaphysicians who have studied his works more deeply than I have, in order
to grapple with some of the problems raised by the ‘quantum revolution’ in physics
that I shall expound in due course. The inoculation that I received against Aristotle
5
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during the course of my own training in physics, however, and the general lack of
interest in medieval philosophy among analytic philosophers, leaves me compelled
to give some account of why I have begun reconsidering certain much maligned
‘Aristotelian’ ideas, like the doctrine of hylomorphism, which strongly influenced
the course of Western philosophy via the reception of Aristotle in the Middle Ages.
Although the philosophy of the Middle Ages was far from monolithic, medieval
metaphysics from the thirteenth century can be broadly characterised within the
Latin tradition by its explicit commitment to the Aristotelian principles of ‘matter’
(hyle) and ‘form’ (morphe). (The term ‘hylomorphism’ is a portmanteau of these
Greek words.) Aristotle’s hylomorphic doctrine of substances deploys matter and
form as co-relative concepts to explain how the world is carved into fundamental sub-
stances with intrinsic properties that persist through time. Among some scholastic
philosophers, the matter of a substance was conceived as a determinable substrate
underlying all change, and forms were conceived as di↵erent determinations of mat-
ter which fixed their causal powers. Among others, they were understood di↵erently.
However, whilst Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism came to be interpreted in
various ways, some of which I shall touch upon in this chapter, it continued to frame
philosophical debate until the rise of corpuscularianism in the seventeenth century.
Strict demarcations between medieval and early modern philosophy are increasingly
discouraged by historians of philosophy. Nonetheless, the wide-spread rejection of
form as the determining principle of matter,4 initiated by the early mechanistic
philosophers, and led by René Descartes and John Locke, constitutes a striking
discontinuity between medieval and modern notions of the natural order. Indeed, it
has often been presented as one of the lasting and inevitable triumphs of modern
science, in which an opaque medieval philosophy was forced into retreat by a more
perspicuous account of nature.
My thesis aims to put such hackneyed claims into question, by drawing upon
hylomorphic ideas to make sense of contemporary physics at precisely those points
where the ghosts of corpuscularianism, so to speak, seem to be inhibiting under-
standing.5 More immediately, I wish to suggest a di↵erent philosophical evaluation
of the demise of substantial form. In assessing the merits of Aristotle’s doctrine,
I believe we should distinguish between two general approaches that I shall call
Aristotelian-Thomistic and late scholastic [Simpson, 2018].6 I claim that, in doing
so, it is plausible that the widespread rejection of form, which continues to this
present day, is an historical contingency: it results in part from the ‘physicalisation’
of Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism in late scholastic metaphysics, combined
with the rise of a kind of microphysical reductionism which (I shall later argue)
contemporary physics does not support.
In o↵ering these observations, I hope to persuade the reader that it is not un-
reasonable to draw upon hylomorphism for inspiration, in spite of the ‘bad press’ it
received in the seventeenth century. However, since I am neither a classicist nor a
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medievalist, and primarily concerned with the metaphysics of science, the reflections
o↵ered in this introductory chapter shall be brief and painted with a broad brush.
My goal in this thesis is to work towards uncovering an ontology that is compati-
ble with quantum mechanics and accommodates the possibility of scientific inquiry.
Any rigorous examination has been deferred to subsequent chapters.
§1.2. Proto-scientific inquiry
Although Aristotle was famously the protégé of Plato, and both philosophers aspired
to universal truths about reality, it is widely acknowledged that these great thinkers
of antiquity diverged in their methodology and their metaphysics.7 For Plato, reality
lay beyond our experience of particular things, in a transcendent realm of universals
he called the ‘forms’, which somehow cause the plurality of particulars with which
we are acquainted, and in which these various particulars are said to ‘participate’.
A form is the universal essence which bestows qualitative similarity upon particular
things – such as the form of the triangle, or the form of man – and can only be
known through a kind of recollection (see eg. [Plato, Meno, 71-81, 85-86]).8
In his treatise, On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle criticised Plato’s treat-
ment of the forms on the grounds that, since they are transcendent entities, they
cannot function as e cient causes in the world of space and time [Aristotle, Gen.
& Corr. 335b, 18-24]. For Aristotle, if the forms are to explain the characteris-
tic activities of concrete particulars, they must somehow be ‘immanent’ within the
‘substances’ that they are said to ‘in-form’. Moreover, according to Aristotle, we
ultimately come to know the forms through sensory experience, by causally inter-
acting with substances, rather than through recollection [Aristotle, Metaphysics III
3-4]. It is the substances, not the forms, that act as e cient causes in nature.
Whilst the ontological status of the forms in Aristotle’s metaphysics, and their
relation to the substances that they are said to in-form, is still vigorously debated
(of which more later), Aristotle maintained a robust commitment to the reality
of in-formed substances that exist in the world of space and time. This broadly
empirical stance is manifest in Aristotle’s systematic study of natural phenomena
and his indefatigable classification of the natural world into natural kinds. For
Aristotle, philosophical inquiry into the truth about the world began with the study
of nature as it presents itself in ordinary experience, proceeding to more abstract
reflections upon the nature of time and change (in the Physics), and thence to more
fundamental questions about the nature of being (in the Metaphysics).
For these reasons, I suggest, it is not unreasonable to consider Aristotle as a
kind of proto-scientist who inaugurated the empirical tradition of scientific inquiry;
a tradition characterised by a certain confidence in the power of human reason to
uncover the truths about nature. For Aristotle, the truths about nature ultimately
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pertain to the various forms that are immanent within the world of change.
§1.3. Matter and form in Aristotle
i. Being and change
Aristotle distinguished two ways of being in his account of change: there is being-
in-potency (or potentiality) and there is being-in-act (or actuality) (see [Aristotle,
Physics I.7]).9 According to Aristotle, as he has generally been understood,10 the
natural order is fundamentally composed of substances, which are concrete partic-
ulars that have powers to bring about change. For example, animals are organic
substances which exercise powers of growth and nutrition.11 Yet animals are not
permanent entities which can persist through all kinds of change. Rather, organic
substances are transitory entities that come into being through the procreative ac-
tivities of other substances, and they are subject to processes of death and decay.
Aristotle introduced the co-relative concepts of matter (hyle) and form (morphe)
in his account of how substances are generated and decomposed in nature, and
how they take on di↵erent characteristics during the course of their existence (see
eg. [Aristotle, Physics II.3]). Matter is that which changes and gets determined
(or actualised), and form is that which determines (or actualises) matter. Both
metaphysical principles are required to explain the changes in nature that we observe
in ordinary experience, along with the concept of privation, which is the lack of the
form that is required by whatever the goal of the change happens to be.
For instance, when an animal consumes a plant, by exercising its powers of
growth and nutrition, it transforms the matter of the plant into its own flesh. In
so doing, the substance of the animal is a subject of change: by gathering flesh
where there was previously a privation, the matter of the substance is determined
by a di↵erent accidental form. In exercising its power to nourish, and in being
consumed by the animal, the matter of the plant is also a subject of change. By
being transformed into the flesh of the animal, it is stripped of powers that are
essential to the nature of the plant, and acquires powers that are essential to the
nature of the animal. In this case, the matter is now said to be determined (or
actualised) by the substantial form of the animal, since the animal exists where its
form was previously in privation. The causal relations between two substances are
described in terms of their powers to e↵ect change, whether the change brought
about is accidental or substantial in kind.
ii. Actual and potential parts
Aristotelian substances have a per se unity which other kinds of entities lack. In or-
der to distinguish an Aristotelian substance, like an animal, from an aggregate, like
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a pile of sand, we must distinguish between actual and potential physical parts. An
aggregate is composed of actual physical parts that have a determinate physical na-
ture. These parts can in principle exist independently of the whole, and retain their
natures and identities even whilst they are composing an aggregate. An aggregate
entity derives its nature and being from the sum of its actual parts.
An Aristotelian substance, by contrast, does not consist of actual physical parts
into which it can (hypothetically) be decomposed. Rather, all the physical parts of
a substance are dependent for their physical natures upon the substance of which
they are part. Whilst a living substance, such as an animal, can decompose into a
collection of non-living chemicals, which do not depend upon the original substance
for their existence or physical natures, these physical entities are not numerically
identical to any of the parts of the substance that existed prior to its decomposition.
The separate entities into which a substance may decompose on corruption are
said to exist only in potential, just so long as the substance itself exists.12 The
metaphysical unity of the substance thus pertains to its having a single nature,
upon which the natures of all of the parts of the substance jointly depend. It is the
metaphysical unity of the substance that distinguishes it from an aggregate.13
It is possible to make this distinction more precise. According to Miller, actual
and potential parts satisfy the ordering axioms of classical mereology, inasmuch as
the classical definitions of ‘proper parthood’, ‘overlap’, ‘underlap’, and ‘disjointness’
can be applied without modification [Miller, 2019]. However, potential parts do
not satisfy the classical axiomatisation for decomposition. Following the classical
remainder axiom, or the alternative axioms of strong and weak supplementation, if
x is a proper part of y there must be some other part of y that is disjoint with x
[Cotnoir & Varzi, forthcoming, pp. 25, 104, 111]. Miller proposes that the appropri-
ate decomposition axiom for potential parts is what Cotnoir and Varzi have called
the axiom of ‘strong company’ instead: namely, for all x and y, if y is a proper part
of x, then there exists a further part which is a proper part of x and not a part of y
[p. 125]. In this model, a substance, unlike an aggregate, is without disjoint parts.
iii. Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism
In this brief exposition, three propositions that characterise what I shall call the
Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of hylomorphism can be discerned which were sub-
sequently challenged during the rise of corpuscularianism. First:
E cient and final causes
AH/I: The existence of substances with causal powers to bring about change
explains the di↵erent phenomena that we observe within the physical world.
A substance X brings about some change   in another substance Y by exercising an
active power to change Y, whilst the other substance Y su↵ers the change brought
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about by X by exercising a passive power. There is an intentional or ‘teleological’
aspect to the nature of this interaction: the substance X is said to have a power P
to bring about  , which is as much as to say that the power P is directed toward
 .14 Both the agent and the recipient act as e cient causes only by co-manifesting
their ‘reciprocal’ causal powers. Yet substantial forms, according to Aristotle, also
have a role to play in explaining the physical nature of substances:
Formal and material causes
AH/II: The existence of substantial forms explains how the potentiality of matter
is determined (or actualised) as di↵erent substances with causal powers.
For Aristotle, animals have powers of perception, locomotion, and various passions,
that plants do not, and humans have rational (or, intellectual) powers that other
animals do not. Since animal and human substances are transitory, however, and
do not have actual physical parts, we require an explanation of how di↵erent kinds
of substances arise in the physical world. According to Aquinas’ interpretation
of Aristotle, the fact that there are substances in the world with fundamentally
di↵erent causal powers is explained by the existence of di↵erent substantial forms,
which determine their matter in di↵erent ways [Aquinas, De Principis Naturae 5]. I
suggest, then, that the fundamental explanatory roles of matter and form can only
be robustly distinguished if we accept the following proposition:
Anti-physicalist principle
AH/III: The physical parts of a particular substance do not have a determinate
(or actual) physical nature apart from the form of the substance.
Matter and form are co-relative principles, according to Aristotle’s doctrine of hy-
lomorphism: the matter of a particular substance has no causal powers to act in
the world, apart from the form of the substance, and the form of the substance has
no causal power to act in the world, apart from the matter whose causal powers
it determines. Hence a substance cannot consist of actual physical parts that have
their own essential and intrinsic powers, which interact with one another as e cient
causes. The question of whether or not matter has any being apart from the exis-
tence of substances, however, and whether or not forms have any being apart from
the substances they in-form, is a historical controversy of long-standing.
According to a traditional line of interpretation that is often attributed to Aquinas,
Aristotle thinks of substantial form as both the principle of unity of a substance and
that by which substances are fundamentally and objectively what they are [Aquinas,
De Principis Naturae, 5, 30]. For Aquinas, whilst a substantial form is not a con-
stituent part of a substance, in the way that the material elements of a substance
are parts of the substance, a substantial form may be said to unite itself to the
matter of a substance in virtue of being the formal cause of its essence or nature
[Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, 6].15 In Aquinas’s view, substantial forms play a role
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in objectively carving the world into di↵erent substances, and must therefore have
being apart from the substances that they in-form.
According to a more recent line of interpretation that originates in the work of
Theodore Scaltsas, however, matter and form for Aristotle are merely abstractions
from the fundamental unity of the substance, and have no being apart from the
substance from which they are abstracted [Scaltsas, 1994]. For Marmodoro, for
example, whilst the substantial form is the principle of unity of the substance, it is
not objectively the cause of the substance being what it is [Marmodoro, 2013a].16
Rather, the matter and form of a substance are related to the unified whole as
constituent principles, rather than constituent parts, which we subjectively depend
upon to carve nature according to our explanatory interests [Marmodoro, 2018b].17
I shall follow the older Aristotelian-Thomistic line of interpretation, in which a
substance is counted as a unified metaphysical composite. Whilst I do not propose
to settle this controversy in this chapter, or to engage in any detailed exegesis of
Aristotle, I shall consider Marmodoro’s approach to hylomorphism in Chapter 6,
in the context of a contemporary metaphysical model, and will o↵er a number of
reasons for rejecting it. (For detailed criticism of Scaltsas’ line of interpretation,
see [Peterson, 2018].) All I wish to claim here is that an ‘Aristotelian’ conception of
hylomorphism, which distinguishes the explanatory roles of matter and form, will
be one in which the anti-physicalist principle (AH/III) is staunchly maintained.
§1.4. Matter and form in late scholasticism
Whilst the concepts of matter and form were widely deployed in scholastic meta-
physics, in accounting for the nature and unity of substances, these doctrines were
developed by some scholastic philosophers in ways that were incompatible with
Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism. No single systematic view characterises the
late scholastic period. Nonetheless, it is possible to pick out some suggestive tenden-
cies within medieval metaphysics that served as a prelude to corpuscularianism.18
I shall use the term physicalise to refer to the tendency to treat matter and form
as having the same ontological standing as physical substances, or the actual parts
of an aggregate, by regarding them as concrete entities with determinate causal
powers.19 The necessity of some material substrate underlying all forms of change
was widely accepted within the Latin tradition. As Franco Burgersdijk observed,
‘all seem to have granted to Aristotle that the generation and corruption of natural
things requires a common subject’.20 In this way, Aristotle sought to a rm the
continuity of natural processes and to avert the supposition that change must involve
creation from nothing.
However, the Aristotelian-Thomistic construal of this substrate as a determinable
potentiality, which was defended by Aquinas, was widely criticised by other scholas-
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tics for failing to bottom out in anything concrete or determinate, and was never
widely accepted, even in the thirteenth century. Duns Scotus, for example, insisted
against Aquinas that this substrate should have actual parts.21 William of Ockham,
writing in the early fourteenth century, echoed Averroes in requiring that matter
should have extension.22 The metaphysical misgivings concerning a merely deter-
minable substrate were starkly expressed by the seventeenth century Ockhamist,
André Dabillon, who insisted that either ‘the things that compose an actual being
actually exist, or a substantial whole would be composed of nothing’. Since this
position is untenable, he claimed that it must be the case that both ‘matter and
form are real substantial beings that exist actually in nature’.23
In addition to physicalising the material substrate of change, increasing its inde-
pendence from substantial form, many scholastics seem to attribute a quasi-physical
status to form, suggesting that it interacts with other entities like an e cient cause.
A significant example of this tendency lies in the widespread rejection of the so-called
‘unitarian doctrine’ of substantial form.24 In Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism,
a substance has a single substantial form, which is the principle of unity of the
substance. For some scholastics, however, such as Scotus, a plurality of substantial
forms were said to exist within the same substance. For example, the form of cor-
poreity (by which an animal is embodied), and the form of the soul (by which an
animal is living), were held to be present simultaneously within a human substance.
Yet if multiple substantial forms can exist within a substance that simultaneously
determine its causal powers, wherein lies the unity of the substance? For certain
scholastics, it seems the temptation was to preserve their commitment to the unifying
character of forms by portraying them as elements within the composite with powers
to organise their various parts into a single functional whole. Francisco Suárez,
a philosopher of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, seems to be
considering such a position when he writes, ‘The aggregation of multiple faculties or
accidental forms in a simple substantial subject is not enough for the constitution
of a natural thing... A form is required that, as it were, rules over all those faculties
and accidents, and is the source of all actions and natural motions of such a being.’25
In this way, form becomes physicalised as something in the world with the causal
power to organise other determinate parts within some kind of causal structure.
This marks a departure from Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism, I suggest, in
which it is form that determines the causal powers of a substance.
Yet once matter and form have been physicalised, formal and e cient causation
become di cult to distinguish from one another. For the Aristotelian-Thomistic
hylomorphist, substances were supposed to share (in some sense) a common sub-
strate of determinable potentiality, which is in-formed one way, and then another.
For certain scholastics, however, substantial forms seem to act as e cient causes,
since that is the only way in which they can make a causal di↵erence to things
that have their own essential and determinate natures. It is enough for my pur-
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poses to note that the meanings of the terms ‘matter’ and ‘form’ were modified in
certain variants of scholastic hylomorphism. Whilst the metaphysical role of form,
both in joint-carving and the generation of substance, remained the same in inten-
tion, the ways in which these tasks were implemented rapidly shifted from their
Aristotelian-Thomistic moorings. Matter and form were physicalised, and formal
causation confounded with e cient causation; a circumstance that would place the
concept of substantial form in direct competition with scientific mechanisms.
§1.5. Corpuscularianism
The mechanical philosophy of the seventeenth century, far from arising in a philo-
sophical vacuum, represents a development in these tendencies, which culminated in
the complete physicalisation of the substrate of change as material corpuscles with
fully determinate properties, combined with an explicit rejection of the notion of
substantial forms. Abandoning the hylomorphism of late scholasticism, the corpus-
cularists proposed an alternative ontology consisting of material bodies composed
of determinate constituents arranged within physical space, echoing the atomism of
Leucippus and Democritus that Aristotle had so vehemently opposed.
i. From potentiality to corpuscles
One of the earliest instantiations of corpuscularianism was the mechanical philos-
ophy of Descartes, who famously conjectured that reality could be neatly divided
between thinking things (the ‘res cogitantes’) and extended things (the ‘res extensa’),
with the extended things being wholly characterised by the geometric properties of
‘shape, size [and] position’, and the mechanical property of the ‘motion of particles
of matter’, which is governed by universal laws. A thorough-going reductionist in
his approach to the material world, Descartes believed ‘there is nothing in all of
nature whose character (ratio) cannot be deduced through these same principles’,26
and dismissed substantial form as ‘a philosophical being unknown to me’.27
It would be di cult to overstate the enduring impact of Descartes’ metaphysics,
although Cartesian physics was a short-lived a↵air by contrast: Isaac Newton re-
jected Descartes’ identification of matter with extension, and proceeded to develop
an alternative account of motion that would rapidly secure Newtonian mechanics
as the archetype of modern physics. Nonetheless, the common commitment to cor-
puscles continued to set the agenda for natural philosophers from the seventeenth
century. Buoyed by swift advances in the experimental sciences, corpuscularianism
swiftly supplanted scholasticism in many parts of Europe, as scientists like Robert
Boyle contrived plausible mechanical explanations for natural phenomena, specifi-
cally targeting cases in physics where scholastics had attributed phenomena to the
activities of forms.28 Henry Oldenburg, who served as the first secretary for the
14 1 Nature and the old Aristotelianism
Royal Society, memorably complimented Boyle for having ‘driven out that drivel of
substantial forms’ which ‘has stopped the progress of true philosophy, and made the
best of scholars not more knowing as to the nature of particular bodies than the
meanest ploughmen’.29
ii. From substantial forms to universal laws
Whilst corpuscularians maintained a commitment to the notion of a material sub-
strate underlying all change – in Boyle’s view, a ‘substance extended, divisible, and
impenetrable’ 30 – the doctrine of substantial forms was swiftly abandoned during
the course of the seventeenth century (albeit with some notable dissenters, such
as Leibniz [Leibniz, 1976]). This loss was accompanied by a shift in how change
was conceived. As Silva observes: ‘intrinsic natural formal causes were replaced by
extrinsically imposed laws of nature’ [Silva, 2019, p.65]. In a world stripped of sub-
stantial forms that determine the intrinsic powers of di↵erent substances that exist
in nature, ‘natural philosophers needed to refer to the laws of nature that extrin-
sically guided the movements of corpuscles and atoms in a void’ [p.64]. According
to Boyle, the material world that is laid bare by the physical sciences should be
regarded as a ‘contrivance of brute matter managed by certain laws of local mo-
tion’ [Boyle, 2000, vol.10, p.447]. The corpuscularian matter, of which everything
else is made, persists through time and only changes with respect to accidents like
position. There is no need for the category of substantial change.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the French mechanist Pierre Simon de
Laplace had given voice to a vision of a universal mechanism that would dominate
the imagination of philosophers until the turn of the twentieth century – a cosmos
whose state at any future time is entirely fixed by the present locations and momenta
of small particles and the laws of Newtonian mechanics.31 This is the world of
‘classical physics’, with which most philosophers are familiar, in which the universal
laws of physics determine all the physical possibilities of nature. It is a world in
which the substantial forms of the late scholastics – conceived as ‘organising powers’
– have no fundamental role to play in bringing about change.
iii. From laws and corpuscles to minds
In spite of his role in undermining the old Aristotelianism, Descartes’ mind-body
dualism has failed to sustain a significant following among modern philosophers, who
have found the relation it posits between mind and body implausibly tenuous,32 and
often distance themselves from any explicit ontological commitment to ‘corpuscles’,
preferring to describe the material world as containing ‘what a true complete physical
science would say it contains’ [Crane and Mellor, 1990, p.186]. It became a matter
of urgency to conceive of alternative ways in which the psychological world of the
scientist might be related to the world that the scientist purports to describe.
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The logical positivists of the early twentieth century, such as Schlick and Car-
nap, perceived their scientific empiricism as demanding some form of physicalism.
Mid-century analytic philosophers, like J.C. Smart and U.T. Place, favoured a type
of linguistic reductionism in which ordinary language ascriptions about the mind
could be translated into true statements about our best physics. When syntactic
explications of the mind-body relation fell into disfavour, philosophers searched for
semantic explications instead. According to Donald Davidson, mental character-
istics should be considered as ‘supervenient’ upon physical characteristics. This
means that ‘there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but di↵ering in
some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without
altering in some physical respect’ [Davidson, 2001, p.214].
Nonetheless, what animates both of these approaches, I suggest, is the ghost of a
corpuscularian conception of matter: namely, that there is some substrate of deter-
minate being underlying the macroscopic world of scientists and their experiments,
whose laws and properties exist without further explanation. The philosopher’s task
is then to find the correct way of relating the ‘mental’ to these basic features. For
example, Cian Dorr o↵ers the following three-part recipe for constructing meta-
physical hypotheses [Dorr, 2011, p.139], which has been described as ‘orthodoxy
for post-Quinean metaphysics’ [Button, 2013, p.12]: first, a ‘fundamental ontology’
of physical constituents is to be stated; secondly, a ‘fundamental ideology’ should
be specified to describe them; finally, ‘some laws’ must be laid down that ‘capture
important general patterns’ among them [Dorr, 2011, p.139]. According to this pro-
cedure, the whole truth about the world supervenes upon the physical facts about
these laws and constituents. I shall refer to this metaontology as micro-monism.
iv. The quantum revolution
Let me lay my cards on the table. I have misgivings about the privileged status the
micro-monist conception of nature continues to enjoy among analytic metaphysicians
and philosophers of mind. I also share Leibniz’s doubts about the wisdom of the
corpuscularian philosophy that displaced the doctrine of hylomorphism, from which
the philosophy of micro-monism descends [Leibniz, 1976]. My doubts and misgivings
have arisen in the light of the quantum revolution, which overturned the universal
pretensions of Newtonian mechanics in the 1920s, and with which contemporary
metaphysicians and philosophers of mind are still coming to grips.
Specifically, I question whether a quantum mechanical description of nature sup-
ports an ontology of microphysical properties that stand without further explana-
tion. I will recount this doubt in more detail in connection with the phenomenon
of quantum entanglement, in which the quantum state of two microscopic systems
that are quantum-entangled is irreducible to the quantum states of their separate
constituents (see Part II). I also question whether the explanatory power of quantum
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mechanics is best enabled by reducing the physical possibilities of nature to di↵erent
arrangements of a single set of microscopic constituents. I shall expound this doubt
further in discussing the emergence of thermochemical phenomena in macroscopic
quantum systems, such as phase transitions, which demand a plurality of physically
inequivalent microscopic representations (see Part III). In the course of this thesis,
I mean to call into question two micro-monist assumptions about nature:
Matter with microscopic properties
MM/I: There are fundamental microphysical properties, picked out by our ‘best
physics’, which are intrinsic to the fundamental constituents of nature.
Matter with microscopic constituents
MM/II: Nature consists of a single set of microscopic constituents whose possible
arrangements are determined by the laws of our ‘best physics’.
In this thesis, I hope to take a few steps toward constructing a ‘neo-Aristotelian’
ontology of nature that dispenses with both of these micro-monist assumptions,
beginning with metaphysical models that reject the first assumption (in Part II),
and proceeding toward a model that rejects both assumptions (in Part III). I think a
better description of nature can be achieved, which accommodates the phenomenon
of quantum entanglement and the emergence of thermochemical phenomena, by
deploying the ideas of metaphysical grounding and the metaphysics of potentiality
that I shall discuss further in the following chapter (see Chapter 2), and which draws
metaphysical inspiration from the Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism.
Although I am concerned with metaphysical models that a rm the possibility of
scientific inquiry, and therefore the existence of scientists engaged in such inquiries,
I have no intention of o↵ering here an alternative philosophy of mind. Indeed, I
suspect that a vast deal more work may be needed to transform our metaphysics of
nature, in the light of the quantum revolution, before the construction of a satisfac-
tory account of the mind’s place in a ‘post-corpuscularian’ world becomes feasible.
Yet if my criticisms of micro-monism are cogent, it may prove that the neglected
Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of hylomorphism is ripe for rehabilitation.33
§1.6. General remarks
In this chapter I revisited the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of hylomorphism, in
which substances are conceived as composites of matter and form, observing how it
was ‘physicalised’ during the course of the Middle Ages and finally rejected in the
seventeenth century in favour of the corpuscularian conception of matter. I noted the
empirical motivations for Aristotle’s conception of form (Section 1.2), and discussed
how an Aristotelian-Thomistic implementation of hylomorphism should distinguish
formal from e cient causation (Section 1.3). This distinction was subsequently
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undermined in later forms of hylomorphism (Section 1.4). Eventually, matter was
conceived as an arrangement of corpuscules governed by universal laws, or simply
whatever our best microphysical descriptions of the world tells us it is, and the
concept of substantial form was dismissed as superfluous (Section 1.5). Nonetheless,
the notion of a world that supports universal laws of nature does not necessarily
exclude the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of substantial form. In the following
chapter, I shall lay out the metaphysical tools with which I will begin to formulate
‘neo-Aristotelian’ models that aim to accommodate quantum phenomena.
Notes
1This chapter draws on a paper I completed and published during the course of my doctorate
[Simpson, 2018]. Some paragraphs are taken from this paper verbatim.
2For a recent collection of essays concerning quantum physics and Aristotelian metaphysics,
see [Simpson et al., 2017].
3For expositions of Cartwright’s philosophy of science, see [Cartwright, 1999,Cartwright, 1994].
Concerning the need to return to ‘Aristotelian powers’, see [Cartwright and Pemberton, 2013].
4Wide-spread, but not universal: Leibniz was a notable exception.
5It is not unusual for prominent physicists to deny the intelligibility of quantum mechanics.
Concerning the ‘flight from reason’ in physics, see [Dürr et al., 2012, chp.4].
6I shall be drawing particularly on historical studies by Robert Pasnau in [Pasnau, 2011].
7Famously, in Raphael’s School of Athens, Plato is portrayed pointing a finger upward toward
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8For a discussion of universals in Plato and Aristotle, see [Scaltsas, 1994].
9In my references to Aristotle, I am relying upon [Barnes, 1984].
10For an alternative reading, in which Aristotle is fundamentally committed to powers (or power
tropes), see [Marmodoro, 2014].
11That is, in virtue of their having animal forms, or souls.
12See eg. [Arist. Gen. & Corr. I.10] in [Barnes, 1984]; in particular, 327b23-b33. Also, [Arist.
Metaphys. 1040b5-15 & 1040b5-15].
13For further discussion of integral wholes and potential parts, see [Simons, 2000, chp. 9]..
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substances in Aristotle, but it is the most suitable way for my purposes.
15Koons suggests the following analogy: suppose we imagine a 3:4:5 right triangle. The imagined
triangle is a compound that contains four things: my act of imagination, and each of the three
lines. Clearly, the way in which my act of imagination is part of the imagined triangle di↵ers from
the way in which each of the imagined lines are parts of the triangle. Nonetheless, all four elements
are distinct and disjoint parts of a whole.
16Marmodoro, following Theodore Scaltsas, considers substantial form to unify a substance by
re-identifying the physical constituents from which it derives [Marmodoro, 2018b].
17Marmodoro suggests that, for Aristotle, the world consists fundamentally of ‘power-tropes’
that are characterised by our best physics [Marmodoro, 2014, Chp. 1].
18For a more detailed narrative about the physicalisation of matter and form, see [Pasnau, 2011].
19cf. Pasnau’s discussion in [Pasnau, 2011].
20[Burgersdijk, F. 1650, Collegium Physicum II.34, pp. 1314], as translated in [Pasnau, 2011].
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21See [Scotus, Rep. II.12.2 n. 7 (XI:322b)] in [Wolter and Bychkov, 2004].
22For a discussion of Ockham’s view, see [Pasnau, 2011], ‘Matter and extension’.
23See [Dabillon 1643, Physique I. 3.2, p. 103] as cited in [Pasnau, 2011].
24William de la Mare targeted Aquinas a rmation of unicity in Correctorium Fratris Thomae
in 1279.
25[Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae, 15.1.7] as quoted in [Pasnau, 2011]]. The text is some-
what ambiguous: Suárez goes on to claim that the whole variety of accidents and powers has its
root and unity in the form.
26From C. Adam and P. Tannery eds., Oeuvres de Descartes, rev. ed., 12 vols., (Paris: Vrin/CNRS,
1964-76), as quotes and translated in [Pasnau, 2011].
27See Rene Descartes to Morin, 12 September 1638, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,
vol. 3, ed. J. Cottingham et. al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
28See R. Boyle, The Origin of Forms and Qualities, in The Works of Robert Boyle, ed. m.
Hunter and E. Davis (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1999-2000).
29H. Oldenburg, Correspondence, ed. and trans., A.R. Hall and M.B. Hall (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 1965), III:67.
30See Works of Boyle, V:305.
31See P.-S. Marquie de Laplace, A philosophical essay on probabilities, trans. F. W. Truscott
and F.L. Emory (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1902).
32Sophisticated forms of Cartesian dualism are experiencing a revival of interest in some quarters,
however, among philosophers frustrated by the problems with physicalism. For an overview, see
[Loose et al., 2018].
33For Aquinas, the soul was conceived as the form of the body. For a contemporary exposition
of his view, see [Leftow, 2001].
Chapter 2
Science and the new Aristotelianism
Physicists and chemists presuppose that change is possible and then go
on to talk about the specific nature of specific changes... Although science
is not itself metaphysics, metaphysics of science is unavoidable.
– Tim Crane, Aristotle Returns1
§2.1. Against näıve scientism
In this thesis, I shall be considering some challenges posed to micro-monist concep-
tions of nature by the phenomenon of quantum entanglement in microscopic systems
(in Part II), and the emergence of thermochemical phenomena in macroscopic sys-
tems (in Part III). The purpose of this chapter is to lay out the metaphysical tools
with which I hope to tackle my problems and construct new metaphysical models.
Metaphysics is concerned with supplying a general account of the structure of
reality and an inventory of what fundamentally exists. Yet one might ask: what is
the point of metaphysics for modern philosophers, who can claim (unlike Aristotle)
to be informed by empirically successful theories like quantum physics? Why not
simply repeat (or claim to accept) whatever our ‘best sciences’ happen to say about
reality, and focus one’s attention upon the logic and grammar of the language in
which scientists happen to say it? I suggest there are at least four reasons why
adopting a näıve form of scientism, in which our best scientific theories are presumed
to be self-su cient for describing reality, will fail to produce a satisfactory account
of nature that accommodates the possibility of scientific inquiry.
First, it is not clear what a physical theory, like quantum mechanics, is in fact
asserting about the world, solely on the basis of its own formalism. For exam-
ple, the physical meaning of the superposition principle, which permits quantum
states associated with mutually exclusive measurement outcomes to be simultane-
ously combined, is only settled by adopting an interpretation in which the scope of
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its application is fixed. (I discuss the ‘measurement problem’ that arises in quantum
mechanics in Chapter 3.) It would be a näıve sort of realist who claimed to be able
to read o↵ the ontology of nature from the formalism of quantum mechanics with-
out o↵ering an account of how determinate measurement outcomes are obtained in
experiments. The problem with näıve scientism is that there are a number of em-
pirically equivalent interpretations of quantum mechanics, for all practical purposes,
so we must find other rational grounds for adjudicating between them.2
Secondly, in attempting to articulate what some physical theory says about the
world, like quantum mechanics, physicists invariably deploy background concepts
that the theory itself presupposes yet does not explain. Such concepts may not be
metaphysically innocent. For example, quantum mechanics presupposes that the
quantal properties of a physical system have the potential to change in accordance
with the Schrödinger equation, but it does not provide an account of change, nor
explain whether this law governs the way systems evolve necessarily or only con-
tingently. (I consider metaphysical accounts of how properties change in Chapters
4–6.) It would be a pompous sort of eliminativist who claimed to disbelieve in the
reality of change because it is inexplicable in terms of some physical theory, since
it would be di cult to make sense of our ability to perform experiments without
invoking the concept of change. The trouble with näıve scientism is that it forestalls
the possibility of o↵ering intelligible interpretations of physics.
Thirdly, scientists are interested in measuring a variety of phenomena that
emerge at di↵erent physical scales, yet we have good reason for considering the
space of physical possibilities for macroscopic systems, defined by quantum statisti-
cal mechanics, to be irreducible to the space of possibilities for microscopic systems,
defined by standard quantum mechanics.3 Hence we have reason to doubt whether
the values of every property emerging at higher-scales is reducible to the values of
microphysical properties. (I discuss issues of theory reducibility in Chapter 7.) For
example, in addition to detecting particles, scientists also conduct experiments to
measure properties like temperature. It would be a crass reductionist who supposed
the truth about the temperature of liquid to be determined by a simple averaging
of the properties of its microscopic particles, such as their ‘mean kinetic energy’
(a false claim, but often repeated by philosophers).4 Another di culty with näıve
scientism is that there is no single scientific model in which all of these properties
can be defined simultaneously.
Fourthly, since the possibility of scientific inquiry depends on the existence of sci-
entists who conduct observations and perform experiments, we require a principled
account of how the ‘scientific’ and the ‘manifest’ image are supposed to be related
(to adopt Wilfred Sellars’ terminology). For example, a scientist who detects the
position of a microscopic particle perceives a change in the pointers on a macroscopic
instrument, and consequently believes the particle to be in one place rather than
another. Yet it would demonstrate an absurd lack of self-knowledge to advance an
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account of reality on the basis of quantum mechanics in which psychological states
cannot be accommodated, either because they had been simplistically eliminated
or because the account undermines any conception of how their contents could be
determined. (I discuss the problem of recovering the manifest image in a quantum
world in Chapter 8.) The problem with näıve scientism is that one may end up
excluding scientists from the world they investigate.
§2.2. Against radical scepticism
Given the underdetermination of ontology by science, there can be no question
of our avoiding the metaphysics of science if we are to understand what scientific
knowledge is suppose to be knowledge of. Some philosophers, however, have doubted
whether there are any facts about nature which are eligible for realist interpretation.
After all, human beings find themselves caught up within a multitude of epistemic
practices in which they impose order upon nature, according to whatever their aims
and interests happen to be, rather than simply discover such orderings ready-made.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to ask whether, having taken into account our mutable
conventions, and granted optimal epistemic conditions, it is possible in principle to
state something about the world that could either be true or false, independently of
our preferences and practices. Such propositions would depend for their truth-values
upon an ordering that is intrinsic to nature, rather than one we impose on it.
To answer this question in the negative would be to deny, along with Immanuel
Kant, the possibility of our picking out features of an objective order (or, in Kantian
parlance, the properties of things-in-themselves). Such a world has been described
as one in which ‘reference slides freely across the surface of noumenal waters’ [Smart,
1995, p.309], whilst those who adopt such a stance might be compared to the Vene-
tian judge in Le Sicle de Louis XIV, who, when asked for his impressions of the
gardens of Versailles, confessed that he was most struck by seeing himself there.
Yet a thoroughgoing Kantian scepticism about reference is di cult to maintain.
As Tim Button complains, how is one even supposed to formulate the worry that
our terms of reference express nothing about the world itself? More specifically,
how is one supposed to entertain the sceptical suggestion that “the word ‘cats’ does
not refer to cats”, for example, since in order to do so, one would have to be able
to think about cats in order to contemplate the suggestion that the word ‘cat’ fails
to pick them out. Nor is it su cient merely to articulate the sceptical claim, “the
word ‘cats’ does not refer to cats”; if this sceptical scenario were the case, then the
last word of this sentence would fail to pick out any cats [Button, 2013, pp. 59-60].
Of course, there are more qualified ‘Kantian’ positions one might adopt that re-
quire some metaphysical commitment: one might accept the objective existence of
objects and properties, for instance, whilst confessing irremediable ignorance regard-
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ing their identities [Langton, 2001, Stratmann, 2018]. Nonetheless, to acknowledge
the possibility of our stating something about the world that may either be true or
false, independently of our preferences and practices, is to a rm the possibility of
engaging in metaphysics, and hence of giving some account of what it is that we are
referring to whenever we make propositional claims about things like cats.
§2.3. Metaphysical grounding
i. Grounding and realism
Metaphysics would be vacuous, however, if it did nothing more than a rm the truth
of everything that ‘common sense’ has to say about the world, prior to engaging in
philosophical reflection. A metaphysician, in that case, would be like some benev-
olent but senile academic at a college dinner who is just happy to see everybody
enjoying themselves. Kit Fine identifies two ways in which metaphysics has sought to
add value to scientifically informed discourse about reality, which I shall designate as
the sceptical Quinean approach, and the critical Aristotelian approach [Fine, 2001].5
Both kinds of philosophers style themselves as being part of a realist tradition of
scientific inquiry, which is directed toward uncovering the truth about nature.
According to sceptical Quineans, the task of metaphysics is to specify those
things that really exist, as opposed to those things that are more commonly believed
to exist. In donning this mantle, philosophers seek to distinguish themselves by
adopting a superior epistemological stance that is informed by the natural sciences.
Following Quine’s famous paper, “On what there is”, the sceptical Quinean considers
the task of metaphysics as proceeding by extracting existence claims from our best
scientific theories, by translating them into first-order logic, determining what their
bound variables have to range over in order for their results to be true, and adopting
the elements from these domains as basic posits in a primitive ontology [Quine, 1948];
a recipe neatly summarised by Quine’s famous dictum, ‘to be is to be the value of a
variable’. Quine thus endorses a univocal notion of being. Insofar as we accept the
scientific theory in question, these are the only entities to which we are ontologically
committed. The rest is ideology. The fundamental question of metaphysics, then,
is to determine what there is.
Alternatively, according to the critical Aristotelian approach, the purpose of
metaphysical analysis is not to tame the rampant tendencies of other people to
make false existential claims (of course there are particles and people and sets!),
but rather to organise our beliefs about what there is to reflect an ordering within
nature that exists between that which is fundamental and that which is derivative.
As Sider observes: “One doesn’t get far in metaphysics without some sort of dis-
tinction between fundamental and nonfundamental facts, or between more and less
fundamental facts.” Once this distinction has been admitted, however, “one will
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want to say that nonfundamental, or less fundamental, facts ‘rest’ in some way on
fundamental, or more fundamental, facts” [Sider, 2018].
Following Scha↵er’s paper, “On what grounds what” (named in contrast with
Quine’s), the critical Aristotelian conceives the task of metaphysics as being to ‘limn
this structure’, identifying those entities comprising the sparse structure of being,
and the grounding relations that generate the abundant superstructure of derivative
entities [Scha↵er, 2009]. This sparse structure consists only of those things that God
would have to create in order to generate the whole abundant superstructure of be-
ing. Scha↵er attributes this approach to Aristotle, for whom categorical distinctions
arise from the many equivocal senses of ‘being’, which derive in turn from a single
focal sense of being as attributed to substances.
Scha↵er contrasts the sceptical Quinean and the critical Aristotelian programmes
in terms of their di↵erent conceptions of the target that is to be explained. For the
Quinean, nature is flat, and the task of metaphysics is, so to speak, to “solve for
E = the set of entities”. In this metaphysical scheme, an entity is either to be found
within this set, or it is simply non-existent, and the set E is without any additional
structure. For the critical Aristotelian, by contrast, nature is hierarchical, and the
task is to “solve for the pair hF,Gi”, where F are the fundamental entities and G
are the grounding relations. In this metaphysical scheme, there are four possibilities:
an entity is either in F , or in G, or it is generated from F via G (in which case,
it may be found nested within further levels of structure), or it is non-existent.
Metaphysical categories are merely ways in which things depend on the substances
in F . In other words, they are nodal points within a structure of being, having no
separate being of their own, over and above the substances upon which they depend.
The fundamental question of metaphysics, then, is to determine what grounds what.
There is good reason to favour the critical Aristotelian approach to metaphysics
over the sceptical Quinean approach, inasmuch as the latter appears to be ‘parasitic’
upon the former. This is reflected, for instance, in Quine’s privileging of physics as
providing the best theory for the analysis. Why do so? “The answer is not that
everything worth saying can be translated into the technical vocabulary of physics;
not even that all good science can be translated into that vocabulary,” according to
Quine. “The answer is rather this: nothing happens in the world, not the flutter of
an eyelid, not the flicker of a thought, without some redistribution of microphysical
states” (1981: 98). How does Quine know this? In a world in which there is
metaphysical grounding, as Scha↵er observes, it makes sense to fix the direction of
analysis ‘groundwards’, and to keep faith in seeking out what those fundamental
grounds might plausibly be, whilst it is unclear why a Quinean should not regard
other forms of human inquiry as equally inquiries into what exists, and hence favour
a more profligate ontological relativism.6
The parasitic nature of the Quinean approach to realism, which influenced the
metaphysics of David Lewis [Janssen-Lauret, 2017], is also reflected in Lewis’s no-
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tion of sparse natural properties, upon which all the other properties of nature are
said to supervene and upon which the whole truth about the world is supposed to
depend. According to Lewis, the ‘sharing of [sparse properties] makes for qualitative
similarity, [sparse properties] carve at the joints, they are intrinsic, they are highly
specific, the sets of their instances are ipso facto not entirely miscellaneous, and
there are only just enough of them to characterize things completely and without
redundancy’ [Lewis, 1986, p. 60]. The restriction of priority relations in this way
is intelligible in a world in which there is metaphysical grounding [Scha↵er, 2004],
whereas for Lewis it must be caste (implausibly) as a carefully calculated tradeo↵
between ideology and explanatory power (what is the exchange rate?).
The concept of metaphysical grounding also provides us with a straightforward
way of escaping eliminativist claims, such as van Inwagen’s assertion that, since
tables and chairs are not part of the basic furniture of the world (and since they do
not compose a ‘life’) they cannot actually exist [van Inwagen, 1995]. According to
Scha↵er and Fine, our ontological commitments are not limited solely to the domain
of fundamental physical entities, whatever those might happen to be, but extend to
the derivative domain of abundant entities, which they happen to ground.
Finally, the problem of the singleton in contemporary metaphysics o↵ers a pow-
erful reason for admitting the existence of metaphysical grounding, which has been
acknowledged by van Inwagen as a problem for committed Quineans [van Inwagen,
2019]. For instance, it is clear that the set {Socrates} and the person Socrates
exist in all of the same possible worlds, yet it seems evident that the existence of
{Socrates} depends upon the existence of Socrates, and not vice versa. In that
case, granting the existence of such mathematical objects as sets, we have good rea-
son to take the grounding of the existence of one object in the existence of a more
fundamental object to be a real feature of the world, and hence to prefer critical
Aristotelianism over sceptical Quineanism.
ii. Grounding and explanation
The concept of metaphysical grounding, although arguably enjoying a long history
in Western philosophy [Correia and Schnieder, 2012], was only recently formally
introduced into the analytic tradition by Fine in 2001, has been further developed
in notable works by Scha↵er and Gideon Rosen (see [Scha↵er 2009] and [Rosen,
2010]), and is receiving increasing attention among contemporary metaphysicians.7
The concept of grounding is at work in claims in which one thing is said to obtain
in virtue of another. For example, the fact that a proton is massive and electrically
charged is in virtue of the fact that it has mass and the fact that it is has electric
charge. Or again, the fact that an electron is accelerating in a Stern-Gerlach device
obtains in virtue of the fact that it is being acted upon by the Lorentz force produced
by a magnetic field. We are apprised of numerous intuitions concerning what grounds
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what, whilst di↵erent systems of grounds can be put forward and appraised on the
basis of their simplicity, breadth, coherence, or non-circularity [Fine, 2001, p.22].
The concept of grounding, however, must be teased apart from other concepts
that purport to do similar jobs. When one thing holds in virtue of another, there is
supposed to be some modal connection between them: necessarily, if an electron is
acted upon by a net Lorentz force, the electron will experience a net acceleration.
Nonetheless, modal connections may obtain between two sets of facts without one
happening in virtue of the other. (Fine o↵ers an arresting counterexample: neces-
sarily, if it is snowing, then 2+2 = 4.)8 In order to play a fundamental explanatory
role, however, grounding must somehow close the gap between explanans and ex-
planandum. It may be seen to do so if, when x is said to ground y, it is because x
determines y to be the case, in some appropriate sense.
However, the notion of causal determination is not su cient to capture the
concept of metaphysical grounding, since one thing might be causally determined
by another thing, yet still have some reality over and above that which determines it.
For example, the flow of an electric current may cause an electromagnet to have the
power to attract iron filings, but the electromagnet does not depend for its reality
upon this flow of electric current. In other words, causal determination allows for
the possibility of an ontological gap between them.
Likewise, the concept of supervenience does not capture the concept of ground-
ing, because supervenience, unlike grounding, is not necessarily an asymmetric re-
lation. Lewis believed that properties should be sorted into ‘sparse’ and ‘abundant’
collections, where abundant properties, like mental properties, are supposed to su-
pervene upon sparse properties, like the properties invoked in the ideology of our
‘best physics’. However, if the mental merely supervenes on the physical it might
still be the case that the physical is best understood in terms of the mental. In
other words, the notion of supervenience, though it may have its uses, can o↵er no
assurance that the ‘reduction’ should go one way rather than the other. Echoes of
the concept of metaphysical grounding can also be found in the intuition that moral
features depend upon natural properties, for instance, and the intuition that truth
is grounded in being, rather than the other way round.
The concept of grounding is also to be distinguished from the broader concept
of ontological dependence, inasmuch as metaphysical grounding may be considered a
species of ontological dependence without being the only species within this genus.
For example, every organism may be considered to be ontologically dependent upon
the prior existence of the parent organisms which conceived it at time t0, but it does
not follow that an organism’s existence, at the present moment t, is grounded by
the parents’ existence at time t0 < t. According to Koons, grounding and ontolog-
ical dependence are to be distinguished according to their direction of dependency.
Metaphysical grounding is a necessitating relation: when some fact F wholly grounds
some other fact G, it is impossible for F to exist without G’s existing. This is not
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the case regarding the dependency relation that holds between parent and child.
If some object O is ontologically dependent upon some other object P , then it is
impossible for O to exist without P ’s existence. Whilst the mother can exist apart
from the child, the child depends on the mother’s having existed at some point.
In its logical form, grounding is similar both to causation and parthood, in that
the relation of grounding, conceived as a two-place predicate xGy, is irreflexive,
transitive and asymmetric. The relation G thus induces a partial ordering over
the great chain of being, yet di↵ers from either causation or parthood in requiring
the existence of a set of minimal elements (or single element) at the roots of this
structure. More precisely, we may say that x is fundamental if and only if nothing
grounds x, and that x is derivative if and only if there is something that grounds x.
Grounding, then, is to be conceived as a fundamental form of explanation –
a metaphysical explanation, rather than a causal explanation – which cannot be
analysed in terms of Humean supervenience or causal determination. As Fine puts
it, ‘ground... stands to philosophy as cause stands to science’ [Fine, 2012, p.40]. A
critical Aristotelian realism that embraces metaphysical grounding should thus be
distinguished from the neo-Humean and Armstrongian programmes that dominated
analytic philosophy in the last century. As Koslicki observes, the introduction of
grounding within the analytic tradition constitutes a reorientation of contemporary
metaphysics toward the classical and medieval philosophical tradition, as well as a
broadening of its domain of discourse, inasmuch as both ancient philosophers like
Aristotle and ‘continental’ philosophers like Husserl have recognised the importance
of questions of ontological dependence in metaphysics [Koslicki, 2012].
iii. Grounding and objects
The concept of grounding o↵ers alternative ways of distinguishing between di↵er-
ent metaphysical positions held by philosophers concerning the objects of scientific
inquiry. For example, in the philosophy of time, it has been suggested that the
di↵erence between presentists and four-dimensionalists is captured by the diago-
nistic of whether or not they subscribe to the existence of temporal parts, on the
assumption that, since presentists believe that only the present moment exists, they
must therefore deny that any thing that exists has temporal parts. However, as
Scha↵er points out, the distinction can be framed more intuitively by the question
of whether an object that persists is grounded in its temporal parts, or whether the
object grounds its temporal parts. The presentist, on this view, is not committed
to denying the existence of temporal parts, but rather to a rming the existence of
objects which are more fundamental than any of their temporal parts.
Here is another example that is of relevance to debates about realism and anti-
realism in the philosophy of science: one might explain Kant’s approach to saving
human freedom from physical determinism as one in which the physical world of
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Newtonian mechanics describes a phenomenal realm that is ultimately grounded in
the noumenal realm of freedom, rather than the phenomenal world being grounded
in the physical world (see [Stratmann, 2018] and [Koons, 2018a, p.390]). In that
case, facts about the Newtonian physical world will (partly) depend upon facts
about the phenomenal world, rather than (simply) upon facts about physical things
in themselves. Similarly, for neo-Kantian philosophers of science, like Hasok Chang,
facts about the properties of objects in the physical world might also be considered
to depend upon facts about the preferences and practices of human subjects in the
noumenal world. Scientific inquiry, in that case, is an inquiry into what is real, since
what is real encompasses what is grounded, but it is not an inquiry into what is
fundamental, since physical facts depend upon facts about human subjects.
For the critical Aristotelian, by contrast, the physical world contains fundamental
objects with properties that exist independently of our preferences and practices, as
well as objects and artifacts that are derivative, and scientific inquiry is concerned
with disclosing their true natures. Since the categories of being fundamental and of
being derivative are both exhaustive and exclusive, it follows that x is an existent
if and only if x is fundamental or x is derivative. However, the partial ordering
induced by the relation of grounding gives rise to a richer variety of objects than
are acknowledged among sceptical Quineans, enabling the following mereological
distinctions suggested by Scha↵er:
Integrated whole
GR/I: x is an integrated whole if and only if x grounds each of its proper parts.
Aggregate
GR/II: x is an aggregate entity if and only if each of x’s proper parts together
jointly ground x.
Interdependent entities
GR/III: x and y are interdependent entities if and only there is an integrated
whole of which x and y are proper parts.
For example, tables and chairs may be considered aggregate entities, subject to the
existence of suitable grounding relations, since they are composed of a collection of
more fundamental parts. Contra van Inwagen, who embraces a Quinean metaontol-
ogy, we need not eliminate them from our ontologies. However, it is possible for an
entity to be fundamental and also to have derivative parts. According to Scha↵er,
the cosmos itself is an integrated whole that grounds all of its parts [Scha↵er, 2010]. I
shall return to this controversial claim and will consider examples of interdependent
entities in the following chapter.
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iv. Criteria for fundamentality
Scha↵er suggests three criteria for fundamental objects in nature that are subject to
scientific inquiry, which – following Aristotle – he refers to as substances [Scha↵er,
2009, pp.377-78]:
Minimal Completeness
FS/I: A set S of substances at world w is complete for w i↵ S serves to characterise
w, by providing a supervenience base for w, and S is minimally complete for w i↵
(i) S is complete for w, and (ii) no proper subset of S is complete for w.
Metaphysical Generality
FS/II: The ways the substances could be just are the ways the world could be:
the substances have a form that fits all metaphysical possibilities.
Empirical specifiability
FS/III: A substance has an intrinsic, empirically specifiable content that is in-
formed by fundamental physics.
I shall consider the intrinsic properties of such a substance to be wholly grounded
in its fundamental monadic properties, and regard a substance S to have a physical
property P intrinsically just in case S has P and every possible duplicate of S also
has P . In what follows, however, I shall part ways with Scha↵er in describing the
nature of a substance’s intrinsic properties and their relation to scientific inquiry.
§2.4. Causal powers
i. Powers and realism
According to scientific realists, scientific inquiry is our best way of finding out the
properties of nature. Recent work in the metaphysics of science has been marked by a
resurgent interest in the relationship between the properties that exist in nature and
the causal powers they confer upon physical entities. Contemporary metaphysicians
can be divided into powerists and Humeans according to whether they consider
these powers to be conferred contingently or necessarily.
According to neo-Humeans, like Lewis, the relationship between properties and
their powers is entirely contingent, since none of the regularities of nature are neces-
sary. Likewise, Quine, who influenced Lewis in his espousal of Humeanism [Janssen-
Lauret, 2017], opposed the existence of any non-contingent modalities in nature, con-
necting the distinction between necessary and contingent attributes with Aristotle’s
distinction between essence and accident, which he dismissed as indefensible [Quine,
1960, pp.198-99].
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The Humean assumption of contingency, however, whilst reflecting the natu-
ral philosophy of early scientists, like Francis Bacon,9 and the antipathy toward
Aristotle that can be found in the writings of Galileo Galilei, for instance, is not
metaphysically innocent. Suppose we ask the question: what makes a property the
property that it is? The Humean view has the counterintuitive consequence that,
since any nomic profile is supposedly compatible with the identity of a given prop-
erty, there is a possible world in which something has exactly the same properties
but the powers have been swapped : two negatively charged particles might attract
one another, rather than repel, whilst two oppositely charged particles might repel
instead of attract [Bird, 2007, pp.70-81]. The fundamental properties of nature, on
this view, are categorical properties, which can be described without reference to
any happenings or conditions. In other words, a Humean world ‘condemns us to
necessary ignorance’ concerning the identities of physical properties [p.78].10
For powerists, by contrast, the causal powers that are conferred by a fundamental
property are intrinsic to the nature of that property itself. Such properties are
properly described in terms of what happens under certain conditions, as it is not
possible that the powers of two fundamental properties might ever be swapped. The
essence of a property, in that case, might be specified by a ‘cause-function’, which
maps ‘from the circumstances and potential causes to the property in question’, and
an ‘e↵ect-function’, which maps ‘from the property in question and circumstances
to potential e↵ects’ [Scha↵er, 2005, p.2]. The powerist assumption of necessity has
the anti-Humean consequence that some laws of nature are necessary rather than
contingent. If a system is situated in the appropriate circumstances, its causal
powers will manifest their nomic profiles. So, should we be powerists or Humeans?
Humean philosophers, on the one hand, have attempted to avoid ontological
commitment to the existence of powers by o↵ering various ways to analyse of power
ascriptions.11 A notable attempt is Gilbert Ryle’s conditional analysis, in which
something’s power   to give a response R to a stimulus S is predicated on the truth
of the counterfactual, “it would give a response R if it were the case that S” [Ryle,
1949]. For example, we might consider a locked door to have the power to resist
being opened, just in case it would fail to open if it were pushed.
The conditional analysis, though widely adopted, su↵ers from a number of prob-
lems, such as ‘finking’ and ‘masking’ counterexamples. A finking counterexample
exploits the fact that the conditions for an object’s acquiring or losing a disposi-
tion might be the same as the disposition’s stimulus conditions [Martin, 1994]. For
example, a locked door that has the power to resist being opened might open auto-
matically when it is pushed, if its locking mechanism has been rigged to a suitable
circuit that unlocks the door whenever it is touched. A masking counterexample
exploits factors that prevent or block the manifestation of a power, even though
it seems we should predicate the property nonetheless [Johnston, 1992,Bird, 1998].
For instance, a poisonous substance surely remains poisonous, even if an antidote is
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ingested, but on the conditional analysis it fails to count as such.
A subsequent generation of empiricists adopted a more sophisticated approach.
Recognising that one of the chief defects of the conditional analysis lay in its failure
to associate dispositions with objective properties, causal analyses were suggested
in which something has the power   to give response R to a stimulus S just in
case it has some categorical property P that would cause it to give response R if it
were to undergo stimulus S. For example, we may say that sugar has the ‘power’
to dissolve in water, within a certain temperature range, because it has a certain
molecular structure, and having this structure ‘causes’ it to dissolve when placed in
water (which is to say, if we are Humean, there is an observed regularity of things
having such a structure dissolving when they are placed in water).
As critics have pointed out, however, this amendment fails to avert finking and
masking counterexamples, and introduces the additional problem of ‘deviant causal
chains’ [Mayr, 2011, pp.175-80]. A deviant causal chain can bring about the charac-
teristic response R of a disposition   to a stimulus S, without being a manifestation
of   [Smith, 1977]. For example, an army of submerged nanobots that have been
programmed to pull apart any molecules of sucrose do not manifest the power of
sugar to dissolve in water. It seems, then, that the exercise of a power requires the
right sort of process, not simply a causal chain between its characteristic stimulus
and response. In short, it does not appear that powers can straightforwardly be
displaced from scientific explanation by analysis.
Powerist philosophers, on the other hand, have sought to press their advantage by
compelling an ontological commitment to powers as a consequence of ‘taking scien-
tific practices seriously’. Brian Ellis and Nancy Cartwright, for instance, have argued
that we should be realists about powers because ascriptions of powers are indispensi-
ble to scientific explanations. According to Ellis, powers are necessary to prevent an
ontological regress, since ‘there never seems to be any point at which causal powers
can just drop out of the account’ [Ellis, 2014, p.76]. Similarly, Cartwright claims
that certain composite phenomena can only be explained in terms of the exercise of
powers whose manifestations are not realised [Cartwright, 2017], as in the case of a
charged particle suspended motionless between two similarly charged electric plates.
Yet neither of these claims seems entirely compelling. As Chakravartty observes,
it is one thing to argue that there are explanatory contexts in which dispositional
ascriptions are indispensable; that is to say, one might argue for the linguistic ac-
ceptance of dispositional predicates in scientific explanations. It is another thing
to suppose that such arguments compel an ontological commitment to the exis-
tence of powers as occurrent properties in nature. After all, it seems a determined
Humean could take powerful descriptions as being elliptical for categorical descrip-
tions, whether or not they can in practice o↵er a relevant categorical description.
Moreover, Cartwright appears to be begging the question against Humeans, since
the explanatory context in which powerists might appeal to the possibility of powers
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exercising without manifesting does not arise for Humeans.
Powerist philosophers have also sought to compel ontological commitments by
appealing to the e cacy of abstraction in scientific practice, and using powers to
explain it. Roy Bhaskar and Andreas Hüttemann, for instance, have argued that
the existence of powers explains why certain regularities that hold in the isolated
conditions of the laboratory also hold outside of these artificial conditions. According
to Bhaskar, it is because scientists successfully isolate powers, by abstracting away
from the world, that the knowledge they generate in specific contexts is exportable to
wider contexts [Bhaskar, 1978]. According to Hüttemann, it is impossible to explain
how laws, conceived in abstraction, are applicable to concrete physical conditions,
without assuming they refer to powers [Hüttemann, 1998].
Yet such arguments, although suggestive, are unlikely to trouble Humeans. As
Chakravartty observes, the possibility of exporting specific laws discovered in ab-
straction and successfully applying them within another context depends on whether
the conditions in both contexts are su ciently similar, since causal powers typically
only manifest in certain conditions. Whether one regards the term ‘solubility’ as
picking out a concrete power of the sugar, for instance, or referring to an abstract
molecular structure, the question of whether the external conditions are su ciently
similar for those particular laws to apply remains the same. There is nothing about
a powers ontology per se that guarantees the general applicability of specific laws.
It seems, then, that the answer to the question of whether we should be pow-
erists or Humeans is not one that can be settled simply by appealing to scientific
practices, and that the distinction between dispositional and categorical properties
that scientific explanations demand has no logical implications for the existence of
powers as genuinely occurrent properties within nature. Nonetheless, an ontological
commitment to powers might be motivated by considering what concept of proper-
ties is in keeping with the nature of scientific inquiry, insofar as scientific inquiry is
conceived as our best approach to finding out the truth about nature. According to
Chakravartty, powerism ‘represents an ontological commitment that is maximally
consistent with a view of the sciences according to which they are our best hopes
for learning whatever contingent truths about the natural world as may be within
our grasp’ [Chakravartty, 2017]. To put it another way, I suggest that an ontological
commitment to powers is ‘fitting’ for scientific realists who locate themselves within
the Aristotelian empirical tradition (see Chapter 1), which is characterised by a
certain confidence in the power of human reason to uncover truths about nature.
Conversely, ‘scientific’ realists who disavow powers in favour of categorical proper-
ties are guilty of a kind of ‘pragmatic incoherence’, since they must claim that the
natures and identities of the properties investigated by the sciences are not empir-
ically specifiable, but have hidden quiddities. As I shall argue in later chapters, a
Humean approach to ontology, which excludes the existence of fundamental powers,
leads to di culties in a rming the truth about nature’s laws (see Chapters 4 & 5).
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ii. Powers and explanation
The concept of causal powers was introduced within mainstream analytic philoso-
phy by Rom Harré and E. H. Madden in 1973 [Harré and Madden, 1973]. It was
further developed by George Molnar in the 1990s [Molnar, 2006], and has recently
become the foundation of a non-Humean theory of causation put forward by Stephen
Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum [Mumford and Anjum, 2011]. It was introduced into
contemporary philosophy of science by Nancy Cartwright, under the guise of ‘causal
capacities’ [Cartwright, 1994,Cartwright, 1999]. Anna Marmodoro has expounded
its Aristotelian roots by linking the concept to Aristotle’s discussion of potentiality
and actuality [Marmodoro, 2014, chp. 1].
A world with powers is a world in which objects in nature have fundamental
agency, since causal powers are features of reality that bring about change, and
they are irreducible to categorical properties, which make no reference to change.12
More precisely, causal powers are generally understood to bring about change by
conditional necessity, such that, when a power is situated in the appropriate cir-
cumstances, it will bring about its manifestation necessarily.13 A power is typically
individuated by reference to some characteristic manifestation, but exists indepen-
dently of whether or not it is exercised. The power of water to dissolve sugar, for
example, is retained whether or not it is exercised by adding sugar to tea.
The existence of causal powers in nature, according to some powerists, divides
the world into agents and patients connected by causal processes, in which cause
and e↵ect are united within a single whole [Koons and Pickavance, 2017, chp. 6
& 28]. (For John Heil, by contrast, ‘the model here is not a chain, but a net, or
perhaps two playing cards supporting one another upright’ [Heil, 2005].) When an
object exercises a causal power to bring about some change, it initiates a causal
process, beginning with the agent’s active power, which encompasses the process of
change that takes place in the patient, whilst the patient exercises a corresponding
passive power. The agent’s power to bring about change, and the patient’s power to
su↵er change, exist within relations of ontological dependence [Marmodoro, 2013b],
since causal powers are defined by what they change, as well as the type of change
that they bring about, and active powers depend upon passive powers for their
manifestation.
Metaphysics and the philosophy of science overlap on the topic of the laws of na-
ture, inasmuch as metaphysicans of science wish to know whether there is something
in the world that explains the phenomenal regularities we associate with laws, whilst
contemporary philosophers of science have noted that many law statements in the
sciences do not appear to describe universal regularities, but regularities that are in
some sense context-dependent, depending on certain physical conditions. According
to powerists, causal powers explanatorily ground the law-like regularities that sci-
entists discover in their experiments, since causal powers are associated with nomic
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profiles, and context-dependence is built into the very definition of powers in terms
of the conditions of their manifestation. In other words, laws may be understood as
expressing the essence of powers [Bird, 2007, chp. 9].
Humeans, on the other hand, neither want nor need an explanation of law-like
regularities: the order of explanation goes in the opposite direction. According to
standard Humean accounts, it is a contingent fact that most instances of sugar being
wet are followed by instances of sugar being dissolved, whilst universal laws of nature
are supposed to account for particular ‘dispositions’. As Humeans point out, it would
be fallacious to infer the existence of non-contingent relations in nature from the
existence of conceptually linked modes of description. Causal powers are merely the
projection onto reality of a certain mode of description in scientific practices.14
Yet we should not conceive the adoption of powerism as simply a matter of adding
modal glue to a Humean mosaic of properties, depending on whether or not we
find Humean explanations satisfactory. Rather, the justification for the powerist’s
adoption of powers lies in adopting a coherent alternative to Humeanism that is
maximally consistent with a conception of scientific inquiry in which the sciences
are concerned with uncovering truths about nature. In Chapter 4, I will discuss
conceptual problems that arise in a recent attempt to form a Humean supervenience
base for the laws of quantum mechanics, when those laws are taken to be true laws.
iii. Powers and objects
Nonetheless, modern philosophers have often expressed suspicions about explana-
tions that appeal to the powers of objects in nature, frequently citing the French
playwright Moliére in Le Malade imaginaire, in which a physician famously re-
sponds to the question of why opium causes drowsiness by observing that it has
virtus domitiva (that is, a power to cause drowsiness). Whilst the response of the
physician is vacuous, the Humean moral that has frequently been drawn is mistaken:
as Chakravartty points out, what we learn from this example concerns the contexts
of explanations, rather than the existence of powers [Chakravartty, 2007, pp. 125-6].
Chakravartty suggests a di↵erent example, in which a patient asks why they feel
drowsy after completing their morning routine, and the physician responds that it
is because the opium they took at midday induces drowsiness. In this case, the
explanation is informative, locating the cause of the condition within a particular
substance ingested at a specific time, rather than, say, a gas spread throughout the
world which the patient has been breathing all morning. It is also an empirical
claim, which may turn out to be mistaken, following further scientific investigation.
Let us consider the structure of the physician’s claim a little more carefully.
To say that opium has a power to cause drowsiness is to predicate a property  
of a substance S, in virtue of which S produces a manifestation M in the right
circumstances. This is an informative claim, since the power   of S to bring about
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M might not be intrinsic to S, but due to some feature of its physical environment.
Since Humeans regard the relationship between physical properties and the powers
they confer to be entirely contingent, however, no causal power could be intrinsic
to any object in nature; rather, the causal powers of any object depends upon the
laws of nature, which in turn depend upon nothing less than the entire pattern of
physical properties distributed throughout space and time.
A diagnostic for pulling apart powerist and Humean attitudes towards powers,
then, can be found in the question of whether some causal powers in nature are
intrinsic to the objects that have them, or whether the powers of all objects in nature
only depend extrinsically upon how they are situated within their environments.
The reason the physician’s claim in Le Malade imaginaire is vacuous is because the
content of his answer is contained within the context of the patient’s question: we
already know that opium has the power to induce drowsiness. We might usefully
rephrase the question, however, by asking whether this is a fundamental power.
iv. Criteria for powers
In the light of this discussion concerning the relation of powers to scientific inquiry,
and inspired by Molnar [Molnar, 2006], I suggest three criteria that causal powers
should meet if they are to play an explanatory role in an ontology of nature:
Intrinsicality of powers
CP/I: Something is essentially powerful because it possesses an intrinsic power,
not (simply) because of its physical environment.
Objectivity of powers
CP/II: Powers are real, occurent properties in nature: they are not reducible to
properties that can be described without reference to happenings or conditions.
Empirical specifiability of powers
CP/III: The causal powers of an object have nomic profiles that are empirically
specifiable by the physical sciences: they are not hidden quiddities.
§2.5. A neo-Aristotelian image of nature
I have discussed the rise of a critical Aristotelian approach to metaphysics, which
is opposed to the sceptical Quinean approach that dominated analytic philosophy
in the last century. I have also noted a growing sympathy among contemporary
philosophers for the Aristotelian notion of powers, in defiance of the long-standing
Humean embargo of necessary connections. However, not every philosopher who
embraces the notion of grounding admits the existence of powers (for instance, see
[Scha↵er, 2005]), nor does every philosopher who adopts an ontology of powers
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accept the presence of hierarchical structure (for example, see [Heil, 2016]). In the
course of this thesis, I mean to motivate and contribute toward a neo-Aristotelian
metaphysics of science that combines a critical Aristotelian approach to metaphysics
with a scientifically informed commitment to an ontology of powers.
i. Criteria for neo-Aristotelian models
I shall regard a contemporary metaphysical model to be ‘neo-Aristotelian’ if it con-
forms to the following criteria [Simpson et al., 2017, pp.1-3]:
A hierarchical structure
NA/I: Nature admits a hierarchical structure, in which some objects are funda-
mental and other objects are derivative.
For neo-Aristotelians, being is not a univocal notion. As Aristotle observes, ‘there
are many senses in which a thing may be said to “be”’ [Aristotle, Metaphysics
IV.2]). An ‘equivocal’ conception of being may be introduced within a contemporary
metaphysical model by adopting the notion of grounding (see Section 2.3), which
requires some entities and properties in nature to be more fundamental than others.
In admitting this hierarchical structure, neo-Aristotelians find themselves aligned
with Fine and Scha↵er in rejecting ‘flat’ Quinean conceptions of nature, which simply
list the set of entities that exist according to some physical theory. In later chapters,
we shall see how the notion of metaphysical grounding can be deployed in explaining
phenomena like quantum entanglement (see Chapters 4 to 6).
A powers ontology
NA/II: Nature contains objects that exercise causal powers.
According to neo-Aristotelians, nature contains real potentiality to bring about
change, which is irreducible to categorical structures that can be described without
reference to change. There are physical objects that possess intrinsic and essential
powers, according to their natures, and extrinsic and accidental powers, according
to their environments (see Section 2.4). Causation is neither reducible to regularities
among categorical properties, nor to transcendent laws of nature that somehow im-
pose change upon nature. Rather, causal powers introduce an element of teleology,
or natural intentionality, inasmuch as powers are directed toward their manifesta-
tions. In these respects, neo-Aristotelians agree with philosophers like Mumford
and Marmodoro in rejecting ‘categoricalist’ Humean conceptions of nature. In later
chapters, we shall see how powers can play a role in grounding the laws of quantum
mechanics (see Chapter 6 & Chapter 9).
Moderate realism
NA/III: The fundamental objects of scientific inquiry have real natures, but
natures are not universals.
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For neo-Aristotelians, the natures of physical things are immanent within those
things. Neo-Aristotelians do not appeal to non-immanent, non-natural universals
to explain natural phenomena (see Section 1.2), nor do they appeal to transcendent
entities or laws that extrinsically determine their behaviour. They regard mathe-
matical models of the world, which characterise physical systems in terms of the
properties of abstract mathematical structures, as idealisations which invariably in-
volve a loss of empirical information. In later chapters, we shall see how the notion
of ‘metaphysical powers’ that unite themselves to the matter of physical entities by
grounding their powers supports a ‘hierarchical’ interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics in which certain entities act according to their natures (see Chapters 6–9).
Fundamental substances
NA/IV: The world is composed of substances, which belong to natural kinds.
According to neo-Aristotelians, the basic building blocks of the physical world are
substances: there is no change in the physical world that does not involve change
in one or more substances. Scha↵er’s ‘tiling constraint’ requires that every physical
part of nature should be wholly contained in the sum of its substances, and that
no two substances should overlap [Scha↵er, 2010]. Substances are entities that have
an intelligible nature, per se unity, and fall under natural kinds. Natural kinds are
neither subjective, conventional, nor (wholly) mind-dependent. They are neither
abundant in nature, nor arbitrarily constructed. Rather, natural kinds are sparse
(to use Lewis’s terminology), and scientific inquiry seeks to discover what natural
kinds exist and what powers are grounded in each kind. In later chapters, we
shall consider a neo-Aristotelian model in which nature consists of a single cosmic
substance (see Chapter 6), and an alternative model in which nature consists of a
plurality of thermochemical substances (see Chapter 9).
ii. Additional criteria for substances
Finally, I should like to suggest some additional ‘neo-Aristotelian’ criteria that apply
to a world that contains robustly Aristotelian substances:
Active and passive powers
FS/IV: Aristotelian substances are e cient causes which enter into causal relations
with one another by exercising their active and passive causal powers.
Metaphysical unity
FS/V: Aristotelian substances are metaphysical unities in nature: they may have
integral or potential physical parts, but they have no actual physical parts.
In later chapters, I shall theorise about how the causal powers of a substance are
grounded in the nature of the substance (see Chapter 6 & Chapter 9).
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§2.6. General remarks
In this chapter, I discussed the role of metaphysics in the philosophy of science in
providing a unified account of what nature is like (Section 2.1–2.2). I considered the
use of metaphysical grounding for introducing di↵erent levels of being within nature
(Section 2.3) and observed how an ontology of powers is consistent with a conception
of scientific inquiry in which the sciences are concerned with uncovering truths about
nature (Section 2.4). I also outlined some basic features of a ‘neo-Aristotelian’
approach to the metaphysics of science, which combines both the notions of powers
and metaphysical grounding (Section 2.5).
Nonetheless, despite the increasing interest in the use of grounding and causal
powers in contemporary philosophy,15 few philosophers have engaged directly with
the metaphysics of quantum theories from a ‘neo-Aristotelian’ perspective, or re-
considered the relationship between the old Aristotelian concepts of ‘matter’ and
‘form’ in the light of contemporary quantum mechanics. Whilst the concept of
potentiality is now more widely embraced among philosophers, the micro-monist
conception of matter as fundamental constituents with intrinsic physical properties
(MM/I-II), which replaced the Aristotelian conception of matter as potentiality for
substance (AH/I-III), has yet to receive any serious scrutiny (see Chapter 1).
In what follows, I shall discuss how quantum mechanics applies pressure to the
classical micro-monist conception of matter as particles (or fields) with intrinsic
physical properties, and will consider a recent proposal for a quantum micro-monist
philosophy of nature that seeks to accommodate the phenomenon of quantum entan-
glement by o↵ering an alternative conception of matter without physical properties.
I shall identify a number of problems with this metaphysical model, and demonstrate
how they can be redressed in the course of considering a succession of increasingly
‘neo-Aristotelian’ models of nature.
Notes
1Crane, T., Aristotle Returns, First Things, 2018.
2Even in the Everettian interpretation, the scope of the superposition principle is limited by
the interpretation: measurement outcomes may split across worlds, but perceptual states in each
world are determinate.
3Concerning the irreducibility of QSM and the reality of the thermodynamic limit, see [Ruetsche,
2011], chapter 12.
4For example, see [Kim, 1966]. Temperature is not a characteristic of individual molecules,
but of an equilibrium distribution. The distinction is apparent in the case of systems that are
not at equilibrium, in which the molecules have a mean kinetic energy but the temperature is not
well-defined.
5I mean critical with respect to what may be taken as ‘received wisdom’ or ‘common sense’.
6Concerning the ‘grounding challenge’ to Quinean philosophy, see [Egerton, 2016].
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7According to Scha↵er’s theory of ‘priority monism’, for example, the cosmos is a fundamental
substance that grounds its integral parts [Scha↵er, 2010].
8This modal necessity obtains because it is necessary that 2 + 2 = 4, but not in virtue of the
fact that it is snowing.
9Bacon denounced the ‘frigid distinction of act and potency’, claiming that ‘single bodies have
each a single and proper motion, and that if they participate in any other, then this results from
an external cause’.
10This thought is sometimes expressed by the claim that Humeans are committed to the existence
of natural properties that have hidden quiddities, although the modern use of this term di↵ers from
the scholastic use.
11For a more detailed discussion, see [Mayr, 2011, chps. 6-7].
12The concept of agency may be taken to have paradigmatic form in the case of human or
creaturely agency.
13Mumford and Anjum defend the alternative view of dispositional modality, in which powers
only ‘tend’ to manifest in a certain way. For criticisms of this view, see [Marmodoro, 2016].
14Not all Humeans agree: Handfield thinks such an account gets ‘the order of explanation entirely
the wrong way round’ [Handfield, 2010, p.108]. His own form of ‘Humean dispositionalism’ [Hand-
field, 2008], however, is not without serious di culties [Simpson, 2017].
15For recent anthologies, see [Simpson et al., 2017, Jacobs, 2017, Gro↵ and Greco, 2017,Mar-
modoro, 2013c,Tahko, 2011].
Part II
The road to power monism
In Part I, I discussed how the Aristotelian ‘hylomorphic’ conception of nature, in
which the physical world consists of substances composed of matter and form, was
replaced by a micro-monist conception of nature, in which the physical world consists
of a set of fundamental constituents with intrinsic physical properties (Chapter
1). I also discussed the rise of ‘neo-Aristotelian’ approaches within contemporary
metaphysics, which deploy the notions of grounding and causal powers (Chapter 2).
In Part II, I shall explore how the phenomenon of quantum entanglement chal-
lenges the classical micro-monist conception of the world as consisting of particles (or
fields) with intrinsic physical properties. I begin with a metaphysical model called
‘Super-Humeanism’, which attempts to update neo-Humean metaphysics to pro-
duce a quantum micro-monist model that is compatible with quantum mechanics. I
discuss a number of problems with this model, and proceed to propose two models
that modify Super-Humeanism in various ways: a semi-Humean model, which de-
ploys powers but retains Humean laws; and a ‘neo-Aristotelian’ model, that deploys
powers and the concept of metaphysical grounding. Part II consists of four chapters:
Chapter 3 Matter without microphysical properties 41
Chapter 4 Super-Humean matter points 59
Chapter 5 A network of power-atoms 81




Matter without microphysical properties
I would not call [entanglement] one but rather the characteristic trait
of quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its entire departure from
classical lines of thought.
– Erwin Schrödinger, Naturwissenschaften
§3.1. The quantum revolution in microscopic physics
Erwin Schrödinger regarded quantum entanglement to be both ‘the characteristic
trait of quantum mechanics’ and a revolutionary concept ‘that enforces its entire
departure from classical lines of thought’ [Schrödinger, 1935a]. Many contemporary
metaphysicians, however, have not concerned themselves with accounting for such
phenomena, whilst some have been content to adopt instrumentalist approaches to
quantum mechanics instead. It has been suggested, for instance, that the predictions
generated by quantum mechanics should be taken as rational credences rather than
objective probabilities [Healey, 2012]. In this thesis, I mean to adopt a broadly
realist stance in which quantum physics is considered to be part of a tradition of
scientific inquiry that is commensurate with the empirical tradition of Aristotle (see
Section 1.2), the goal of which is to give true descriptions of nature:
Assumption of inquiry: Scientific realism
AI/I: Other things being equal, we should favour accounts that imply that our
best physical theories, properly interpreted, are possibly true, independently of
our preferences and practices.
Nonetheless, quantum entanglement poses a metaphysical challenge to the clas-
sical micro-monist conception of matter as consisting of particles (or fields) with
intrinsic physical properties (MM/I-II). Indeed, certain philosophers of science, like
James Ladyman, have argued that, in the light of quantum entanglement, natural-
ists should adopt ‘structural ontologies’ instead of ‘substance ontologies’, abandoning
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the traditional categories of ‘things’ that have intrinsic properties in favour of ‘ontic
structures’ that are constituted solely by relations [Ladyman and Ross, 2007].
More recently, a refinement of this project has been advanced by Michael Esfeld,
who has combined ontic structural realism with the primitive ontology approach to
quantum mechanics (of which more later), putting forward a minimalist ontology
of the natural world consisting of ‘matter points’ constituted by distance relations.
According to Esfeld, it is not ‘things’ that must go, such as particles, but ‘physical
properties’, like mass and charge, if metaphysicians are to succeed in accommodating
quantum phenomena within a true account of nature [Esfeld, 2014a]. The matter
of which the world is made is not essentially characterised by any of the micro-
properties that our physical theories rely upon in order to represent change; rather,
such properties are simply useful and informative ways of representing that change.
§3.2. The problem of non-locality
In what follows, I shall consider some motivations for adopting an ontology of quan-
tum mechanics without fundamental microphysical properties. To understand why
philosophers like Esfeld and Ladyman assert that microphysical properties neither
determine behaviour nor individuate physical objects, we must consider the role that
the concepts of non-locality, non-separability and holism have played in these meta-
physical debates. The phenomenon I wish to discuss concerns systems in which
microscopic particles are said to be ‘quantum-entangled’. In such cases, the out-
comes of measurements of physical ‘observables’ associated with each particle are
correlated in such a way that the quantum state describing this system cannot be
decomposed into the product of separate states associated with each particle.
For example, in the famous EPR experiment involving two particles, originally
proposed as a thought-experiment by Albert Einstein and his associates in 1935
[Einstein et al., 1935], one particle is constrained to be ‘spin-up’ |"i when another
is ‘spin-down’ |#i, and vice versa, however far apart the two particles are spatially
separated. Quantum mechanics permits solutions to the Schrödinger equation to
be combined, allowing the system to be in a superposition of both states. The





(|"i1 |#i2   |#i1 |"i2). (3.2.1)
When a system is in the singlet state, there is a probability of 1/2 that we will
observe particle 1 to be ‘spin up’, and particle 2 to be ‘spin down’; there is also a
probability of 1/2 that we will observe particle 1 to be ‘spin down’, and particle 2
to be ‘spin up’. There are no other physically possible outcomes. The probabilities
for these outcomes are obtained from the square modulus of the wave function that
represents the quantum state: | |2.
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Following Esfeld’s discussion in [Esfeld, 2017], I shall briefly review how this en-
tangled behaviour arises. Suppose two particles emitted from a common source fly
o↵ in opposite directions, and two experimenters (traditionally, ‘Alice’ and ‘Bob’)
are suitably positioned to measure certain physical observables associated with each
particle, once the two particles are su ciently separated. In his ground-breaking dis-
cussion of quantum entanglement in 1964, the physicist John Bell formulated a theo-
rem drawing a radical distinction between the local behaviour explained by classical
physics and the non-local behaviour of systems governed by quantum physics [Bell,
1964]. In order to describe its implications more precisely, it will be helpful to
introduce some notation.
Let  A specify the configuration of Alice’s apparatus, and A the outcome of her
experiment; likewise,  B for Bob’s apparatus, and B for his outcome. Let   denote
whatever in the past may have influenced the behaviour of the system that is being
measured. In our example,   includes the physical state of the two-particle system,
prior to measurement. The measuring apparatus in each case is a Stern-Gerlach
device, in which a pointer has the possibility of being deflected up or down, and the
configuration parameters are the two angles of polarisation of each device,  A and
 B. These parameters can be set at an appropriate angle for measuring vertical spin
(that is, ‘spin-up’, or ‘spin-down’), but can also be adjusted separately to produce a
range of measurement outcomes. According to Bell, the principle of locality requires:
P a, b(A|B, ) = P a(A| ), (3.2.2)
P a, b(B|A, ) = P b(B| ). (3.2.3)
This formalisation can be read as follows: according to the principle of locality,
the probabilities for Alice obtaining outcome A can be fixed by conditionalising
on the configuration of her apparatus  A, and whatever in the past influenced its
behaviour  , such as the local properties of the particle she measures. Significantly,
conditionalising on the configuration of Bob’s apparatus, in a world in which locality
holds, does not change the probabilities for Alice’s outcome. This is also the case
for Bob’s outcome with respect to Alice’s apparatus.
Bell’s theorem demonstrates that the principle of locality is violated by the phe-
nomenon of quantum entanglement. In this way, Bell problematised the correlations
between spatially separated systems that are quantum-entangled for any physical
theory in which the prospect for transmitting a signal that causally influences a
physical system is limited by the speed of light. According to quantum mechanics,
the probabilities for obtaining a measurement outcome in one part of the experiment
depend on the outcome obtained in the other part of the experiment, in spite of the
fact that the two measurement events are represented as ‘spacelike separated’ in the
theory of special relativity.
To visualise the limits on causal signalling imposed by the theory of relativity, the
mathematician Hermann Minkowski suggested imagining a flash of light, confined
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to a two-dimensional plane, which spreads out in a circle from an event E at some
time t [Minkowski, 1908]. If we graph the growing circle using time as the vertical
axis, we obtain a ‘light-cone’ for event E that extends to include any past event
t0 < t in which a signal could have been sent which would have time to reach E
and causally influence this event. However, any event which falls outside of the
light-cone of E is ‘spacelike separated’ from E, and cannot be causally related to E
by any mechanism:
The superluminal ban on causal signalling
SBS: The physical cause of a physical e↵ect must lie within the past light-cone
of its e↵ect.
Since the measurement events in the two wings of the EPR experiment corresponding
to A and B do not belong within each other’s past light-cones, they are space-like
separated. However, applying the ‘classical’ assumption that the behaviour of the
particles can be explained by a local mechanism implies one set of measurement
statistics, whereas quantum mechanics predicts another. Significantly, in the case of
the EPR experiment, quantum mechanics predicts that the measurement statistics
will depend on the relative angle between the two measuring devices,  A  B. This
fact is something that neither particle, considered separately, could possibly ‘know’
by means of any subluminal mechanism. Whilst the EPR experiment was originally
intended as a reductio ad absurdum of quantum mechanics by Einstein, subsequent
experiments – in particular, those of Alain Aspect in the 1980s [Aspect et al., 1982])
– are now widely regarded as having confirmed the statistics predicted by quantum
mechanics and established non-locality as an empirical fact in the following sense:
Quantum non-locality
QNL: What happens at point P in space and time depends not only upon what
exists in the past light-cone of this event, but also upon what happens outside of
its light-cone, at points in space separated from P by a space-like interval.1
This behaviour is not merely a peculiarity of early pioneer quantum mechanics: it
remains a puzzling feature of more sophisticated quantum field theories deployed
by the Standard Model of particle physics, and is likely to remain a feature of any
theory of quantum gravity. The problem of non-locality that contemporary realists
face is the challenge of explaining the non-local measurement outcomes of quan-
tum experiments, given the ban on superluminal signalling that applies to causal
mechanisms in modern physics.
Yet there is more than one way to think about dependency relations. Non-locality
might be construed as a form of metaphysical dependency, rather than a form of
causal dependency (see Section 2.3), if we are willing to drop the assumption that
quantum-entangled particles exist independently of one another.
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§3.3. Against microphysical properties
Since the 1980s, quantum-entangled systems have been widely considered by philoso-
phers of physics to be non-separable, in the sense that the physical states of the
sub-systems of a quantum-entangled system fail to determine the total state of the
system as a whole (eg. [Howard, 1985], [Howard, 1989] and [Teller, 1986]). This in
turn has suggested the need for some form of holism, in which the properties of a
system depend in some way upon the whole system instead of being determined by
the properties and relations of their parts (eg. [Healey, 1991]). Such a position, how-
ever, contradicts a common assumption among analytic metaphysicians, influenced
by philosophers like David Lewis, concerning the status of physical properties:2
Micro-property fundamentalism
MPF: The physical properties of a macroscopic system supervene upon the in-
trinsic physical properties of, and relations between, the microscopic constituents
of its supervenience base.
The contradiction between the thesis of micro-property fundamentalism and the fact
of quantum non-locality turns on two mediating assumptions that are still widely
held among analytic philosophers concerning the nature of physical properties:
Classical metaphysical assumptions
CM: The fundamental physical properties in the supervenience base are
1. spatiotemporally localised, and
2. causally related by a simple set of microphysical laws.
According to Lewis, for example: ‘All there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local
matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another... We have geometry:
a system of external relations of spatio-temporal distances between points... And
at those points we have local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties which
need nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated. For short, we have
an arrangement of qualities. And that is all.’ [Lewis, 1986, p.ix]. For neo-Humeans
like Lewis, natural properties may be related within a system of laws, where a law
expresses a regularity in their arrangement that constitutes a ‘contingent general-
ization that appears as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems
that achieve a best combination of simplicity and strength’ [Lewis, 1973, p.73].
If micro-property fundamentalism (MPF) involves these ‘classical’ metaphysical
assumptions (CM), then it implies the existence of a supervenience base composed
solely of localised physical properties that are causally related by microphysical laws.
Yet the fact of quantum non-locality implies, on the contrary, the non-existence
of such a supervenience base, insofar as such laws and properties conform to the
superluminal ban on signalling (SBS & QNL) [Maudlin, 2007, chp.2].
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I shall take the fact of quantum non-locality as a starting point for my discussion,
setting aside theories which attempt to explain away the appearance of non-locality.3
Of course, one might acknowledge the fact of quantum non-locality, but deny the
claim that the superluminal ban on signalling in modern physics applies to all causal
mechanisms, by postulating the existence of a superluminal mechanical force. This
force would have to act upon both wings of the EPR experiment such that the
microphysical properties of both systems exhibit non-local correlations.
However, the notion of an additional ‘quantum force’ (typically associated with
the work of David Bohm in the 1950s [Bohm, 1951,Bohm, 1952a,Bohm, 1952b]) has
struck many physicists as contrived and implausible: such a force finds no analogue
in classical mechanics, where the forces that couple particles and fields depend on
the intrinsic properties of the particles in motion, and the introduction of a special
mechanism to produce non-local quantum phenomena is ad hoc. Moreover, further
experiments have continued to increase the lower-bound on the velocity at which
such a mechanism would have to operate to produce the non-local correlations in the
measurement outcomes of quantum-entangled systems [Salart et al., 2008,Cocciaro
et al., 2011]. To the historian of science, such an attempt to salvage the framework
of classical mechanics is more likely to evoke the spectre of Ptolemaic epicycles than
the fabled cry of ‘Eureka’. I shall exclude this possibility by endorsing this second
assumption about scientific practice:
Assumption of inquiry: Ockham’s razor
AI/II: Other things being equal, we should adopt the simplest scientific theory
that explains the phenomena.
Yet if quantum non-locality is not to be explained away as mere appearance, and
if Ockham’s razor is to be wielded against the hypothesis of a superluminal causal
mechanism, then the contradiction between the fact of quantum non-locality and
the thesis of micro-property fundamentalism leads to the following dilemma:
Supervenience dilemma
Either (i) micro-property fundamentalism is false, or (ii) the fundamental micro-
physical properties of a system are not spatiotemporally localised.
Wave function monists seize the second horn of this dilemma by regarding the wave
function representing the quantum state as the more fundamental reality upon which
the world of physical objects supervenes, and denying the assumption that the parts
of a system are spatiotemporally localised (CM1). According to this approach,
local properties belong merely to the theatre of experimentation and observation,
to be recovered by finding something within the wave function that functionally
corresponds to the pointer-like behaviour of our measuring devices.
Some wave function monists, for example, o↵er to restore the thesis of micro-
property fundamentalism by identifying the wave function with a physical field that
exists in the high-dimensional space in which the wave function is mathematically
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defined, whilst identifying the properties of this field with intrinsic qualities of the
points in this mathematical space (see eg. [Loewer, 2016]). Such an approach has
run into di culties in its generalisation to quantum field theory [Myrvold, 2015].
Other wave function monists have suggested that the high-dimensional space of the
wave function may be conceived as a physical property of four-dimensional space-
time, whilst postulating the existence of ‘branches’ within the wave function from
which innumerable ‘macro-worlds’ may be said to ‘emerge’ that realise every possible
measurement outcome. The lack of any precise definition of a branch continues to
frustrate any many-worlds account of the emergence of physical objects.4 Nonethe-
less, in spite of their technical di culties, various forms of wave function monism
remain popular among philosophers of physics.
However, metaphysicians have raised fundamental objections. Tim Maudlin,
recalling earlier arguments made by Bell, has notably argued that functional cor-
respondence, by itself, is insu cient for securing a connection between the world
described by quantum mechanics and the theatre of experimentation and obser-
vation [Maudlin, 2010, Bell, 1987b]. In order for there really to be a pointer on
a measuring device, which has some probability of pointing up or down when we
make a measurement, there must be some pointer-shaped configuration, which has
the potential to evolve one way or another, corresponding to the possible positions
of the pointer observed by experimentalists. If no pointers with possible positions
really existed – that is, if the world of physical objects had no matter to give it
being apart from the wave function – there would be nothing for the probabilities of
the di↵erent measurement outcomes predicted by quantum mechanics to be about.
This corresponds to what Maudlin identifies at the problem of statistics in [Maudlin,
1995, pp. 10-13] (see also [Price, 2010]).
By dissolving this distinction between the abstract model of quantum mechanics
and the physical world that it is supposed to be modelling, wave function monism
slides into obscurantism, shifting the theatre of experimentation and observation
away from the world of space and time to a Pythagorean world of mathematical
properties. Within the reified world of the wave function, neither scientists nor
their measuring devices exist in reality, and there are no objective, non-perspectival
facts about which way the pointers on their measuring devices are pointing. As
Esfeld observes, such a strategy threatens to surrender a ‘central tenet not only
of common sense realism, but also of all working science’ [Esfeld, 2014a]. It also
leads to intractable problems in the philosophy of perception (for further discussion,
see [Solé, 2013, p. 366], and [Belot, 2012, pp. 73-74]).5
In order to safeguard this assumption of scientific inquiry, I shall favour interpre-
tations of quantum mechanics that straightforwardly a rm the existence of objects
in physical space whose parts are spatiotemporally localised. I shall also favour
interpretations in which scientific instruments are objects that register determinate
measurement outcomes according to the predictions of quantum mechanics:
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Assumption of inquiry: Reality of objects in physical space
AI/III: The objects of scientific inquiry are real and their parts are localised within
a physical space that is distinct from any mathematical representation.
Suppose, then, we seize the first horn of the supervenience dilemma. In that case,
we must abandon classical assumptions about how physical objects are fundamen-
tally characterised (CM). Whilst classical mechanics could provide an account of
the dynamics of objects in physical space that was empirically adequate for local
phenomena, the phenomenon of quantum entanglement is incompatible with the
notion that quantal properties, like spin, are intrinsic features of localised particles
or fields. Moreover, the evidence of interference phenomena, such as the Aharonov-
Bohm e↵ect, and of other interferometry experiments, such as the COW experiment,
suggests that ‘classical’ properties, like mass and charge, are best understood at the
level of the wave function, rather than as intrinsic properties of particles [Brown
et al., 1995,Brown et al., 1996]. In short, if we accept certain standard assumptions
of scientific inquiry (AI/I-III), we have good reason to follow Esfeld in demoting mi-
crophysical properties from being fundamental to being (in some sense) derivative.
§3.4. Entanglement and the measurement problem
Whilst non-separability implies that systems which are quantum-entangled will tem-
porally develop together, embracing non-separability is not su cient to solve the
problem of non-locality [Henson, 2013]. In order to give an empirically adequate
account of quantum entanglement, we must explain the determinate measurement
outcomes in the EPR experiment [Esfeld, 2017]. To make these outcomes intelligible,
we require an account of the dynamics of a quantum-entangled system that indi-
viduates its separate components and explains its non-local statistical correlations,
without flaunting the ban on superluminal signalling (SBS).
Part of the challenge in achieving such an account is that the description of
the world o↵ered by standard quantum mechanics, taken at face value, seems ob-
viously false. This is because the indeterminacy that it famously attributes to the
microscopic realm of particles it likewise extends to the macroscopic realm of our
measuring devices. Suppose, for example, we consider an electron in a Stern-Gerlach
device, which is in the quantum state of spin-up |"i or spin-down |#i. According
to the generalised Born Rule, adopted in standard quantum mechanics, any observ-
able of a device is associated with a quantum state that is subject to the laws of
quantum mechanics, and in standard quantum mechanics any quantum state (or
wave function) evolves according to the linear Schr̈odinger equation. I shall take
the device as having been prepared in a quantum state that is suitable for making
a measurement of vertical spin (that is, spin-up or spin-down), and will label this
state | i (it is typically taken as a many-particle wave function).6 According to
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standard quantum mechanics, on registering the spin of the particle, the pointer on
the detector is supposed to assume an appropriate final state:
|"i | i ! |"i | "i or |#i | i ! |#i | #i (3.4.1)
The final state (on the right of the arrow) to which the total system evolves is one
in which the pointer of the measuring device is either pointing up | "i or down | #i,
depending on the state of the particle.7 A system that may be in one or the other
of these states is described as a proper mixture, in which the di↵erent probabilis-
tic weightings of the elements in this ensemble simply reflect our ignorance of the
system’s actual condition prior to completing the experiment. However, quantum








(|"i | "i+ |#i | #i) (3.4.2)
In this example, the final state of the pointer on the device, as described by stan-
dard quantum mechanics, is neither up | "i nor down | #i, but an indeterminate
superposition with respect to its position, which is distinguishable in principle from
a proper mixture by the phenomenon of quantum interference. What we observe,
however, is a pointer that occupies one of its possible positions: in this case, the
probability of either outcome is 1/2. The bare quantum mechanics delivers the cor-
rect statistics for the results of repeated measurements, which is predictively useful,
but fails to secure a determinate outcome that corresponds to our experience, which
is deeply perplexing.
This is the famous measurement problem (or, the ‘Schrödinger-cat paradox’,
devised by Schrödinger [Schrödinger, 1935b]). More precisely, it corresponds to
what Maudlin identifies as the problem of outcomes [Maudlin, 1995, pp. 7-10]. In
order to solve this problem, without abandoning the assumption of realism (AI/I),
we must find a way to connect the formalism of quantum mechanics to some reality
that exists independently of our preferences and practices, which fixes the facts
about the measurement outcomes of quantum experiments and recovers the correct
quantum statistics. However, since the wave function that solves the Schrödinger
equation only encodes probabilities for local observables that fail to commute with
one another (via the Born Rule, which is supposed to hold universally in standard
quantum mechanics), such an account faces a dilemma posed by Bell [Bell, 1987b]:
Nomological dilemma
Either (i) the standard (linear) Schrödinger dynamics is wrong, or (ii) standard
quantum mechanics is incomplete.8
All things considered, only two schools of interpretation seem empirically adequate:
either we must seize the first horn of the dilemma by adopting some non-linear
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modification of the Schrödinger dynamics, which allows the wave function to ‘col-
lapse’ and produce a definite outcome, or seize the second horn of the dilemma by
adopting ‘additional variables’ and supplementing the Schrödinger dynamics with a
non-linear dynamics for their temporal development. According to Maudlin: ‘only
collapse theories and hidden variables theories have a chance of succeeding, and, of
the latter, the modal interpretations fail’ [Maudlin, 1995, p.7]. In modal interpreta-
tions, the wave function is supplemented by a ‘value state’ that supports additional
properties but has no separate dynamics, yet these face what Maudlin calls the
problem of e↵ect, since the outcome of measurements a↵ord no predictive power
for the future behaviour of the system [pp.13-4]. In a micro-monist world in which
all the measurable properties of a system are quantal properties determined by the
universal wave function (via the Born Rule), the two standard approaches to solving
the problem of outcomes are the GRW theory and Bohmian mechanics.
i. The GRW collapse theory
The GRW model suggested by Giancarlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini and Tullio We-
ber in 1986 [Ghirardi et al., 1986] seizes the first horn of the nomological dilemma:
it seeks to incorporate the text-book ‘collapse’ of the wave function proposed by
Heisenberg, by modifying the Schrödinger equation for the wave function  to in-
clude a stochastic mechanism, non-linear in  , which brings about its spontaneous
localisation. Whilst microsystems composed of a few quantum-entangled particles
seldom localise spontaneously (the collapse rate being of the order of 1016 seconds),
macrosystems composed of many quantum-entangled particles localise in a very
short time (in about 10 7 seconds, for a system of 1023 particles). Any localisation
in one element of a quantum-entangled system precipitates the localisation of the
other elements, hence the collapse rate of macroscopic objects increases according to
the number of their microscopic constituents [Clifton and Monton, 1999, p.700-1].
(For a substantial review of ‘dynamical reduction’ schemes of this kind, see [Bassi
and Ghirardi, 2003].)
In more recent discussions of the GRW theory, it has been suggested that the
wave function should be supplemented with a ‘matter-density’ field that evolves in
physical space, and stochastic localisations of the wave function should be under-
stood as corresponding to spontaneous contractions in the distribution of matter-
density [Ghirardi et al., 1995]. (For a relativistic version of GRW theory, see [Tu-
mulka, 2006].) This interpretation a rms the reality of objects in physical space and
specifies what the probabilities of quantum mechanics are about (AI/III). However,
the GRW theory comes with a theoretical cost: the spontaneous collapse mecha-
nism that it posits to explain measurement outcomes is not observed to take place
in nature, and the stochastic terms that it adds to the Schrödinger equation lack any
underlying justification. However, underlying theories for alternative collapse mech-
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anisms are being actively investigated [Bassi et al., 2013]. I shall consider a plausible
example of an alternative collapse mechanism later in this discussion, which appeals
to the thermal properties of complex physical systems (see Chapter 7).
ii. The de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory
The pilot wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm [de Broglie, 1928,Bohm, 1951,Bohm,
1952a,Bohm, 1952b], which has been championed by Detlef Dürr, Sheldon Goldstein
and Nino Zangh́ı under the name of ‘Bohmian mechanics’ since the 1990s [Dürr
et al., 1992,Dürr et al., 1997], seizes the second horn of the nomological dilemma: it
leaves the Schrödinger dynamics of the wave function  untouched, whilst positing
a configuration of N particles that follow a guiding equation that specifies each
particle’s velocity. (For recent textbook studies, see [Holland, 1993,Dürr, 2009,Dürr
et al., 2012,Bricmont, 2016].) The particles, in this case, have well-defined positions
at each moment of time.
The equation of motion – or ‘guiding equation’ – is first-order with respect to
time t and non-linear in  , determining a velocity field v i that does not require the
particles to have intrinsic physical properties, but only to have determinate relative
positions. (The particles are attributed gravitational mass, but the COW experi-
ment suggests that mass delocalises over the wave function [Brown, 1996].) There is
no need for a second-order formulation involving accelerations rather than velocities,
in order for this theory to be explanatory, hence there is no need to maintain the
framework of classical mechanics and posit a dubious ‘quantum force’. According
to Bohmians, the Schrödinger equation and guiding equation together comprise the
non-classical dynamics of a particle configuration that exists independently of our
observations, and the wave function is given the nomological role of inducing a ve-
locity field that choreographs the trajectories of all the particles through physical
space. This universal wave function does not collapse. (From this point, ‘Bohmian
mechanics’ will refer to this first-order formulation, unless otherwise stated.)
Agreement with the Born Rule is typically secured via the quantum equilibrium
hypothesis: specifically, if the initial configuration of the particles at t may be
supposed to be randomly distributed with a probability distribution ⇢(t = 0) =
| t=0|2, then it follows as a consequence of the Schrödinger equation and Bohm’s
law of motion that this relationship will hold at some later time t > 0 for the
distribution ⇢(t) = | t|2. Since the theory allows in principle for non-equilibrium
solutions, ⇢ 6= | |2, this restriction to quantum equilibrium has generally been taken
as a postulate [Dürr et al., 1992].9 This introduces the elements of randomness
and indeterminacy essential to quantum mechanics. Although the particles have
determinate positions, we cannot know where all of the particles are, and must
resort to the probabilities of quantum mechanics to make predictions. Nonetheless,
the physical state of the world at time t is completely specified by both the wave
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function and the positions of the particles: ( , {Q1, . . . ,QN})t.
According to this interpretation of quantum mechanics, indeterminate super-
positions, such as the singlet state in the EPR experiment, are not fundamental
features of reality: rather, every macroscopic object is composed of a determinate
configuration of microscopic particles. These particles occupy definite positions at
any time t, and evolve according to a deterministic law of nature. The probabilities
encoded in the wave function are thus epistemic probabilities about their trajecto-
ries. Whilst the motion of Bohmian particles may seem random, the appearance
of randomness is an artefact of treating physical systems in isolation: the actual
velocity function for the global configuration is defined in terms of a universal wave
function, and depends upon the positions of all of the particles. Bohmian parti-
cles do not move like Billiard balls in classical mechanics, which travel in straight
lines until disturbed by an external force, but wobble their way through space in
conformity with the velocity field v induced by the universal wave function. The
‘non-locality’ of Bohmian mechanics is manifest by the fact that the velocity of any
one particle depends on the instantaneous positions of all of the other particles.10
iii. Decoherence
Nonetheless, in order for there to be any measurements of sub-systems of particles,
such as the quantum-entangled system containing the two particles that feature in
the EPR experiment, it must be possible for the pointers on a measuring device to
represent something about this sub-system. In order for this representation to have
empirical content, there must be some specifiable correlation between the states of
the measuring apparatus, and the states of the system that is being measured. This
relation is typically supposed to obtain in quantum mechanics through the process
of decoherence, through which sub-systems of particles emerge whose behaviour
approximate classical (Newton-Maxwell) laws.11
In a world in which the quantum dynamics depends upon a universal wave func-
tion, a measuring device is not an isolated entity, but is continually interacting
with an environment composed of a swarm of particles, such as air molecules and
photons. According to decoherence theory, this has the e↵ect of making large-scale
superpositions indistinguishable in practice from proper mixtures, in which the en-
tangled state of the total system – enlarged to include the particle being measured,
the measuring device, and the global environment – determines for the measuring
device, for all practical purposes, a mixture that consists of di↵erent possible pointer
positions.12 Decoherence is the process of obtaining this mixture for any physical
system that is immersed in an environment with many more degrees of freedom
than itself. When the process of decoherence occurs in a physical system, such as
a system composed of a measuring device and the sub-system of particles that it is
supposed to be measuring, its quantum dynamics can be described in practice using
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an e↵ective wave function, rather than the universal wave function.13
Decoherence theory, by itself, is not su cient to account for the actual measure-
ment outcomes of a quantum experiment. When combined with Bohmian mechanics,
however, which posits a set of facts about the positions of all the particles, deco-
herence theory implies that the actual measurement outcome will be determined
for all practice purposes by facts about both the microscopic positions of the parti-
cles composing the sub-system and the particles composing the measuring device(s),
however far apart they may be separated. Thus Bohmian mechanics, unlike classical
mechanics, o↵ers an account of the non-local correlations between the outcomes of
the EPR experiment: on the one hand, the pointers on the two measuring devices,
which point either up or down, are composed of two localised arrangements of par-
ticles that are separated in physical space, as in classical physics; on the other hand,
the non-local correlations in their measurement outcomes are due to the fact that
fixing the configuration parameter in one part of the experiment, either  A or  B,
will influence the trajectory of the particles in both parts of the experiment, because
the particles are governed by the same wave function.
The measurement problem, as described above, does not arise for Bohmian me-
chanics, in which the fundamental description of a physical state, before making a
measurement, involves a single configuration of local constituents, and after mea-
surement, includes the values of local variables that register the actual result. Yet I
note here on passing that the theory of decoherence, upon which Bohmian mechan-
ics relies, is hardly beyond questioning. It assumes, for instance, that the pointers
of our measuring devices are rigid, solid bodies, although there are di culties in ac-
counting for the emergence of solid bodies from a finite set of particles (see Chapter
7). It also assumes (implausibly) that the environment of a system may be charac-
terised by a many-body wave function that is subject to unitary time evolution (a
subject I will take up again in Chapter 9). I shall defer these points, however, for
the sake of argument.
§3.5. A nomological wave function
From a philosophical standpoint, we can identify two levels of interpretation of a
theory like quantum mechanics: the first requires us to take a position on the mea-
surement problem and the quantum dynamics, which goes beyond the empirical
data. Yet this is only a partial interpretation: a metaphysical model is also needed
in order to specify an ontology of entities that exist in the world that exist indepen-
dently of our preferences and practices,14 and to enable a semantic interpretation of
quantum mechanics, in which the theory may be understood as making truth claims
about these entities. I shall be concerned primarily with the latter in this thesis.
In recent years, the GRW theory and Bohmian mechanics have been deployed
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by philosophers of science as part of a ‘primitive ontology approach’ to quantum
mechanics, which seeks to provide a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics that
avoids the problem of non-locality [Allori et al., 2008,Esfeld, 2014b]. This approach
is inspired by Bell’s concept of ‘local beables’ [Bell, 1987b, chp.7] (whilst the term
‘primitive ontology’ originates in [Dürr et al., 2012, chp.2], originally published in
1992). Those who adopt this approach reject the notion that one can ‘read o↵ the
ontology’ of a physical theory from its mathematical structure, but maintain that all
the empirical data constituting our evidence for quantum mechanics – such as the
positions of pointers, etc. – concern a distribution of matter in three dimensional
space or four-dimensional spacetime. The various properties that appear in the
mathematical formalism of a physical theory represent a law of nature describing the
temporal development of the matter. They enter into the physical theory through
their nomological role, but are not part of the primitive ontology.
A primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics aims to account for the
determinate measurement outcomes of scientific experiments, like the EPR experi-
ment, and more generally the macroscopic objects upon which scientists depend, by
o↵ering an account of the empirical content of a physical theory that is exhausted
by its statements about the primitive ontology [Maudlin, 2019]. In the GRWm
model, for example, the primitive ontology consists of a matter-field (or, gunk),
and the formalism describes the spread and spontaneous contraction in its ‘matter
density’ [Ghirardi et al., 1995].15 This distribution of matter is described by a field
equation that depends on the wave function. In the Bohmian interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, by contrast, the primitive ontology consists of particles (or, atoms),
and the formalism specifies a law describing their trajectories through space. This
law also depends upon the wave function. The matter in these ontologies is ‘primi-
tive’ in more than one sense: first, it cannot be read o↵ the formalism of standard
quantum mechanics, but is put forward for the sake of empirical adequacy; secondly,
it is a ‘primitive stu↵, materia prima, having no physical properties at all’ [Esfeld
et al., 2017, p.135].
However, a di culty arises for philosophers who reject wave function realism and
embrace a primitive ontology of matter, because the wave function at time t does
not supervene upon the configuration of matter at time t [Suárez, 2015]. Rather,
the wave function itself evolves through time, according to the Schrödinger equation,
whilst two matter configurations that are identical at time tmay have wave functions
that di↵er. In that case they will diverge at time t0 > t. Barring speculative claims
about how a theory of quantum-gravity might determine the wave function,16 this
raises a third dilemma for those who adopt a primitive ontology approach:
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Truthmaker dilemma
To account for the truth of the Bohmian law of motion (or the GRW field equation),
either we must appeal to (i) some entity in addition to the primitive matter, or
(ii) the whole distribution of primitive matter for all time.
Suppose we attempt to take hold of the first horn of this dilemma by adding rela-
tions of necessitation, a la Armstrong, that somehow cause the particles to move in
a certain way. According to the Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley conception of lawhood,
we may think of a law of nature as being a primitive second-order relation between
universals that brings about change by natural necessity (see [Dretske, 1977,Arm-
strong, 1983] and [Tooley, 1977,Tooley, 1987]).17 Yet there are two di culties here.
First, a law of motion that includes the wave function as a nomological parameter,
rather than a physical entity, cannot be construed simply as a relation between the
positions of particles, since the wave function is subject to change at each moment,
whereas the Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley conception of lawhood takes the temporal
universality of laws for granted. Secondly, the particles in the primitive ontology do
not have fundamental physical properties that could instantiate necessitation rela-
tions, since their properties depend on the wave function. It seems a distinct law
would have to be formulated for every contiguous pair of configurations (cf. AI/II).
Suppose we refuse to expand the primitive ontology and seize the second horn of
this dilemma instead. According to the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis conception of lawhood,
we should think of generalisations as laws if and only if they are axioms in the best
system that balances strength and simplicity in deriving the facts (see [Ramsey,
1978], [Lewis, 1973, pp. 73-75] [Lewis, 1987, postscript] and [Mill, 1875, Book III
Chapter IV]). Such an account is compatible with a nomological interpretation
of the wave function in which it is part of the best systems account of the facts,
where the initial value of the wave function  (t = 0) is fixed by the facts about the
whole distribution of matter for all time (see [Miller, 2013], [Bhogal and Perry, 2017]
and [Chen, 2018]).
In classical neo-Humean metaphysics, this mosaic of facts consists of intrinsic
physical properties instantiated at di↵erent points in spacetime. However, as Esfeld
observes, ‘there is something new in quantum non-locality’ that calls for a break
with this neo-Humean ontology of sparse natural properties [Esfeld, 2017] (cf. [Miller,
2013]). For Bohmian primitivists, like Esfeld, this break consists in replacing varying
Humean qualities with the single, uniform ‘quality’ of position. In short, some
spacetime points are occupied by particles, and others are not. And that is all. I
shall consider a ‘Super-Humean’ metaphysical model that takes this approach to the
ontology of nature in the following chapter.
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§3.6. General remarks
In this chapter, I have discussed how the quantum revolution overthrew the classical
micro-monist picture of nature, replacing the image of a world composed of particles
(or fields) with intrinsic physical properties with a world in which microphysical
properties are determined at the level of a wave function that is attributed to a
quantum system as a whole. This revolution gave rise to the problem of non-
locality (Section 3.2), which is the problem of explaining the outcomes of the EPR
experiment given the superluminal ban on signalling in modern physics. In seeking to
come to terms with this problem, I rejected the notion that microphysical properties
are fundamental but non-localised (Section 3.3).
Desideratum: Matter without microphysical properties
DD/I: Other things being equal, we should favour metaphysical accounts in which
microphysical properties are not fundamental.
I then o↵ered considerations in favour of a primitive ontology approach to Bohmian
mechanics (Section 3.4), in which matter consists of featureless particles, and the
wave function may be conceived as part of a law which determines their trajectories
(Section 3.5).
Nonetheless, in order to specify the supervenience base of the Bohmian law of
motion, we need to establish what counts as a ‘particle’ in nature, and how these
particles follow continuous trajectories through space. In the following three chap-
ters (Chapters 4–6), I shall consider a sequence of metaphysical models which o↵er
rival accounts of the supervenience base of the Bohmian interpretation of quantum
mechanics. All three of these accounts seek to accommodate the phenomenon of
quantum entanglement without departing from standard assumptions of scientific
inquiry (AI/I-III). The first is a Humean model recently proposed by Michael Esfeld
(Chapter 4). This model seeks to correct the neo-Humean metaphysics of Lewis by
dispensing with his ontology of sparse natural properties.
Notes
1This formulation is adapted from [Esfeld, 2017].
2Eg. Lewis’s doctrine of Humean Supervenience.
3Such arguments rescind a common assumption of scientific inquiry: namely, that the settings
of our measuring device are independent of the prior state of the measured system. (See [Esfeld,
2017], p. 2332.)
4The ‘Oxford Everettians’ have attempted to provide a quasi-rigorous definition of ‘branches’.
For a critique of this ‘many-worlds’ approach, see [Koons, 2017].
5Belot writes (adapting Jane Austin): “It is a truth universally acknowledged that an approach
to understanding quantum mechanics is acceptable only if it allows us to construct models of the
sort of experiments that provide evidence in favour of the theory” [Belot, 2012].
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6I shall question this representation in Chapter 7. For an alternative view of the measuring
device and the system’s environment, see [Drossel and Ellis, 2018].
7For simplicity, I assume the measurement does not disturb the particle’s spin eigenstates.
8In Bell’s own words: ‘Either the wave function, as given by the Schrodinger equation, is not
everything, or it is not right’ [Bell, 1987b].
9This move has sometimes been criticised as being ‘artificial’ [Valentini, 2019].
10Concerning relativistic versions of Bohmian mechanics, see [Dürr et al., 2014].
11For a helpful introduction to decoherence that avoids common misconceptions, see [Butterfield,
2001].
12As Bohm explains, the wave packets corresponding to di↵erent eigenvalues of the observable
will cease to overlap in the space of relevant coordinate of the apparatus [Bohm, 1952b, p.181].
13We may think of the environment as ‘measuring’ the experiment.
14Or ‘beables’, in Bell’s terminology.
15Alternatively, in the GRWf model, the primitive ontology consists of ‘flashes’, which are the
collapse events [Bell, 1987a].
16It is sometimes claimed that the wave function is static, based on the time-independence of
the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (the analogue of the Schrödinger equation in quantum gravity).
17Although each of these philosophers has his own view about laws of nature, it is generally




Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.
– Attributed to Albert Einstein.
§4.1. Objects and structure
In the previous chapter, I introduced the problem of non-locality posed by the phe-
nomenon of quantum entanglement, which is the challenge of explaining the non-
local measurement outcomes of quantum experiments, given the superluminal ban on
signalling in modern physics. Following Ladyman and Esfeld, I suggested that such
phenomena gives us good reason to abandon the ‘classical’ micro-monist conception
of matter as consisting of particles (or fields) with intrinsic physical properties [La-
dyman and Ross, 2007,Esfeld and Deckert, 2017].
The primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics embraced by Esfeld of-
fers an account of quantum phenomena that preserves a single world of objects that
exist in physical space, but abandons the thesis of micro-property fundamentalism
(MPF). According to Bohmian primitivists, like Esfeld, a solution to the problem of
non-locality can be secured in terms of a distribution of particles that lack intrinsic
physical properties, if their trajectories are specified by the Bohmian law of motion.
We nonetheless require a metaphysical account of how the featureless particles com-
posing this configuration are supposed to be individuated (in other words, of what
grounds the individuality and mutual distinctness of these basic entities).
In this chapter, I o↵er some critical reflections on Esfeld’s ‘Super-Humean’ meta-
physical model, which combines the primitive ontology approach to quantum me-
chanics (discussed in Chapter 3) with ontic structural realism in order to specify
the nature of these particles and provide a supervenience base for this Bohmian
law. Since the late 1990s, many philosophers of science have considered some
form of structural realism to be the most tenable kind of scientific realism, per-
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suaded by John Worrall of its power to break the tension between the famous ‘no-
miracles argument’ for realism and the ‘pessimistic meta-induction argument’ for
anti-realism [Worrall, 1989]. According to contemporary proponents of ontic struc-
tural realism, like French and Ladyman, these structures are best described within
a model-theoretic approach to scientific theories [French and Ladyman, 2003] (dis-
cussed further in Chapter 8). On this view, the change in two quantum-entangled
systems, such as the two particles in the EPR experiment, is explicable in terms of
the change in the relations in which they stand. A suitable ontic structure, in this
case, is one that:
OS1: does not supervene on the physical properties of the objects it relates, and
OS2: does not require the objects it relates to have intrinsic physical properties.
For ontic structural realists, there are no objects with intrinsic physical properties;
in fact, there is nothing more to being an object than the relations in which it
stands. The notion of ontic structure thus integrates the concepts of holism and
non-separability (discussed in Chapter 3) by allowing objects to be individuated
solely by their relations.
§4.2. Local matter points
However, ontic structural realism, by itself, does not explain the non-local measure-
ment outcomes of the EPR experiment, since it does not provide an account of what
instantiates this structure and constitutes these measurement outcomes, to which
the theory of quantum mechanics may be said to refer [Pylkkänen et al., 2015].
Nonetheless, according to Esfeld, it can supply the conceptual resources needed to
solve the problem of non-locality when it is combined with the primitive ontology
approach to quantum mechanics [Esfeld, 2012]. Esfeld’s ontology may be defined
using three axioms:1
Super-Humeanism
SH1: There are distance relations that individuate matter points.
SH2: There is a cosmic substance, composed of all the distance relations, of which
the matter points are integral parts.
SH3: The matter points are the substrate of all physical change; it is the distances
between them that change.
The primitive ontology consists of the ‘matter points’. The ontic structure consists
of the ‘distance relations’. The matter points do not exist over and above this
structure, since there is nothing more to being a matter point than its standing
in certain distance relations. However, the world is not made of relations without
relata: the matter points may be said to instantiate this structure because they
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are constituted by these relations [Esfeld and Lam, 2010].2 This model is called
‘Super-Humeanism’.
i. Matter
For Esfeld, ‘matter points’ comprise the primitive substrate of all physical change.
However, this matter is not to be confused with a bare, Lockean substrate. Rather,
Esfeld adopts a ‘Cartesian characterization of matter in terms of spatial extension’
[Esfeld et al., 2017, p.140]. The decision to cash out the nature of matter in terms
of matter points is supported by three considerations [Esfeld and Deckert, 2017].
First, Esfeld claims that our experimental evidence for the truth of quantum me-
chanics is always ‘evidence of discrete objects (i.e. particles) from dots on a display
to traces in a cloud chamber’ [p.5]. This being the case, any empirically adequate
account of quantum phenomena must be expressible in terms of the behaviour of a
spatial distribution of matter. Secondly, physical properties do not determine the
temporal development of a quantum-entangled system. According to Esfeld, the
properties we attribute to physical objects are nothing more than a simple and in-
formative means of representing change [p.7]. Thirdly, if the world contains distinct
physical objects, it is necessary that there should be some type of world-making re-
lation in virtue of which they compose a single world together. According to Esfeld,
distance relations are as good a candidate as any for these world-making relations,
as long as they are not tied to a particular geometry [p.10].
The minimalist character of Super-Humeanism is embodied in the claim that
these world-making relations also constitute physical objects and specify the nature
of matter. Esfeld writes: ‘Its being part of what is minimally su cient to obtain an
ontology of the natural world that is empirically adequate is the best argument for an
ontological commitment’ [p.3]. The Super-Humean shuns any ontological commit-
ment to fundamental physical properties, or any additional metaphysical structure
besides distance relations. Super-Humeans rely upon the regularity account of rela-
tional spacetime developed by Huggett, in which the geometric structures deployed
in Newtonian mechanics or the theory of Special Relativity are regarded merely as
useful constructs for representing the change in the particles’ distance relations, and
as having ‘no reality beyond their assumption by the laws’ [Huggett, 2006, p.57].3
Likewise, the Super-Humean shuns any fundamental commitment to physical
fields as the mediators of particle interactions. Although the concept of the field
has been successful as an e↵ective device for providing simple and informative de-
scriptions of subsystems, physical fields are subject to a self-interaction problem in
classical electrodynamics, and an ultra-violet divergence problem in quantum field
theory, for which there appear to be no satisfactory solutions [Lazarovici, 2017].
Interactions in classical electrodynamics can be represented in physics without ref-
erence to fields using Wheeler-Feynmann theory, however, whilst particle creation
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and annihilation in quantum field theory may be worked out in terms of permanent
particles using the Dirac sea model [Deckert et al., 2019].
ii. Substances and entities
In adopting an ontology of matter points without physical properties, Super-Humeans
reject the classical micro-monist picture of nature, discussed in Chapter 3, in which
the world consists of particles and fields with intrinsic physical properties that are
picked out by our best physical theory. On the one hand, Super-Humeans a rm
that there is a set of microscopic particles that compose all the macroscopic objects.
A scientist perceives a pointer on a macroscopic instrument, such as a Stern-Gerlach
device, for example, because there are particles arranged pointer-wise. On the other
hand, Super-Humeans insist that these particles lack any intrinsic properties, and
are holistically individuated by the distance relations in which they stand.
According to Esfeld, if we take Scha↵er’s theory of ‘priority monism’ to be merely
a verbal re-description of the structural individuation of physical objects [Scha↵er,
2010], in which ontological independence is taken as the criterion for something
being a substance, Super-Humeanism should be cast as a form of priority monism,
in which the microscopic particles are grounded in one fundamental substance; that
is, in the cosmos as a whole [Esfeld, 2019, p.4]. A Super-Humean cosmos is thus an
integrated whole (G1), rather than the mereological sum of its physical parts, and
the particles that compose it are interdependent entities (G3) (see Section 2.3).
On this view, we should consider the various local ‘substances’ that are studied by
the empirical sciences – such as charged electrons, chemical molecules, or organisms
– as useful constructs that are partly grounded in our explanatory interests. The
physical properties with which they are endowed in scientific descriptions of their
behaviour are simply useful and convenient ways of representing change in certain
parts of the global particle configuration. According to Super-Humeans, the world
is not, in fact, objectively carved into separate substances with intrinsic properties.
We subjectively carve them out of the cosmos as a whole.
iii. Laws of nature
In order to explain how physical systems change through time, however, such that
a pointer on a Stern-Gerlach measuring device may change from pointing up to
pointing down, for example, Esfeld is compelled to expand his supervenience base
beyond matter points. Since distance relations are supposed to establish the order
of what coexists in nature, he takes up Leibniz’ relationalist definition of space.
Since these distance relations constitute particles that change their positions, he
follows Leibniz in conceiving time as the order of change. Esfeld must therefore
sort his supervenience base into an infinite number of time-slices by imposing a
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linear ordering, in which each time-slice contains a complete assignment of distance
relations between all of the matter-points that exist at that time. To give a direction
to this linear ordering, which explains why one time-slice follows another, he must
also include a primitive arrow of change (of which more later).
The Humean character of Super-Humeanism is embodied in the claim that any
change in a physical system must supervene upon a Humean mosaic of matter points,
where one configuration of matter points has no necessary connections with another.
Esfeld writes: ‘everything else in the natural world supervenes on that mosaic in the
sense that it comes in as a means to describe that change’ [p.8]. To account for the
truth of the Bohmian law of motion, Esfeld adopts the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account
of lawhood, in which a regularity only qualifies as a law of nature just in case it
is an axiom in the ‘best system’ that balances strength and simplicity in deriving
the facts about how matter points are distributed in every time-slice.4 The truth of
the Bohmian law of motion is wholly determined by the spatial distribution of the
matter points for all time, whilst the wave function of quantum mechanics is simply
part of the Bohmian representation of this law of nature.
iv. Physical properties
Whilst physical properties are not part of the primitive ontology, they are nonethe-
less indispensable for representing causal interactions between physical sub-systems,
and formulating predictions for the behaviour of objects picked out by their physical
properties. For example, when Alice transmits the results from her wing of the EPR
experiment over the internet to Bob, physicists explain how he acquires this infor-
mation by means of a causal mechanism involving the electromagnetic properties of
the fibre-optic cables running between them. Yet Super-Humeans have reasons to
believe that such mechanisms are not fundamentally characterised by microphysical
properties that determine the way in which they behave. Rather, Super-Humeans
seek to supplant the Humean mosaic of sparse natural properties with a changing
configuration of distance relations. If we adopt Super-Humeanism, however, we can
replace the thesis of property micro-determination with an alternative thesis:
Holistic property determination
HMD: The physical properties of a system are grounded on nothing less than the
total distribution of matter points for all time.
Super-Humeans treat physical properties in the same way that classical neo-Humeans
treat causal powers: just as powers are merely conceptual decorations, according to
Lewis, so physical properties are not objective and intrinsic features of reality, ac-
cording to Esfeld. Rather, we should think of them as useful and informative ways
of representing parts of the changing global configuration of matter points. Whilst
the laws of classical physics may be deemed explanatory, insofar as they are gen-
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eral principles that support counterfactuals, they should be distinguished from the
Bohmian law of motion according to their scope of application. Super-Humeans re-
gard the truth of the Bohmian law (or something like it) to be universal, inasmuch
as it is taken to hold everywhere for all time, but regard the truth of classical laws
to be scale-dependent, inasmuch as their domain is restricted to causal interactions
within large systems of particles. Such systems may be more e↵ectively described
using suitable coarse-grained representations according to our explanatory interests.
v. Advantages of Super-Humeanism
Super-Humeanism, unlike the neo-Humeanism of David Lewis, o↵ers a simple ac-
count of non-local quantum phenomena in terms of a holistic law of nature, which
supervenes upon and is wholly made true by a linearly ordered set of time-slices
composed of matter points. Furthermore, by adopting a primitive ontology of mat-
ter, Super-Humeanism is able to circumvent a common objection to classical neo-
Humeanism. This objection involves the claim that, since the identity of a Humean
property must be independent of the identity of whatever causal roles it may en-
ter, Humean metaphysics is committed to the existence of fundamental properties
that possess a hidden quiddity (or ‘primitive thisness’). Insofar as the existence of
quiddities is taken to be implausible, neo-Humeanism comes at a theoretical cost.
Moreover, its commitment to quiddities is pragmatically inconsistent with a realist
conception of scientific inquiry (see Section 2.4).
Esfeld is able to bypass these objections, however, by making the ‘Super-Humean’
move of eliminating all of the causally redundant and unknowable qualities that
featured in classical neo-Humean metaphysics [Esfeld, 2014a]. According to Super-
Humeans, physical properties are neither fundamental constituents, nor intrinsic
features of spacetime: they are nothing more than a simple and informative means
of representing change in the distance relations between microscopic particles. Like-
wise, by a rming the existence of individual matter points, Super-Humeanism also
avoids some of the objections commonly raised against ontic structural realism
(for instance, see [Briceño and Mumford, 2016]). Nonetheless, in attempting to
maintain a Humean ontology of microscopic particles that is compatible with quan-
tum mechanics, without invoking an ontology of sparse natural properties, Super-
Humeanism creates some metaphysical problems of its own.5
§4.3. The symmetric worlds problem
My first objection concerns an implausible modal commitment that follows from its
structuralist conception of matter.6 I shall argue that it leads to the contradiction
that distinct particles in symmetric configurations are in fact identical.
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i. Argument
This argument turns on the claim that, if Super-Humeanism is true, then it is
metaphysically impossible that two distinct particles could be constituted by the
same set of distance relations. In other words, Super-Humeanism is committed to
the principle of constituent identity:
Super-Humean principle of constituent identity
PCI: If particle 1 is constituted by the same set of distance relations as particle
2, then particles 1 and 2 are identical to each other.
However, the principle of constituent identity entails a controversial principle:
Leibniz’ principle of the identity of indiscernibles
PII: If object O1 has a property if and only if object O2 does too, then O1 and
O2 are identical.
This claim is not to be confused with Leibniz’s law, which is often referred to as the
principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. According to this law, where there are
instances of incompatible properties, there must correspondingly be distinct objects.
Since the cosmos counts as an integral whole for Super-Humeans, Leibniz’s law
may be restricted to its integral parts: where there are instances of incompatible
properties, there should correspondingly be distinct integral parts. (PII) is both
logically independent of Leibniz’s law, however, and more controversial: the sparser
one’s theory of constituents, the easier it is for objects to be indiscernible, and hence
the easier it is to satisfy the identity condition imposed by (PII). In a sparse ontology,
there are fewer properties that can explain the fact of an objective resemblance
between two or more things, or the fact of their objective distinctness.
A Super-Humean cannot appeal to the intrinsic properties of particles to distin-
guish them, since Super-Humeanism admits only ontic structure within its super-
venience base. However, its supervenience base is extremely sparse, since the only
perfectly natural constituents it admits are distance relations. Super-Humeanism
thus depends upon the following form of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles:
Super-Humean principle of the identity of indiscernibles
SPII: If object O1 stands in a distance relation to some object Oi if and only if
object O2 does too, then O1 is identical to O2.
However, this principle leads to implausible results, which come at a theoretical cost.
This objection can be made more forcefully by means of the following argument:
Symmetric worlds argument:
i. Suppose there are three non-identical particles, 1, 2 and 3, separated by
distances d12, d13 and d23, and suppose they trace a locus such that d12 = d23.
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ii. If Super-Humeanism is true, then particle 1 is identical to the relations
{d12, d13}, and particle 3 is also identical to the relation {d12, d13}.
iii. Therefore, Super-Humeanism implies that particle 1 is identical to particle 3
(by ii).
iv. Therefore, Super-Humeanism is false (by i & iii).
The second premise is simply a restatement of that form of the principle of the
indiscernibility of identicals to which Super-Humeans are unavoidably committed
(SPII). The argument hangs, then, by the first premise, which may be rephrased as
the modal claim that it is possible for there to be two non-identical particles that
stand in the same distance relations.
I make this claim on the basis that we can conceive possible scenarios in which
there are two particles that stand in the same distance relations. In fact, we fre-
quently do so in considering textbook examples, such as the cases of spatially ho-
mogeneous and isotropic cosmological models, in which all of the particles, by the
above reasoning, would be identical to each other [Wüthrich, 2009]. The relevance
of this claim to my argument depends upon the commonly held assumption that the
conceivability of some state of a↵airs o↵ers evidence for its possibility, albeit only a
defeasible kind of evidence.
The evidence required for the first premise is easy to come by. For example,
consider a world in which particles 1 and 3 are making a circular orbit of the same
radius around particle 2. In such a world, the distance between particles 1 and
2 is identical to the distance between particles 2 and 3, hence d12 = d23. Whilst
this scenario is perfectly conceivable, and such a system can be modelled straightfor-
wardly using quantum mechanics, Super-Humeanism entails that there is no possible
world in which it could ever be realised. It cannot be realised because the super-
venience base in a Super-Humean world is too sparse to individuate particles 1 and
3. This counts as evidence for the first premise, in support of the conclusion that
Super-Humeanism is false.
Such scenarios are commonly referred to as ‘Max Black’ worlds, which are pos-
sible worlds that contain indiscernible objects that we have reason nonetheless to
consider distinct [Black, 1952]. In Max Black’s original example, we are asked to
imagine a world with two distinct but qualitatively indiscernible spheres that stand
one mile apart. In fact, the number of Max Black worlds that can be o↵ered in
evidence against Super-Humeanism may be multiplied ad infinitum by conceiving
any number of symmetric configurations of particles in which many of the particles
stand in identical sets of distance relations.
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ii. Strong and weak structuralism
This generalisation of my argument against Super-Humeanism is analogous to John
Hawthorne’s criticisms of causal structuralism [Hawthorne, 2001], in which he dis-
tinguishes two forms of structuralism. According to the strong form (as I shall call
it), two things are identical if they play identical roles in a structure, where the roles
that they play are defined abstractly without reference to the identities of things in
the structure. According to the weak form, the roles that they play are defined con-
cretely in terms of relations to relata whose identities are independent of their roles.
Hawthorne’s criticisms are directed toward the strong form of causal structuralism,
in which a natural property is supposed to have an individual essence consisting
of nothing over and above its ‘causal profile’. This view is troubled by intra-world
duplications of causal profiles resulting from the possibility of symmetric structures.
However, Hawthorne notes that a weak form of causal structuralism can be defined
that avoids this trouble, in which the necessary and su cient conditions for being a
particular property are specified in terms of its relations to other properties, whilst
properties have identities independently of their causal roles. For the weak form to
be viable, a property must have a quiddity over and above its causal profile.
Similarly, Super-Humeanism advances a strong form of structuralism, in which a
particle has an individual essence consisting of nothing over and above its ‘distance
profile’ (so to speak). This view is troubled by intra-world duplications of distance
profiles resulting from the possibility of symmetric configurations. A weak form of
structuralism, in this case, would be one in which the matter points have identities
over and above the structure of distance relations they instantiate. For this view
to be viable, each particle would require an haecceity that exists over and above its
distance profile.
This parallel move, however, is unavailable to Super-Humeans, since it would
require the abandonment of ontic structural realism. If the featureless particles of
Bohmian mechanics have an identity over and above their distance relations, they
cannot be constituted solely by distance relations. If each of the matter points which
instantiate these relations has an haecceity, this configuration is not an ontic struc-
ture (cf. OS2). Yet if the Bohmian particles are constituted neither by properties
nor relations, and they have no haecceities over and above the distance relations in
which they stand, it is unclear how they are supposed to exist as distinct objects.
(I shall pursue a weak structuralist model in Chapter 5.)
iii. Weak discernibility
As an alternative strategy, we might consider appealing to the ‘weak discernibility’
of particles in symmetric configurations. Two objects may be said to be weakly
discernible if they stand in some irreflexive relation [Quine, 1976]. Simon Saunders
has argued that, whilst we should retain the principle of identity of indiscernibles,
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it is su cient that physical particles should be weakly discernible in order for them
to count as distinct objects [Saunders, 2003,Saunders, 2006]. A distance relation is
an example of such a relation: the two spheres in Max Black’s original example, for
instance, are weakly discernible, since each object is one mile from the other, but is
not one mile from itself. The examples used by Saunders to illustrate his claim are
drawn from quantum mechanics: two particles in the singlet state may be considered
weakly discernible, insofar as each particle ‘spins’ in the opposite direction to the
other, but not in the opposite direction to itself. These particles are fermions, which
are anti-correlated with respect to their spin. Yet there are also quantum-entangled
states involving bosons, which are positively correlated with respect to their spin.
These particles are not weakly discernible.
However, Katherine Hawley has argued that the claim that objects are distinct
just in case they are weakly discernible is unmotivated [Hawley, 2006]. Noting
that Saunders is e↵ectively using (PII) to settle the ‘inverse special composition
question’ and decide when quantum-entangled systems may be considered to have
basic constituents, Hawley observes that an appeal to weak discernibility is merely
an appeal to the fact that positing basic constituents is not forbidden by (PII). To
argue that we should actually posit basic constituents in such cases is to invoke
a supplementary principle: namely, that we should posit the existence of basic
constituents whenever this is not forbidden by (PII).
Hawley o↵ers three objections to adopting this supplementary principle. First,
in the case of the property of spin, it seems arbitrary to regard the relation of being-
of-the-opposite-spin as a ‘better or worse claim to ontological basicness’ than the
relation of being-of-the-same-spin. On such a basis, Saunders claims that fermions
are distinct objects but bosons are not. Secondly, the supplementary principle leads
to arbitrary divisions within physical systems. For example, a system with four
units of charge, according to this principle, could be partitioned into two basic con-
stituents, where the first has a single unit of charge, and the second has three units.
Thirdly, maintaining both (PII) and the supplementary principle involves holding
conflicting motivations: (PII) favours mereological simplicity over complexity, by
restricting our ontology to the minimum requirements of Leibniz’s law, whereas the
supplementary principle prefers mereological complexity over simplicity, whenever
we can get away with it.
Perhaps that is not quite right. Saunders’ proposal – with its conflicting motiva-
tions – might make sense as an account of the individuation of substances, if Leibniz’s
law were properly restricted to integral parts. In that case, the realisation of Saun-
ders’ principle, in a Super-Humean world, would require the reification of the nodes
in the structure of distance relations, in order to avoid the problem of symmetric
worlds and the collapse of the cosmic substance into its integral parts. Such a move
would amount to postulating a substrate of bare particulars with haecceities that
are somehow united with a spatial structure – which may sometimes be symmetric
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– to compose a single substance. (I shall take up this thought again in Chapter 6).
Once again, however, the particles would require haecceities, and Super-Humeans
would have to abandon their commitment to ontic structural realism.
iv. Symmetric worlds dilemma
As I have noted, it is possible to avoid the problem of symmetric worlds whilst main-
taining a weak form of Bohmian structuralism. On the one hand, although Leibniz’s
law requires us to recognise the non-identity of physical systems that instantiate
incompatible properties, apparent heterogeneity might be taken to correspond to
modifications of a single substance (as Hawley notes). On the other hand, since
Leibniz’s law is logically independent of (PII), one might favour a model in which
particles with distance relations are posited as putative elements. Either move, how-
ever, would amount to admitting the existence of haecceities and abandoning the
strong form of structuralism. Super-Humeans are thus confronted with a dilemma:
The symmetric worlds dilemma
Either (i) posit particles with haecceities, or (ii) deny the possibility of symmetric
configurations.
Since Super-Humeans cannot appeal to particles with haecceities without rejecting
ontic structural realism, they must take the second horn of the dilemma and deny
that symmetric configurations of particles could exist in any possible world. They
must maintain this posture in spite of the fact that the dynamical equations of
physical theories admit symmetrical solutions, and the particles comprising a Super-
Humean world would have an eternity in which to explore their configuration space.
This prohibition must extend to solutions in which the configuration of particles is
momentarily symmetric at certain times, or risk a rming the bizarre possibility of
a ‘peekaboo’ cosmos whose particle configuration vanishes at certain times.
The symmetric worlds problem for Super-Humeanism has its roots in what
Jukka Keränen introduced as ‘the identity problem’ in the philosophy of mathe-
matics [Keränen, 2001]. On the one hand, symmetries are supposed to be a guide
to the ontic structures, insofar as it is the structures of two rival theories with dif-
ferent ideologies but isomorphic structures that are taken to be ontic by structural
realists. Such theories are acknowledged to be true by structural realists only up
to an isomorphism. On the other hand, the ontic structures are also supposed to
individuate the objects in the ontology, insofar as ontic structuralists are not elim-
inativists about objects. For Super-Humeans, the ontic structure consists solely of
distance relations, and the objects are the particles referred to by Bohmian mechan-
ics. However, as Keränen points out, such structures cannot both be symmetrical
and individuating.
Esfeld is aware that symmetric configurations present a di culty for his meta-
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physical model, but thinks Super-Humeans should bite the bullet and deny that
symmetries are a guide to the ontic structures. This stance may be supported by
two claims. First, Super-Humeans might claim to be only in the business of describ-
ing the actual world. Secondly, Super-Humeans might simply deny that symmetric
configurations of its particles are in fact conceivable.
With respect to the first move, Super-Humeans might seek to justify the exclusion
of entirely symmetric worlds by observing that the actual world is obviously not
symmetrical (at least, as far as we can tell), and by pointing out that all physical
theories have surplus mathematical structure [Esfeld and Deckert, 2017, p.69]. For
example, the solution to the Klein-Gordon equation is the di↵erence between a
‘retarded’ and an ‘advanced’ Green’s function, but the advanced Green’s function is
typically discarded for problems involving time. According to Super-Humeans, we
should likewise regard symmetric solutions to the dynamical equations of physical
theories as ‘mathematical surplus’, which have no bearing on what the world is like.
Nonetheless, the rejection of a solution to an equation of motion usually concurs
with our modal intuitions, whilst many physicists concur in finding symmetric solu-
tions to be possible. For example, cosmologists who have contemplated the famous
Friedmann-Lematre-Robertson-Walker solutions to Einstein’s field equations, which
describe homogeneous and isotropic spacetimes, have apparently considered them
possible (concerning problems with spacetime structuralism, see [Wüthrich, 2009]).
Moreover, in e↵ectively banning symmetric configurations from the past or future,
the Super-Humean is not merely describing the world as we find it – “Just the facts,
ma’am”, like any law-abiding Humean – but prescribing how particles should be-
have in all possible worlds with the same laws. Ironically, in seeking to produce an
account of nature that is more Humean than neo-Humeanism, Esfeld has committed
himself to a strong modal claim.
A committed Super-Humean, then, is likely to challenge the uniformity of the
evidence of our modal intuitions. Whereas philosophers like Wüthrich may take the
metaphysical possibility of symmetrical configurations for granted, Super-Humeans
may claim to be unable to conceive perfectly symmetric configurations, along with
philosophers like Hacking and Belot [Hacking, 1975, Belot, 2001]. More precisely,
such philosophers claim that we have no reason to think that this is the correct
description of what it is that we imagine, when we suppose ourselves to be imagining
symmetric worlds. Super-Humeans will thus maintain that there is no possible world
that must be described in a way that is incompatible with (PII).
Nonetheless, the Super-Humean refusal to take symmetry as a guide to the ontic
structures comes at the cost of isolating their primitive ontology from any input from
the empirical sciences, leaving Super-Humeans with ontological parsimony or sim-
plicity as their only metaphysical guide. This is the cause of Lazarovici’s complaint
that Super-Humeanism is a ‘one-trick pony’ [Lazarovici, 2018], since the determined
Super-Humean will only argue that, if the criterion of ontological simplicity is prop-
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erly elevated, it will uniquely favour their primitive ontology. In what follows, I o↵er
reasons for thinking the pony stumbles in performing its only trick.
§4.4. A temporal dilemma
My second objection calls into question whether Super-Humeanism can o↵er a realist
account of the laws of nature, given its structuralist conception of matter and its
notion of primitive change. I shall argue that these two commitments lead to a
dilemma between two contrary views of time: namely, a presentist view, in which
only one configuration exists at a particular moment of time, and an eternalist view,
in which every configuration exists for all time.
i. In favour of presentism
On the one hand, Super-Humeans require that particle configurations should change
for the sake of empirical adequacy. Yet they cannot appeal to the so-called At-At
theory of change advanced by Bertrand Russell [Russell, 1903, pp.469-473],7 in its
ordinary form, in which individuals change by instantiating di↵erent properties at
di↵erent times, because they reject the assumption that the particles are primi-
tively individuated by their physical properties. Rather, Super-Humeans embrace
a structuralist conception of the particles, in which they lack any intrinsic physical
properties, but are holistically individuated by the distance relations in which they
stand. Likewise, Super-Humeans cannot embed the particle configurations as points
within a primitive spacetime, because they adopt a Leibnizian conception of space,
in which space is also constituted by distance relations.
Nor is it su cient for Super-Humeans to adopt as real an eternal series of config-
urations, minus the usual background conception of spacetime, without explaining
how the time-slices comprising this series are supposed to be individuated as tempo-
ral parts of a single structure. At first glance, it seems they might introduce primitive
temporal relations between each of the particles. Yet it is unclear how such particles
might be supposed to instantiate two qualitatively distinct kinds of relations without
abandoning minimalism. Super-Humeans are committed to a strong form of struc-
turalism, in which all of the matter points at a moment of time must be holistically
individuated by the intra-structural relations that constitute a particular configura-
tion, because they lack any intrinsic properties or primitive identities. Since these
configurations also lack intrinsic properties, over and above their constituents, it
seems that they would also have to be holistically individuated in terms of distance
relations, in order to instantiate inter -structural relations across time-slices within
an eternal stack of configurations.
However, as Lazarovici points out, the distance relations that constitute both the
particle configurations and the physical space in which they move are directionless,
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structureless and dimensionless [Lazarovici, 2018].8 In that case, it is di cult to see
how Super-Humeans who adopt an eternal stack of configurations can explain the
structure of time. For instance, a scientist who sets up a measuring apparatus to
measure the positions of particles, before measuring their positions, then makes the
measurement, before writing the result down, does not set up the apparatus after
writing the result down, nor make the measurement before setting up the apparatus.
Yet why should the temporal order be both transitive and anti-symmetric in a world
made solely of distance relations? It is also di cult to see how Super-Humeans can
explain the di↵erence between primitive change in the configuration of the particles,
and a variation in their distribution along some dimension, without appealing to
additional brute matters of fact.
In short, in order to get these Bohmian particles to change their configuration,
it seems Super-Humeans will have to ‘clear the deck’, so to speak, of one set of
distance relations, before replacing it with another. This suggests Super-Humeans
should adopt a presentist view of time, in which there is only one configuration of
particles that exists at the present moment. (This appears to be Esfeld’s position.)9
ii. In favour of eternalism
On the other hand, Super-Humeans require the existence of an adequate superve-
nience base for the wave function, which must include facts about potential configu-
rations for all of time. In Esfeld’s view, this base is composed of an infinite number
of time-slices, in which each time-slice consists of an arrangement of matter points.
He requires the existence of such an extensive base because a law that includes
the wave function does not supervene upon, and is not wholly made true by, the
distribution of particles at a particular time.
Of course, all Humeans who toy with presentism will face the problem of find-
ing truth-makers for propositions about entities that do not supervene upon what
exists at the present moment, such as universal laws of nature. However, there is
an additional complication for Super-Humeans seeking to accommodate quantum
phenomena. To bring out this di↵erence, consider how the laws are represented in
a classical world, according to neo-Humeans, and in a quantum world, according
to Super-Humeans. In a classical world, one configuration of properties Pi follows
regularly from another Pj according to a law L : Pi ! Pj that refers to distinct
configurations of properties instantiated in the world at di↵erent times. However,
in a quantum world, a best systems account of the world will include only positions
and a wave function, L : (Qi, i) ! (Qj, j), whilst Super-Humeans will insist there
is nothing besides matter points which may serve as referents.
Yet matter points are constituted by nothing but distance relations: they have
no intrinsic physical properties, since any properties are on the same level as the
wave function, which is merely part of the ‘best system’ account of how these matter
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points are distributed for all time. It follows that the truth of any propositions that
pick out objects by their physical properties, including microscopic objects such as
electrons with properties like mass and charge, will fail to supervene upon what
exists at the present moment, or upon any local matters of fact, but will depend for
their truth upon nothing less than the whole stack of configurations for all time.
In short, in order to secure a supervenience base of a wave function conceived
as a nomological entity, and in order to save their commitment to scientific realism,
it seems Super-Humeans will have to ‘join the dots’, so to speak, by uniting each
particle configuration as temporal parts of a single structure. This suggests Super-
Humeans should adopt an eternalist view of time, in which the cosmos is comprised
of a series of time-slices, where every slice is as real as the series of which it is part.
iii. Temporal dilemma
If Super-Humeanism entails both presentism and eternalism, however, it contains a
flagrant contradiction. Super-Humeans are thus caught on the horns of a dilemma:
Temporal dilemma
Either (i) embrace presentism, but abandon scientific realism, or (ii) embrace eter-
nalism, but abandon strong structuralism.
To take the first horn of the dilemma, by embracing presentism, would be to abandon
the truth of a law of nature that includes the wave function, as well as the truth of
propositions that refer to the physical objects that scientists interact with in their
experiments. Might this consequence be averted?
On the one hand, Super-Humeans could attempt to compress the facts upon
which they depend within a single time-slice, by making facts about future time-
slices depend upon facts about a past time-slice. One configuration might be sup-
posed to necessitate another. (I explore this possibility in Chapter 5.) However,
according to Super-Humeans, there are no necessary connections between any of
the time-slices. On the other hand, Super-Humeans might attempt to soften the
requirements of realism, by claiming that the truth of the laws of nature could be
fixed at the end of the world (that is, a future time-slice). Super-Humeanism might
then be reconciled with presentism by appealing to memory: just as the present
configuration of particles may be supposed to contain the memory of past changes,
so the eschaton may be supposed to contain the memory of every past change.
Yet it is di cult to see how memory could play a role in grounding the truth of
any laws without endowing memories with the kind of necessary connections that
all Humeans reject. Whether or not mnemonic impressions qualify as memories
is surely something that is consequent upon the laws of nature, whereas Super-
Humeans who appealed to memory to ground the truth of these laws would have
to appeal to additional facts, over and above the positions of the particles, which
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would have to be correlated somehow with their positions in past time-slices.
In any case, I doubt that the eschaton holds any hope in store for Super-Humeans,
however long their memories. Suppose they take the eschaton literally. In that
case, they would have to believe that some future time-slice tf will instantiate a
primitive property of ‘finality’, such that the primitive arrow of change will not
point to a future time-slice at time t = tf . However, such a move is unavailable to
Super-Humeans who embrace a strong form of structuralism: by stipulation, there
are no primitive or intrinsic properties in nature. Suppose they take the eschaton
metaphorically instead. In that case, they would have to deny that there is some
time-slice that is identical to the end of the world. If so, any law that depends for
its truth upon the eschaton could not literally be true, and Super-Humeans could
not be realists about laws.
To take the second horn of this dilemma, by embracing eternalism, would be to
abandon the minimalism of Super-Humeanism, in which both the space in which
particles move, and the particles that move through space, are constituted by dis-
tance relations. Yet there is more than one way of being an eternalist, according
to whether one adopts the ‘A-theory of time’, which posits an absolute distinction
between past, present, and future, or the ‘B-theory’, which denies the existence of
such a distinction [McTaggart, 1908]. Perhaps we can find a compromise.
On the one hand, Super-Humeans attracted to the B-theory of time might form
an eternal series of configurations by embracing a substantival conception of space-
time.10 In doing so, however, they would introduce a di culty concerning how
the distance relations that constitute the particle configuration are to be embedded
in spacetime without abandoning their structuralist characterisation of matter. In
abandoning either the Leibnizian conception of space, or the strong form of struc-
turalism, they would have to abandon Super-Humean minimalism, which claims
that its world-making relations are su cient for constituting a world of physical
objects.
On the other hand, Super-Humeans attracted to the A-theory of time might
attempt to construct an eternal series of configurations by adopting the so-called
‘moving spotlight theory’.11 In this case, we might think of the world as consisting
eternally of a block of facts about distance relations in di↵erent time-slices, whilst
requiring the existence of ‘presentness’ as a property of a time-slice, along with the
properties of ‘pastness’ and ‘futurity’. Primitive change in a block-universe may then
be understood in terms of the instantiation of these properties. However, setting
aside the problems that have been raised with the moving spotlight theory (for ex-
amples, see [Sider, 2001, 2.1]), such a move also violates Super-Humean minimalism:
by stipulation, there are no primitive or intrinsic properties in nature.
Perhaps we can split the temporal dilemma. In the Growing Block theory of
time, advanced by Michael Tooley [Tooley, 2000], the past and the present both
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exist, but the future does not. Yet surely this represents the worst of both possible
worlds for Super-Humeans. On the one hand, like the presentist view, it fails to o↵er
an adequate supervenience base for laws and physical properties, since the future
does not exist yet. On the other hand, like the spotlight theory of time, it requires
the existence of ‘presentness’ as a property of a time-slice, along with the properties
of ‘pastness’ and ‘futurity’. It seems, then, that Super-Humeans are caught on the
horns of the temporal dilemma. To take either horn would be to undermine the
Super-Humean account of the truth of the Bohmian law, either by abandoning its
minimalism, or by abandoning its realist stance toward laws.
§4.5. Problems for persistence
My third objection concerns whether Super-Humeanism can o↵er an ontology of
particles, given its structuralist conception of matter and Leibnizian conception of
space. Specifically, I am concerned with a question raised by Lazarovici: what
provides for the identity of the matter points over time? [Lazarovici, 2018, p.82].
i. From matter points to spaghetti
Clearly, a world made of matter points need not be a world that contains particles,
which persist through time; it might contain flashes, which appear discontinuously
throughout space. Since matter points are constituted by distance relations, we
cannot appeal to their enduring properties in specifying their persistence conditions.
Since matter points have no temporal parts that are instantiated in spacetime, we
cannot appeal to their perdurance. The persistence conditions for an ontology of
particles, in a world of matter points and primitive change, must be cashed out at
the level of the ontic structure.
However, it is impossible to formulate persistence conditions for particles in terms
of the persistence of the elements of this structure, since a set of distance relations
has no identity over and above its members, such that it can survive a change in
its membership. A world in which distance relations primitively change is a world
in which one set of ontic relations come into being (or ‘presentness’) followed by
another, where each set has a di↵erent identity from the previous set. Since there
are no substances which instantiate these ontic relations, nor any primitive spacetime
in which they are embedded, there is nothing to unite these sets of relations as a
persisting subject of change.
A more promising solution might be to attempt to formulate persistence condi-
tions for the particles in terms of the trajectories traced by the matter points instead.
In a Super-Humean world, it is a brute fact that the number of matter points in this
world is fixed, and the distance relations between them are non-vanishing. Suppose
that primitive change were discrete, such that, in the temporal interval (t1, t2) ,
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where t2 > t1, there were only a finite number of numerically distinct time slices.
In that case, it would be a world of flashes rather than particles, in which di↵er-
ent matter points would appear at certain points along each Bohmian trajectory.
However, suppose primitive change in this world were continuous, such that, in the
temporal interval (t1, t2), there were an actually infinite number of time-slices. In
that case, matter points would prima facie trace continuous trajectories that do not
cross. We might think of Bohmian particles, then, as persisting by enduring.
However, I have doubts about the coherence of conjuring the identities of particles
from their trajectories. To begin with, a set of trajectories need not represent
continuous motion. Consider a world W1, in which there are three particles that
follow continuous trajectories, and a second world W2 containing three particles
whose trajectories result from splicing the second half of particle 1’s trajectory in
W1 to the first half of particle 2’s, and the second half of particle 2’s trajectory to
the first half of particle 1’s, whilst the motion of particle 3 is left unchanged. W2 is a
world in which particle 1 hops to the site of particle 2, just as particle 2 hops to the
site of particle 1. The trajectories in W2 are identical to those in W1. Nonetheless,
they represent discontinuous motion.
To eliminate the possibility that trajectories might represent discontinuous rather
than continuous motion, Super-Humeans will have to rule out the possibility of
worlds like W2, even though W2 is empirically indistinguishable from W1. In this
respect, the Super-Humean is in the same boat as the weak structuralist who in-
troduces haecceities, which are not empirically discernible, to secure the identities
of the particles. In that case, the particles would not be matter points, but matter
spaghetti, in which the essence of each particle is cashed out in terms of a densely
ordered set of sets of distance relations.
ii. Uncoordinated matter spaghetti
Replacing matter points with matter spaghetii, however, raises another di culty:
namely, the problem of how distinct strands of matter spaghetti compose a single
configuration. In order for two or more strands to constitute a configuration of
Bohmian particles that trace continuous trajectories together through space, we
must find a way of coordinating simultaneity relations between the distinct sets of
distance relations that belong to their di↵erent trajectories.
To tease out this di culty, consider the case of a world of two particles, A and
B, in which particle A traverses a trajectory between two distinct points in space,
(x1, x2), and particle B traverses a trajectory between two di↵erent points, (x3, x4).
In a Super-Humean world in which change is continuous, the essence of a strand of
matter spaghetti must be supposed to be dense in the spatial positions that consti-
tute a trajectory. Yet why should we suppose that the ordering of positions in the
interval (x1, x2), for one strand of spaghetti, should correspond to the ordering of
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the positions in (x3, x4), in another strand, in such a way that, for every infinites-
imal increment  x in the position of A along its trajectory with each infinitesimal
increment in time  t, there is a corresponding infinitesimal increment in the posi-
tion of B? The two strands might be coordinated in such a way that, as particle
A advances from the spatiotemporal point (x1, t) to (x1 +  x, t +  t), particle B
jumps discontinuously in space from one point to another; for example, from (x3, t)
to (x4, t +  t), where |x4| >> |x3|. In fact, there are an infinite number of ways
of pairing points in (x1, x2) with points in (x3, x4), and hence infinitely many more
ways of making a world of flashes rather than particles.
Or again, consider the possibility of a cyclic cosmos, of the kind contemplated in
the 1920s by Einstein, in which the universe endlessly repeats the same process of
expansion and contraction, which takes place in a period T . Suppose Qt represents
the configuration of particles at some moment t. In that case, Qt will be identical to
the configuration after n periods, Qt = Q(t+nT ), where n is any positive integer. It
follows that any matter point in a strand of matter spaghetti A that is coordinated
with a matter point in a non-identical strand B can be coordinated with an infinite
number of matter points in B, and likewise with an infinite number of matter points
in every strand of matter spaghetti. Why suppose, then, that the matter points in
Qt instantiate a real relation of simultaneity? Indeed, why suppose that di↵erent
strands of matter spaghetti compose a single particle configuration at all, such that
every member of each strand must be paired with a member in every other strand
and co-ordinated in time?
At this point, Super-Humeans may appeal to presentism, in order to impose a
preferred ordering upon all of the matter spaghetti and unite them within a single
evolving configuration. However, as I have suggested, this move comes at a theoret-
ical cost: a Super-Humean world in which only one configuration of matter points
exists at the present moment is a world in which the laws of nature and propositions
referring to objects that scientists interact with in their experiments are left with-
out truthmakers. The only alternative for Super-Humeans who appeal to matter
spaghetti is to pile on additional brute facts: it must be a brute fact that all of the
matter spaghetti composes a single configuration, and it must be a brute fact that
matter points pair up in such a way that they constitute a world of particles that
travel together through space. It seems Super-Humeans will have to help themselves
to a great many brute facts to build a world of 1086 particles.
iii. Persistence dilemma
I conclude that there is small hope of Super-Humeans deriving the identities of parti-
cles from their trajectories. Those who attempt to wrest themselves from the horns
of the temporal dilemma concerning the nature of time will thus find themselves
caught on the horns of a persistence dilemma concerning the nature of space:
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Persistence dilemma
Either (i) abandon Leibnizian space, and embrace the At-At theory of change, or
(ii) retain primitive change, but embrace particles with haecceities.
By seizing the first horn of this dilemma, we might explain how there are particles
that persist, but must abandon any primitive notion of change: a particle that
persists is one that perdures by tracing a worldline in spacetime, whilst any change
in a physical system is to be explained by the instantiation of properties at di↵erent
points in spacetime. However, Super-Humeans who take this option must give up
both their ontological minimalism and their primitive notion of change. How should
the distance relations that constitute the matter points be embedded in spacetime?
By seizing the second horn of the dilemma, we can explain how there are particles
which persist without abandoning a primitive notion of change: a particle may
persist by enduring if it has an haecceity that exists over and above the distance
relations in which it stands. However, Super-Humeans who adopt this position must
abandon their strong form of structuralism. How, then, should they understand a
particle’s capacity to change the distance relations in which it stands?
Thus to take either horn of the persistence dilemma would be to undermine
the Super-Humean ontology of moving particles, either by abandoning its notion
of primitive change, or by abandoning its conception of matter. It seems Esfeld’s
only recourse is to abandon minimalism by endowing particles with haecceities or
by adopting a substantival conception of spacetime. (I shall consider a model in
which the particles have haecceities in Chapter 5.)
§4.6. General remarks
In this chapter, I have considered the Super-Humean metaphysics proposed by Es-
feld. According to Esfeld, the world of macroscopic objects, such as our measuring
devices, is composed of microscopic particles, which are distributed according to a
law of nature specified by Bohmian mechanics. This law explains the ‘non-local’
measurement outcomes associated with quantum experiments, such as the famous
EPR experiment, which involves two quantum-entangled particles.
Super-Humeanism o↵ers a supervenience base for this law consisting of a chang-
ing configuration of matter points, which have no intrinsic physical properties or
powers, but are constituted solely by the distance relations in which they stand
(Section 4.2). Super-Humeans thus depart from a ‘classical’ micro-monist concep-
tion of reality, in which the physical world is built up of basic constituents with
intrinsic microphysical properties (MM/I), and abandons the neo-Humean mosaic
of sparse natural properties in favour of distance relations. According to this alter-
native picture of nature, we should think of the cosmos as an integral whole, rather
than a mereological sum, which has particles as its integral parts.
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However, I have argued that Super-Humean minimalism comes at a theoretical
cost and introduces conceptual problems. First, I argued that its conception of
matter fails to discern between any number of Max Black worlds that contain sym-
metric particle configurations (Section 4.3). Super-Humeanism is thus saddled with
the implausible modal claim that a Bohmian particle configuration is necessarily
asymmetric. Secondly, I argued that its account of the truthfulness of the Bohmian
law of motion leads to a self-undermining dilemma concerning the nature of time
(Section 4.4). For this law to be true, the particle configurations would have to
support necessary connections. Finally, I argued that the Super-Humean account
of the endurance of particles leads to a self-undermining dilemma concerning the
nature of space (Section 4.5). For particles to persist, they must have some intrinsic
identity, over and above the distance relations in which they stand.
In short, it seems that the problems with Super-Humeanism can only be solved by
taking the following two steps: first, rejecting the minimalism imposed by its strong
form of structuralism, in order to secure physical objects that persist through time;
secondly, lifting its Humean embargo of necessary connections, in order to secure an
adequate supervenience base for its laws. In the light of this discussion, I suggest
the following desideratum to guide the construction of a more adequate ontology:
Desideratum: Objects with causal powers and intrinsic identities
DD/II: Other things being equal, we should favour metaphysical accounts in
which the objects of scientific inquiry have causal powers and intrinsic identities,
over and above the relations in which they stand.
In what follows, I will suggest a number of alternatives to replace Super-Humeanism,
which embody this desideratum by adopting an ontology of powers. Whilst Esfeld
admonishes philosophers against the ‘illusion’ of supposing that, by enriching our
primitive ontology beyond matter points, we can expect to achieve explanations that
are any ‘deeper’ than those o↵ered by Super-Humeans [p.7], it seems that Super-
Humeans do not, after all, have superpowers for deflecting metaphysical trouble.
This being the case, I suggest that metaphysicians and philosophers of science should
balance Esfeld’s injunction in favour of minimalism against some advice attributed
to Einstein: namely, our models should be as simple as possible, but not any simpler.
Notes
1Esfeld uses only two axioms, (SH1) and (SH3). I have modified the wording of the axioms
slightly, for convenience, and added (SH2) to incorporate his views on grounding and substances.
2Thus avoiding some of the objections commonly raised against more radical forms of ontic
structural realism (eg. [Briceño and Mumford, 2016]), such as the version espoused by Ladyman
and French in [French and Ladyman, 2003]. For further discussion, see [Esfeld, 2019].
3The positions of a particle configuration defined in a Minkowskian spacetime would not be
observer-independent.
80 NOTES
4See [Ramsey, 1978]; [Lewis, 1973], pp. 73-75, [Lewis, 1987] (postscript) and [Mill, 1875] (Book
III Chapter IV).
5In refining my objections, I have benefited from correspondence with Esfeld and Koons.
6Parts of this section, and the following two sections, draw upon my recent publication [Simpson,
2019], and some sentences are taken verbatim.
7Christened by Peter Geach as ‘mere Cambridge changes’ [Geach, 1969].
8Lazarovici focusses on how space is ‘lost’ by reducing all geometric structure to distance rela-
tions: ‘There is nothing about the distance relations that would make them 3-dimensional or put
any other constraints on the dimension, curvature or topology of the physical geometry’ [Lazarovici,
2018, p.82].
9See [Esfeld and Deckert, 2017, pp. 151-152]: ‘. . . change exists, but not a whole ordered stack
of configurations Presentism, thus conceived, is the most simple and parsimonious ontology, since
only one configuration exists.’ However, Esfeld does not adopt a primitive arrow of time.
10John McTaggart claimed there can be no real or primitive change in the block-universe con-
ceived in the B-theory of time [McTaggart, 1908], although many philosophers disagree with him.
11The basic idea is found in [Broad, 1923, pp.59-60], although Broad does not assert this theory.
Chapter 5
A network of power-atoms
I shall be telling this with a sigh... Two roads diverged in a wood, and I
- I took the one less traveled by.
– Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken
§5.1. Powers and structure
In the previous chapter, I considered the metaphysics of Super-Humeanism, which
provides a supervenience base for the laws of Bohmian mechanics, and a↵ords an
ontology of nature that maintains certain standard assumptions of scientific inquiry
(AI/I-III). I advanced a number of arguments against Super-Humeanism, in the
form of a symmetric worlds problem (Section 4.3), a temporal dilemma (Section
4.4), and a persistence dilemma (Section 4.5), which challenge its conception of
matter. At the heart of these problems is the strong form of structuralism espoused
by Super-Humeans, in which the Bohmian particles are ‘matter points’ that have
no identities over and above the distance relations in which they stand, combined
with the Humean embargo of necessary connections, which prevents one particle
configuration causing or necessitating another.
In this chapter, I shall propose an alternative ontology for the Bohmian inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics, for the purpose of addressing all three of these
problems. I mean to do so by adopting a weak form of structuralism, and by endow-
ing the Bohmian particles with causal powers. An ontology of powers can account for
natural phenomena, like the motion of microscopic particles, by providing a concep-
tual framework that reconciles persistence with primitive change. First, a powerist
might conceive change as the actualisation of a potentiality that is intrinsic to the
subject of change. It is in exercising its powers that a subject brings about change,
whilst remaining essentially unchanged. Secondly, powerists do not need to posit a
primitive arrow of change, over and above the things that are changed, because a
power to bring about change exhibits what Molnar called ‘physical intentionality’,
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being directed toward future actualities [Molnar, 2006, pp. 60-81]. For powerists,
the passage of time involves intrinsic changes that actualise prior potentialities.
My aim in this chapter is to construct and explore a half-way house between
Humeanism and Aristotelianism, by o↵ering a metaphysics of physics which adopts
a Humean conception of laws, but deploys causal powers to bring about necessary
change. In so doing, I shall be implementing Heather Demarest’s proposal of tak-
ing a ‘best-systems’ approach that is ‘anti-Humean in its ontology, but Humean in
its laws’ [Demarest, 2017], and following Mauricio Suarez’ suggestion of accounting
for entanglement in terms of the ‘Bohmian dispositions’ of particles [Suárez, 2015].
Whereas the Super-Humean strategy combined the primitive ontology approach to
quantum mechanics with Ladyman’s account of ontic structural realism [Ladyman
and Ross, 2007], I propose to combine the primitive ontology approach with a mod-
ified version of Marmodoro’s account of power structuralism [Marmodoro, 2018a].
§5.2. Local power-atoms
The core of this model – the first of three metaphysical models that I shall propose
in this thesis – may be laid out in two axioms:1
Bohmian power structuralism
PM1: There are power-atoms, which exercise causal powers to change their veloc-
ities in response to their spatial configuration.
PM2: The power-atoms are the substrate of all physical change; it is the distance
relations between them that change.
The primitive ontology, in this case, consists of elements I shall call power-atoms,
rather than matter points.2 This model is called Bohmian power structuralism,
which modifies the Super-Humean model in various ways.
i. Matter
For the power structuralist, physical systems are composed of power-atoms, and each
power-atom exercises a power to change its velocity. However, the way in which a
power-atom exercises its power ontologically depends upon the total configuration
of power-atoms, which is explicated in terms of their distance relations. The power-
atoms instantiate distance relations, because in exercising their powers to change
their velocities, they change the distance relations in which they stand. The power-
atoms instantiate relations of ontological dependence, because the velocity profile
that they manifest at any given time t depends upon the positions of all the power-
atoms at time t (that is, upon the total set of distance relations), and they must
collectively ‘co-manifest’ their powers. In this model, the configuration of the power-
atoms at time t serves as a ‘stimulus condition’ for the velocity profile v (t) specified
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by Bohmian mechanics. In order to implement this model, however, there are several
issues that will need to be addressed.
The first issue I wish to clarify concerns the individuation of a power-atom within
the configuration to which it belongs. Do power-atoms have their own intrinsic iden-
tities, or are they, like matter points, holistically individuated according to their
‘position’ in the total configuration? In order to avoid the problem of symmetric
worlds (see Section 4.3), there must be more to the identity of a power-atom than
the distance relations in which it stands. According to the strong form of struc-
turalism adopted by Super-Humeans, two things are identical if they play identical
roles in a structure, where the roles that they play are defined abstractly without
reference to the identities of things in the structure. According to the weak form,
by contrast, the roles that they play are defined concretely in terms of relations to
relata whose identities are independent of their roles. I propose to adopt a weak
form of structuralism in which each power-atom is attributed an haecceity.
Although more commonly found in medieval metaphysics – most famously, in
the work of the medieval philosopher Duns Scotus – haecceities have also been
deployed by some modern philosophers, like Kant and Peirce. I shall require a
power-atom i to have an haecceity Hi, which is a unique property that no other
object possesses: namely, the property of being this particular power-atom. Such a
property individuates the power-atom. More precisely:
8i8j (i = j , Hi = Hj) . (5.2.1)
Perhaps it is not strictly necessary to introduce haecceities in this model, in order
to individuate the power-atoms. Nevertheless, it would require further metaphysical
inquiry to avoid them, and so I shall tolerate them for the purpose of this discussion.
The second issue I wish to clarify concerns the relation between a power-atom
and its power to move in physical space. Is a power-atom identical to its power, or
does it simply have a power? Marmodoro has put forward an ontology in which there
are ‘power-tropes’ that exist at the fundamental level of reality, which are instances
of pure powerfulness [Marmodoro, 2018a]. She claims that properties like mass, spin
and charge may be treated as power-tropes that compose di↵erent particles.
To say that power-atoms are power-tropes, however, would be to claim that
there is nothing more to being a power-atom than the powers it exercises. Yet if
power-atoms have haecceities and stand in distance relations, there is clearly more
to being a power-atom than its powerfulness. In fact, a power-atom’s power must be
defined concretely in terms of the primitive identities of the power-atoms. It seems,
then, that Bohmian power structuralists should say that power-atoms have powers.
The third issue concerns the essence of a power-atom. If a power-atom has a
power, is that power an essential feature of the power-atom, or is it merely acciden-
tal? Suppose we assume that each power-atom i 2 (1, . . . , N) in a configuration of
N particles with a wave function  has a power to move with velocity v i (t) at time
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t in response to the current configuration {Q1, ..., QN}, but that this power changes
at each moment in time, whilst the power-atom remains unchanged. In that case,
the power would be accidental to the power-atom. Unless we posit something in
addition to the power-atoms, which has the power to change their powers (I consider
such a model in Chapter 6), this change in the powers at each moment of time would
be a brute change without further explanation. Furthermore, it would be entirely
mysterious why the power-atoms should always acquire powers with holistic stim-
ulus conditions that always co-manifest. Such a model comes at a high theoretical
cost, and its explanatory virtues are doubtful.
Suppose that each power-atom has its power to move essentially instead. In
that case, if a power-atom’s power to move at velocity v i (t) were to change at
time t, when the particle configuration changes, the power-atom would itself have
to be replaced with a di↵erent power-atom, which has a di↵erent power to move at
a velocity v i (t +  t). In that case, the whole configuration of power-atoms would
have to change essentially at every moment in time. This model runs into serious
di culties. For one thing, such a change implies the creation ex nihilo of one particle
configuration after another, which stretches credulity. For another, it cannot support
a configuration of particles that persists through time.
Third time lucky. Suppose a power-atom has an essential power to move and
persists through time, whilst the manifestation of its power changes from moment to
moment. In that case, a power-atom must come equipped with a multi-track power
(the term was coined in [Ryle, 1949]), in which the specific manifestation of its
power depends on the particular way in which it is stimulated (see [Ellis and Lierse,
1994,Vetter, 2013] and [Bird, 2007, pp.21-4]). We might think of the essence of this
multi-track power as being represented by a 3(N   1) dimensional space, in which
each ‘position’ in this space corresponds to a particular configuration of the other
N   1 Bohmian particles (and hence to a particular track), and the magnitude at
that position specifies the velocity of the particle possessing that power (and hence
a particular manifestation). There is no occasion to physicalise this configuration
space; it is simply a way of representing the potentiality of each power-atom’s power.
Let’s enhance the primitive ontology, then, to include power-atoms with multi-
track powers. Nonetheless, despite endowing the Bohmian particles with intrinsic
powers, power structuralists reject the ‘classical’ micro-monist picture of nature by
a rming the radical holism of Bohmian mechanics (see Chapter 3). This holism is
reflected in this model in the fact that every power-atom depends upon the position
of every other power-atom for its stimulus conditions and upon the co-manifestion
of all their powers. In a power structuralist world, it would be impossible to add or
subtract a power-atom without altering the essence of every power in the network.
Following Marmodoro’s account of power structuralism [Marmodoro, 2018a],
then, the power structuralist thinks of the powerful nature of each power-atom
as being constituted by a structure of ontological dependencies, such that every
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power-atom is essentially related to all the other power-atoms and they necessarily
co-manifest their powers in a certain way. However, Bohmian power structuralism
modifies Marmodoro’s original account in two significant respects.
First, the original proposal identifies the primitive elements in its ontology with
physical properties, like mass and charge. In combining power structuralism with the
primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics, we must drop this identification:
Bohmian particles are ‘featureless’, insofar as they do not have intrinsic physical
properties that can be picked out by a physical theory. Secondly, Marmodoro’s
original proposal endorses pandispositionalism in claiming that there are only powers
at the fundamental level in nature. Nonetheless, the Bohmian power structuralist
requires power-atoms to stand in distance relations, which are categorical rather
than dispositional features of nature, in order to explicate the notion of a particle
configuration. The velocity profile v (t) of the configuration is simply the rate at
which the particles are changing their relative positions.
The image of nature assumed in [Marmodoro, 2018a] is an essentially ‘classi-
cal’ picture of the world, in the sense I discussed in Chapter 3, inasmuch as it
conceives microscopic particles as fundamental objects with intrinsic physical prop-
erties. These particles are built from power-tropes, like mass and charge, and they
can be combined (or transformed) into larger objects.3 Marmodoro’s model seeks to
include quantum spin among the basic properties of particles. In doing so, however,
it runs into the problem of non-locality, since properties like spin that admit quantum
superpositions cannot be treated as intrinsic properties of localised particles without
violating Bell’s theorem (see Section 3.2). Since the best candidate for reconciling
a fundamental particle ontology with quantum mechanics is the Bohmian interpre-
tation, yet Bohmian particles do not have intrinsic properties like spin, this model
will have to be modified to incorporate quantum phenomena. For the remainder of
this discussion, I shall refer to my replacement model simply as power structuralism,
and any comments that I make about power structuralism will henceforward refer
to my model, rather than Marmodoro’s.
ii. Substances and entities
According to Super-Humeans, there is only one substance that objectively exists in
nature, which may be said to have properties independently of any other object: that
is, the cosmos itself, of which all the matter points are integral parts. In contrast, if
one thinks of a substance as a property-bearer that must be distinguished from the
properties that it bears, it seems that power-atoms are a kind of substance, since
power-atoms have intrinsic causal powers (FS/IV). However, they are a peculiar kind
of substance, since one power-atom can never be said to act upon another power-
atom in isolation from any of the other power-atoms. Rather, it is the configuration
as a whole that enters into causal relations with each power-atom at each moment
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of time. What, then, is the ontological status of this global configuration?
On the one hand, the total configuration of power-atoms cannot compose a funda-
mental substance, according to the ‘neo-Aristotelian’ lights guiding this discussion,
since a substance is a metaphysical unity that cannot be composed of other sub-
stances (FS/V). On the other hand, the total collection of power-atoms possesses
a degree of unity that is much stronger than any arbitrary collection of entities,
such as a heap of sand. Let us say, then, that the power-atoms in this metaphysical
model constitute a tightly integrated collective, but one which lacks the degree of
metaphysical unity that is required to be a substance. Such forms of unity are not
foreign to our experience of the world. There are examples of such collective unities
in biology, for instance, that fall short of the unity of a substance [Oderberg, 2017].
iii. Laws of nature
In the primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics, the matter composing
the objects of scientific inquiry evolves according to a law of nature, and the wave
function enters the account through the nomological role that it plays in the temporal
development of the matter. According to Super-Humeans, the nomological role of
the wave function can be spelled out in terms of a ‘best systems’ account of laws.
For the purposes of o↵ering an alternative ‘semi-Humean’ metaphysical model,
I shall adopt a modified or ‘reformed’ view of the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis view of law-
hood: I shall regard the Schrödinger equation and the Bohmian law of motion as
supervening upon and being wholly made true by a set of non-nomological facts,
but will allow this set to include facts about potential distributions of particles that
are irreducible to categorical matters of fact. In this respect, I shall be following
Demarest’s proposal of taking a ‘best-systems’ approach that is ‘anti-Humean in its
ontology, but Humean in its laws’ [Demarest, 2017].
For Super-Humeans, the supervenience base is composed of an infinite number
of time-slices, where each time-slice is constituted by a set of distance relations. It
also incorporates, in addition, a primitive arrow of change, so that one time-slice
follows another, in order to explain how the Bohmian configuration changes. Each
time-slice is thus a distinct temporal part of the changing configuration of Bohmian
particles, with its own separate identity. In order to fix the truth values of laws that
depend upon the distribution of particles for all time, such as a Bohmian law that
includes the wave function, the Super-Humean may be tempted to adopt some form
of eternalism such that all of the configurations can be said to exist at all times,
although this results in some serious conceptual problems (see Section 4.4).
However, power structuralists do not need to expand their supervenience base
to include numerically distinct configurations for each moment of time. Since the
power-atoms have intrinsic and essential multi-track powers, power structuralism
introduces a horizontal dimension within its explanatory structure that explains
§5.2 Local power-atoms 87
how the same set of power-atoms, which persist from time t to t0 > t, can co-
manifest in di↵erent ways at times t and t0, when subject to di↵erent stimulation
conditions. For the power structuralist, the supervenience base at any time includes
facts about potential future configurations, as well as facts about the configuration
at time t, because the power-atoms have multi-track powers. There is therefore no
need to posit numerically distinct ‘time-slices’, or a primitive arrow of change, in
addition to the power-atoms, since the actual configuration of power-atoms at time
t is intrinsically directed toward other potential configurations at time t0, and the
ways in which the power-atoms are arranged in space are purely accidental to their
existence.
The di↵erence between these two ways of forming the supervenience base comes
down to a di↵erence between two distinct attitudes toward potentiality. A Humean
world, by stipulation, is a world without necessary connections, in which the poten-
tial of one thing to bring about another must be an artifact of our description of it.
A world that contains primitive powers, by contrast, is a world of irreducible poten-
tiality, in which some things are properly described in terms of the manifestations
they have the potential to bring about under certain conditions.
As a consequence of this di↵erent attitude toward potentiality, it is possible for
power structuralists to adopt a di↵erent metaphysical stance toward the temporal
parts of the Bohmian particle configuration. I noted earlier that the di↵erence
between presentism and four-dimensionalism can be framed in terms of whether an
object that persists through time is grounded in its temporal parts, or whether the
object grounds its temporal parts (see Section 2.3). For the Super-Humean, the
particle configuration is grounded in the sum of its temporal parts, which consist
of one set of distance relations followed by another. So the truth about the laws
of nature must also be grounded in the sum of its temporal parts. For the power
structuralist, by contrast, the power-atoms are more fundamental than the temporal
parts of the configuration, which are generated through the exercise of their powers.
Consequently, the whole truth about the laws of nature is grounded in the power-
atoms at any moment of time. Nonetheless, neither the Schrödinger dynamics of
the wave function, nor the guiding equation of Bohmian mechanics, is grounded in
any intrinsic features of the power-atoms. Rather, in this semi-Humean model, the
power-atoms change their velocities in a law-like way as a brute matter of fact. (I
shall return to the subject of the lawfulness of these Bohmian laws presently.)
iv. Physical properties
Power structuralism, like Super-Humeanism, denies that the properties to which
our best physical theories refer, like the physical properties of mass and charge, are
intrinsic properties of microscopic particles (or fields). Such properties enter into the
account solely through the dynamical role they play in describing regularities in the
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distribution of matter. Unlike Super-Humeans, however, who adopt an extremely
sparse ontology of matter points, power structuralists embrace the existence of an
abundant ontology of causal powers, regarding each power-atom as being equipped
with its own unique and essential multi-track power.
Power structuralism thus appears to take a nominalist stance toward properties,
since it claims that there are as many properties as there are particles in the universe.
Nonetheless, we can still consider power-atoms as tokens of a common type, since the
di↵erence between each of the power-atom’s powers is only a quantitative di↵erence,
which pertains to the temporal rate at which power-atoms change their positions.
By abstracting away from this di↵erence we can identify a qualitative essence that
all of the power-atoms share: namely, the potential to change the distance relations
in which they stand. It is this abstract metaphysical essence that characterises the
power-atoms as the matter underlying all physical change.
v. Advantages of power structuralism
Power structuralism, like Super-Humeanism, adopts a primitive ontology approach
to quantum mechanics, positing a primitive ontology of matter governed by the
laws of Bohmian mechanics. This solves the problem of non-locality. However,
by enriching the supervenience base of these laws to include causal powers, power
structuralism gains certain explanatory advantages over Super-Humeanism.
First, power structuralism overcomes the symmetric worlds argument, which
threatens the strong structuralism of Super-Humeanism (see Section 4.3). This
problem arises because particles in symmetric configurations are not individuated
in a world in which they are constituted solely by distance relations. By contrast,
power structuralism adopts a weak form of structuralism in which the fundamental
constituents of nature have haecceities, and the powers of the power-atoms are
defined concretely with reference to these primitive identities.
Secondly, power structuralism avoids the temporal dilemma, which threatens
the truth of the Bohmian law of motion (see Section 4.4). This tension arises for
Super-Humeans who adopt presentism whilst rejecting the existence of necessary
connections. On the one hand, presentism excludes facts about future time-slices
from the supervenience base. On the other hand, Humeans cannot allow past time-
slices to determine the content of future time-slices. Yet the laws of nature are
supposed to depend upon the positions of the particles for all time. Fortunately,
there is no comparable tension in the power structuralist’s account. On the one
hand, a supervenience base that contains power-atoms includes facts about all the
potential configurations of the power-atoms for all time. On the other hand, power
structuralism is compatible with presentism and incorporates an arrow of time, since
the power-atoms are ‘directed’ toward their future potentialities, and they manifest
their future potentialities by exercising their powers.
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Thirdly, power structuralism avoids the persistence dilemma, which calls into
question the Super-Humean’s commitment to a particle ontology (see Section 4.5).
This di culty is generated by combining presentism with a strong form of struc-
turalism, such that nothing fundamentally persists between one time-slice and the
next. Power-atoms, on the other hand, have what it takes to secure the persis-
tence conditions for Bohmian particles that follow continuous trajectories through
space, since they have primitive identities and bring about accidental change in their
positions through the exercise of their powers.
Power structuralism is thus able to overcome all the problems I identified with
Super-Humeanism in Chapter 4. It does so by rejecting strong structuralism and
lifting the Humean embargo of necessary connections. Nonetheless, by adopting an
ontology of powers, whilst maintaining a commitment to Humean laws of nature,
power structuralism produces some counter-intuitive results.
§5.3. The cyclic cosmos objection
My first objection concerns an implausible modal consequence that follows from the
claim that particles have intrinsic powers of motion that are stimulated solely by the
distance relations in which they stand. It is, as far as I know, an original objection
to the idea of particles having ‘Bohmian dispositions’.
i. Argument
Suppose Qt represents the configuration of particles at some moment of time t. In a
cyclic cosmos, Qt will be identical to the configuration after n periods of duration T ,
ie. Qt = QnT+t, where n is any positive integer. According to power structuralism,
the velocity of a power-atom at any moment of time depends instantaneously upon
the whole configuration at that time. It follows that, once the power-atoms assume
a spatial configuration they have assumed before, they will also assume the velocity
profile of that earlier configuration. This presents us with no di culties in the case
of a cyclic cosmos in which every configuration that occurs within a period T is
distinct from every other configuration in this period.
However, consider the possibility of a cosmos in which the process of expansion
is temporally symmetric to the process of contraction. We are to imagine that the
cosmos starts small, expands in a ‘big bang’, reaches a limit of expansion, then
retraces all of its steps in a ‘big crunch’, returning to the initial conditions of the
particle configuration. More precisely, we shall require that QnT+ t = Q(n+1)T  t,
where  t < T/2 is some interval of time that is less than the length of half a
period. Let us choose the period of the cosmos in which n = 0. Since the cosmos
is expanding in the interval t 2 (0, T/2), we know that the velocity profile v1 of
the configuration at  t must be such that the particle configuration is expanding.
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However, since the cosmos is contracting in the interval t 2 (T/2, T ), the velocity
profile v2 at T   t must be such that the configuration is contracting.
The problem is this: according to power structuralism, since the two configu-
rations at these distinct moments of time are identical, they must have identical
velocity profiles v1 = v2, whilst in a cyclic and temporally symmetric cosmos, their
velocity profiles must be exactly opposite: v1 =  v2. So it is not possible for the
configuration to undergo a process of expansion and contraction, in which the pro-
cess of contraction is a mirror image of the process of contraction. An argument
against power structuralism can be formulated as follows:
Cyclic-cosmos argument:
i. Suppose there is a possible world that is cyclic whose expansion and contrac-
tion periods are symmetric.
ii. If power structuralism is true, then it is impossible for cyclic worlds to have
expansion and contraction periods that are symmetric.
iii. Therefore, power structuralism is false (by i & ii).
The first premise asserts a possibility of Bohmian mechanics: the laws are compatible
with the possibility of two spatially identical particle configurations instantiating
non-identical velocity profiles at di↵erent moments of time. For example, Bohmian
mechanics permits the possibility of a cosmos with a time-periodic wave function,
 (t) =  (t + T ), in which the particle configuration recapitulates earlier phases of
motion. The second premise draws out an implication of the metaphysical model
in question. According to power structuralists, the manifestation of the multi-track
power of each power-atom depends only upon the instantaneous spatial configuration
of the other power-atoms. It is therefore impossible for two identical configurations
of power-atoms to have di↵erent velocity profiles at di↵erent times, and it is therefore
impossible that a cyclic world should exist. This results in a contradiction.
ii. Discussion
We might attempt to modify this model so that the manifestations of the powers of
the power-atoms depend on their configurations in the past, or that they incorporate
distinct powers that manifest during di↵erent time intervals. In that case, a spatially
identical configuration of power-atoms could instantiate di↵erent velocity profiles at
di↵erent times. I shall briefly consider three ways of achieving this time-sensitivity,
none of which I find satisfactory.
First, the model might be modified by abandoning any commitment to presen-
tism and replacing a spatial configuration of power-atoms that stand in distance
relations with a spatiotemporal arrangement of power-atoms that are embedded in
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spacetime. In that way, two spatially identical but temporally distinct configurations
might stimulate di↵erent tracks. Yet if the power-atoms are eternally embedded in
spacetime, in what sense do their powers underwrite change in space across time?
Secondly, the model might be modified to give each power-atom its own ‘clock’, in
the form of a property or state that admits a new value with each co-manifestation.
On the one hand, this modification would not require power structuralists to em-
brace four-dimensionalism. On the other hand, such a modification is ad hoc and
strains credulity: not only would power structuralists require us to accept a simul-
taneity relation grounded in a privileged present, but to believe in the existence of
an absolute time that is constituted by the book-keeping habits of particles.
Thirdly, we might allow that power-atoms have two multi-track powers that are
mirror images of one another: the first is a type-A power to be moved with velocity
v given configuration Q, and the second is a type-B power to be moved with velocity
 v given configuration Q. The power-atoms might flip from collectively manifesting
type-A powers to collectively manifesting type-B powers during the course of cosmic
history, solely as a matter of chance. However, this switching mechanism does not
correspond to anything in the physical theory of Bohmian mechanics: it is an ad
hoc modification that fails to square with the determinism of Bohmian mechanics.
Alternatively, we could try to rule out the possibility of a cyclic cosmos. Yet it
is di cult to see how such a ruling could be motivated. Whilst some philosophers
have argued that spatially symmetric configurations are, in fact, inconceivable (see
Section 4.3), there seems to be no equivalent argument for denying the conceivability
of one particle arrangement being repeated at another moment of time. Moreover,
models of a ‘big crunch’ are actively being explored in contemporary cosmology. All
things being equal, we should favour a metaphysical model that does not rule out
such possibilities. Thus the cyclic cosmos objection, although not insurmountable,
seems to add to the theoretical costs of power structuralism, whichever way we turn.
§5.4. The small-world objection
My second objection concerns another implausible modal consequence of power
structuralism, which follows from adopting a Humean conception of laws. It ap-
plies equally well both to power structuralism and Super-Humeanism.
i. Argument
According to power structuralism, the wave function is not part of the primitive
ontology, nor is the Schrödinger equation grounded in any intrinsic facts about
power-atoms. Rather, the Bohmian law of motion is part of a ‘best systems’ account
of how power-atoms are distributed in space. The problem I wish to discuss is that
a world that consists of only a small number of power-atoms is a world whose
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supervenience base is too impoverished to support the superstructure of a wave
function that evolves according to the Schrödinger equation. According to the Mill-
Ramsey-Lewis approach to lawhood, it is true to say that a generalisation is a
law if and only if it is an axiom of the ‘best systems’ that ‘balance[s] strength and
simplicity’ in deriving the facts [Callender and Cohen, 2010, p.433]. In a small world,
however, there will always be some simpler account of the facts than the Schrödinger
equation. According to these criteria, we should accept the generalisation o↵ered by
this simpler account, instead of asserting the truth of a law specified by Bohmian
mechanics. An argument against power structuralism can thus be formulated:
Small-worlds argument:
i. Suppose there are only two particles in a world governed by laws specified by
Bohmian mechanics.
ii. If power structuralism is true, then a world with only two particles is not
governed by laws specified by Bohmian mechanics.
iii. Therefore, power structuralism is false (by i & ii).
The first premise takes the limiting case of a small world with only two power-atoms
in a possible world governed by a law specified by Bohmian mechanics. The second
premise draws out an implication of the metaphysical model in question: according
to the power structuralist’s conception of a law of nature, the law specified by
Bohmian mechanics cannot be true in a small world, since it will be possible to
specify a law that is simpler than a law that includes both the Schrödinger equation
and the guiding equation in its specification. According to power structuralism,
then, such a world could not possibly exist, which results in a contradiction.
As an illustration of a situation involving two particles in which we can specify
a law that is simpler than the law specified by Bohmian mechanics, consider the
textbook example of a particle in a circular orbit around an atom, where the polar
angle ✓ parameterises its position on this two-dimensional ring. In this case, the
wave function that solves the Schrödinger equation satisfies a periodic boundary
condition:  (✓) =  (✓+2⇡). At the lowest energy level of this quantum system it can
be shown by an exact calculation that the wave function does not depend upon time.
However, in a world that contained nothing besides this arrangement of particles,
it is evident that the Schrödinger equation, which depends upon time, would fail to
be ‘law-like’ according to the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis criteria, because a much simpler
law would be true instead: namely, one in which it is stipulated that the wave
function is constant. Hence the power structuralist must insist, counterintuitively,
that a world in which the wave function is constant, but is not nomologically fixed,
is metaphysically impossible.
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ii. Instrumentalist laws
I shall consider two ways one might defend power structuralism from this charge.
The first way is to reject the first premise by denying that laws are the sorts of things
that get to be ‘true’ in the first place. As Cartwright observes, for the philosopher
who thinks that laws do not literally ‘govern’ what goes on in the world, such as those
who take Humean views of laws, ‘it is an additional piece of metaphysics to suppose
that there are true generalizations about the facts’ [Cartwright, 2017].4 In the light
of these considerations, power structuralists might avoid being drawn into a debate
about how large the world has to be in order for the law of Bohmian mechanics
to be true by abandoning the attempt to account for the truth of any nomological
description. They might settle for an instrumentalist construal of the laws of nature
instead. According to this view, a ‘law’ is simply part of a useful instrument for
prediction, and the Schrödinger equation, whilst useful in some worlds, is not true
in any of them.
However, an instrumentalist attitude toward laws is not an option for a power
structuralist who seeks to maintain a realist attitude toward quantum physics. Ac-
cording to this model, the power-atoms comprising its primitive ontology are the
referents of the guiding equation of Bohmian mechanics, which determines the evolu-
tion in their relative positions. Insofar as these power-atoms are part of the superve-
nience base upon which this law depends for its truth, power structuralism retains
its grip upon scientific realism. This grip is relinquished, however, by adopting
instrumentalism: if this law is not true, why should we suppose it requires truth-
makers that exist independently of our preferences and practices? In other words,
why should we think that Bohmian mechanics has a primitive ontology?
iii. Conflicting intuitions
A second way one might seek to respond to this argument is by complaining that
it begs the question against Humeanism. If the world were di↵erent – in this case,
if there were fewer particles – then the laws of nature would be di↵erent tout court.
For the Humean, the laws do not govern what takes place in the world, in the sense
of making anything happen, but merely describe in a simple but informative way its
general patterns and regularities. Indeed, the governing conception of laws is inti-
mately connected to the notion of natural necessities that thoroughgoing Humeans
famously reject in their ontology. The small-worlds argument, however, presup-
poses a governing conception of laws, which is precisely what philosophers who take
a Humean view of laws of nature are supposed to reject [Beebee, 2000].
This dismissal, however, seems too hasty. Rather than simply begging the ques-
tion against Humeanism, the small-world argument, I suggest, serves as an intuition
pump in considering the question of what is accidental and essential to a Bohmian
cosmos. As Van Fraasen observes, ‘To say that we have the concept of a law of
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nature must imply at least that we can mobilize intuitions to decide on pro↵ered
individual examples’ [van Fraassen, 1989, p.46]. Consider, for example, Einstein’s
field equations in the General Theory of Relativity. If we believe these laws to be
true, then we believe it is possible for the universe to be ‘open’ or ‘closed’: the
laws of nature admit either of these possibilities. In other words, it seems to be
accidental rather than essential to a cosmos that supports these laws of nature that
it should be open or closed. Likewise, to believe that the laws of Bohmian mechan-
ics are true, I suggest, is to believe that particles wobble their way through space
in accordance with an equation of motion that depends on a wave function which
satisfies the Schrödinger dynamics. These laws admit the possibility of a world with
many particles and a time-varying wave function, as well as a world with only three
particles and a wave function that remains constant. The number of particles and
the actual wave function are accidental rather than essential features of a Bohmian
cosmos.
To pose such questions is not to assume a governing conception of laws from the
outset. The Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account acknowledges a metaphysical distinction
between true laws of nature, which support counterfactuals, from accidental regu-
larities, which in general do not, and aims to capture this distinction by requiring
a law to be an axiom or theorem in the best system that balances strength and
simplicity in deriving the facts. The di culty that arises for the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis
account, in this context, is that this purely logical distinction fails to capture our
intuitions of what is essential and accidental to being a Bohmian world. As a con-
sequence, power structuralists find themselves insisting, counterintuitively, that a
Bohmian world in which the wave function is constant is metaphysically impossible.
The reason the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account fails to capture these intuitions, I
suggest, is that, in seeking to make laws purely descriptive, it reverses the proper
order of explanation. According to this account, the Bohmian law of nature, which
is supposed to explain such phenomena as non-local measurement outcomes in quan-
tum experiments, depends for its lawfulness upon the global configuration of parti-
cles, and is thus constituted (in part) by that which it seeks to explain. However,
as Armstrong complained in his famous critique of Humean regularity theories, ‘a
fact cannot be used to explain itself’ [Armstrong, 1983, p.40]. In making this claim,
Armstrong echoes Plato’s insight that such things must be referred to a ‘higher prin-
ciple’. In more contemporary parlance: for one thing to explain another, we should
require there to be some ‘metaphysical distance’ between them [Bird, 2007, p.195].
The Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account not only fails to maintain this distance, but re-
verses the proper order of explanation. Laws are supposed to explain instances that
fall under them. In this model, however, the lawfulness of laws is grounded in the
instances they are supposed to explain.
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§5.5. Argument from scientific realism
My third objection is a general concern about the compatibility of scientific realism
with the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis conception of laws that is exacerbated by primitive
ontology approaches to quantum mechanics, like Super-Humeanism and Bohmian
power structuralism.
i. Argument
I have adopted a realist posture toward quantum mechanics, in which it is part of a
tradition of scientific inquiry whose goal is to give a true description of a world that
exists independently of our preferences and practices. According to the Bohmian
interpretation of quantum mechanics, the truth in question pertains to a law of
nature that refers to a particle configuration.
In o↵ering an account of the truth of this law, the power structuralist adopts a
reformed version of the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis view of lawhood, in which a true gen-
eralisation is a law just in case it is an axiom of the best system that balances
‘strength’ and ‘simplicity’ in deriving the facts [Callender and Cohen, 2010, p.433].
The relevant facts, in this case, pertain to the relative positions of the Bohmian
particles. The worry that arises for this account may be expressed in Lewis’s own
words: ‘when we ask where the standards of simplicity and strength and balance
come from, the answer may seem to be that they come from us’ [Lewis, 1994, p.479].5
On the one hand, we should have no di culty in acknowledging that scientific
knowledge is generated by means of practices that are influenced by social and
cultural factors, that what we discover depends on certain preferences that shape
our observations and experiments, and that any knowledge distilled by such methods
is fallible and subject to revision. On the other hand, in order for it to be possible
for scientific inquiry to uncover truths about a world that exists independently of
our preferences and practices, it cannot be the case that such factors determine the
content of whatever we learn about nature through scientific inquiry.
The di culty with the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account is that the content of any
generalisation it acknowledges to be a law seems necessarily to be constituted by
our preferences and practices. This dependency is evident in two ways. In the first
place, this account seems to lack any objective measure of simplicity that can be
used to sift between di↵erent theories. One theory might be simpler than another
in terms of its mathematical vocabulary, for instance, but more complex in terms of
the number of kinds of entities it postulates. Who is to say which sort of ‘simplicity’
is paramount? In the second place, this account lacks any definition of explanatory
strength. One theory may be stronger than others in terms of its power to derive a
broad range of facts, for example, yet less accurate in what it predicts than another
theory of somewhat narrower scope. How should we adjudicate between the di↵erent
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‘strengths’ of these competing theories?
In these ways, the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of the lawfulness of laws makes
the facts about laws subjectively depend upon our preferences and practices, and
in so doing, puts itself at variance with the requirements of realism. An argument
against power structuralism, which can be applied also to Super-Humeanism, may
be formulated as follows:
Argument from scientific realism:
i. It is possible for scientific inquiry to uncover laws of nature whose truth does
not depend upon our preferences and practices.
ii. If power structuralism is true, then all the laws of nature depend for their
truth upon our preferences and practices.
iii. Therefore, if power structuralism is true, it is not possible for scientific inquiry
to uncover laws of nature whose truth does not depend upon our preferences
and practices (by i. and ii.)
iv. Therefore, power structuralism is false (by i & iii).
The first premise restates a realist commitment to the possibility of objective knowl-
edge about nature. The second draws out an implication of the metaphysical model
in question: if power structuralism is true, then the laws of Bohmian mechanics de-
pend upon our preferences and practices in a way that ought to be ruled out by any
robust commitment to scientific realism. This dependency results from the reliance
of this model on the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws. The third premise and the
conclusion follow from the first and second premises. The argument hangs, then, by
the second premise, which turns on the claim that the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account
generates laws which illicitly depend upon our preferences and practices.
ii. Rigidified laws
I will consider two possible rejoinders to this argument. First, there is Lewis’s claim
that we can simply ‘rigidify’ our definition of the laws of nature. In defending
the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws, Lewis initially argued that the only sort
of dependence we need guard against is a certain sort of modal dependence, as
exemplified in the case of the ‘ratbag idealist’ who claims that, if we dislike the
way the world happens to be, it is possible to change the laws of nature simply
by changing the way we think about the world [Lewis, 1994, p.479]. The worry is
that if lawhood is contingent on our best system, which depends in turn upon our
chosen standards, then the laws of nature will also depend on our choices. This
would e↵ectively put the laws of nature on wheels, whilst placing the ratbag idealist
on the driving seat.
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The necessary constraints for avoiding this fanciful assertion, according to Lewis,
may be secured if we ‘rigidify’ the definition of the laws of nature, by building into
the ‘best theory’ of any possible world those standards of simplicity and strength
arising from our present preferences and practices in the actual world. In this way,
we can acknowledge that our preferences and practices might have been di↵erent,
but such di↵erences are relevant only to what the inhabitants of those possible worlds
would describe as the laws of nature.
Nonetheless, whilst this approach may secure the modal independence of the
laws of nature, it leaves them in the state of being explanatorily dependent upon
our preferences and practices, insofar as what makes these generalisations to be
laws is partly those preferences and practices that we happen to have at the present
moment. However, as Koons and Pickavance point out, if it is partly our present
preferences and practices that make the laws what they are, then our reliability as
‘detectors’ of objective laws of nature must be put into question. For one thing,
it seems those preferences and practices could easily have been otherwise [Koons
and Pickavance, 2017, p.57]. For another, we are given no reason to suppose any
likelihood of our having been attracted toward objectively real laws, which just so
happen to be rigidly defined by our present preferences and practices. The strategy
of rigidification looks suspiciously like sleight of hand.
iii. The kindness of nature
Lewis o↵ers a second defence of the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of lawhood, which
is expressed in the hope that nature is ‘kind’ to us. Whereas the ratbag idealist
seeks to put laws on wheels, Lewis claims that ‘the best system will be robustly
best’ inasmuch as it will ‘come out first’ whatever our standards of strength and
simplicity. For Lewis, these standards ‘are only partly a matter of psychology’; he
looks to the pristine world of mathematics to introduce an element of objectivity.
‘It’s not because of how we happen to think that a linear function is simpler than a
quartic or a step function; it’s not because of how we happen to think that a shorter
alternation of prenex quantifiers is simpler than a longer one; and so on’ [Lewis,
1994, p. 479].6 If nature is kind to us, it will favour systems that embody these
mathematical standards – even a robustly best system.
So what would it mean, metaphysically, for nature to be kind to us? According to
Lewis, the whole truth about the world supervenes upon a mosaic of sparse natural
properties. If nature is kind to us, this mosaic will exclude ‘grusome’ properties,
such as the property of being observed to be green before time t, but otherwise
being blue [Goodman, 1983]. Grusome properties are unkind to us, since they are
associated with one nomic profile up until some time t, then change their nomic
profiles after time t. Likewise, if nature is kind to us, this mosaic will contain a
sparsity rather than an abundance of natural properties. An abundance of natural
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properties would frustrate our e↵orts to write simple mathematical laws. What is
needed to secure stable laws of nature across di↵erent systems, then, and hence to
secure the existence of a robustly best system of laws, is the regular co-occurence
of sparse natural properties, picked from a small selection of close companions.
Since assessments of simplicity, strength and balance are ‘immanent’ rather than
‘transcendent’, as Cohen and Callender have argued, being ‘relative to an inventory
of basic kinds or basic predicates’ [p.5] [Cohen and Callender, 2009], an account that
seeks fundamental laws must fasten upon a set of sparse natural properties to avoid
the ‘problem of immanent comparisons’ [pp.5-8].
However, for this argument to get o↵ the ground, we must admit the existence of
this mosaic of sparse natural properties, which is precisely what those who adopt a
primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics reject (see Chapter 3). Accord-
ing to Super-Humeans, the kinds of properties that philosophers typically consider
to be fundamental, like mass and charge, are not occurrent properties in nature, but
merely part of the best system that balances strength and simplicity in describing
the distribution of matter points (see Section 4.2). According to power structural-
ists, there are an abundance of powers – one for each power-atom in nature (see
Section 5.2). Thus whether or not we accept the coherence of Lewis’s appeal to
nature’s kindness, or modifications of this strategy that attempt to deal with the
various objections that have been raised against it (eg. [Massimi, 2017]), it cannot
save power structuralism or Super-Humeanism from the threat of anti-realism. Ac-
cording to Matarese: ‘if we do not regard some [sparse natural] properties other
than particle position as ontologically fundamental, it is impossible... to achieve a
consensus... on what the best system may be’ [Matarese, 2018, p.7].
§5.6. General remarks
In this chapter, I have put forward a primitive ontology of quantum mechanics,
called Bohmian power structuralism, which supports an ontology of particles and
accommodates non-local quantum phenomena. This model o↵ers a primitive on-
tology of power-atoms, which have the power to change their velocities according
to their configuration. By replacing the strong form of structuralism embraced by
Super-Humeanism with a weak form of structuralism, in which the power-atoms
have haecceities, and by lifting the Humean embargo of necessary connections, by
endowing the particles with causal powers, power structuralism overcomes the prob-
lems with Super-Humeanism identified in the previous chapter.
Nonetheless, I have argued that this model also runs into metaphysical trouble
and cannot satisfy the requirements of realism: it is susceptible to a ‘cyclic cosmos’
objection, which points out an implausible modal consequence of its ontology, a
‘small worlds’ argument, which highlights an implausible modal consequence of its
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Humean stance on laws, and an ‘argument from scientific realism’, which exposes its
criteria for lawhood to the charge of subjectivism. The root cause of its most serious
problems is that this model, like Super-Humeanism, depends upon the Mill-Ramsey-
Lewis conception of lawhood, but is incompatible with an ontology of sparse natural
properties that might serve as a constraint on what could be counted as the ‘best
system’ of laws (for reasons discussed in Chapter 3). What is needed, I suggest,
is a temporally universal truthmaker for the lawfulness of the Schrödinger equation
that exists independently of our preferences and practices. However, since it appears
that neither the Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley conception of laws, nor the Mill-Ramsey-
Lewis account, are capable of providing this, we need to adopt a di↵erent account
of laws (see Section 3.5). In view of this discussion, I suggest a third desideratum
to guide the construction of a more adequate primitive ontology:
Desideratum: Laws grounded in powers
DD/III: Other things being equal, we should favour metaphysical accounts in
which laws are grounded in powers.
In the following chapter, I shall o↵er an upgrade of this metaphysical model that
aims to meet this requirement, by enriching the primitive ontology to include an
additional element in which the powers of the power-atoms are ultimately grounded.
Notes
1Presented by Simpson for the Medieval Philosophy Network, The Warburg Institute, London,
Nov. 2017.
2For a discussion of power-atoms as the basic building blocks of nature, in connection with
Aristotle’s account of the four elements, see [Marmodoro, 2018a].







Listening not to me but to the Logos it is wise to agree that all things
are one.
– Heraclitus
§6.1. Powers and laws
In the previous chapter, I discussed a metaphysical model, Bohmian power struc-
turalism, which modifies the metaphysics of Super-Humeanism. Like the Super-
Humean model, it attempts to explain the existence of non-local quantum phenom-
ena by providing a supervenience base for the laws of Bohmian mechanics. According
to the Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics, the world is composed of a
configuration of particles whose trajectories are choreographed by a universal wave
function. Unlike Super-Humeanism, power structuralism endows these particles with
causal powers, such that one configuration necessitates another.
This metaphysical model runs into a number of di culties, however, in the form
of a cyclic cosmos problem (Section 5.3), a small-worlds objection (Section 5.4), and
the argument from scientific realism (Section 5.5). At the heart of these philosophical
problems is its failure to provide a truthmaker for the lawfulness of the Schrödinger
equation in terms of its primitive ontology, rather than in terms of our preferences
and practices. This failure stems from the attempt to combine the Mill-Ramsey-
Lewis account of laws with a primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics,
which removes the sparse natural properties that served as a constraint on what
could be counted as the ‘best system’ of laws.
In this chapter, I shall consider a new, ‘neo-Aristotelian’ metaphysical model that
modifies power structuralism by incorporating a fundamental power to choreograph
the trajectories of the particles, which grounds the lawfulness of the Bohmian laws
of nature. In doing so, I shall seize the second horn of the truthmaker dilemma
discussed in Chapter 3, by introducing what Bell called a ‘non-local beable’ within
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the primitive ontology, in addition to the particles. I shall also discard the Mill-
Ramsey-Lewis account of laws in favour of an Aristotelian-essentialist account, in
which laws neither govern nor describe nature, but express the essence of powers
[Bird, 2007, chp. 9].
§6.2. A non-local power
In order to begin building a metaphysical model that incorporates a power that
grounds the Bohmian law of motion, we must answer the following question: what
has this power? There are two answers one might be tempted to give in response:
first, we might posit the existence of a substance, in addition to the physical parti-
cles, which has a causal power to move all of the particles through physical space;
secondly, we might deny that this power is manifested by an agent that is extrinsic
to the particle configuration, and seek to explain how a cosmos composed of particles
may be said to possess this power.
i. A transcendent power
Let us consider the first option. A powerful substance that exists in addition to the
power-atoms might explain the change in the velocities of the power-atoms by being
the e cient cause of their motion. In that case, the power to choreograph their
trajectories would be an active power of this substance, and the particles would
have passive powers to have their velocities changed. Such an account, however,
runs into an interaction problem, which can be generated by the question: does this
substance exist in physical space, or does it transcend physical space?
On the one hand, suppose that this substance transcends physical space. We
might consider adopting a dualist approach to quantum mechanics, combining the
primitive ontology of Bohmian particles, which exist in low-dimensional physical
space, with the existence of a wave function entity, which exists in a high-dimensional
configuration space. However, if the substance is a transcendent entity that does not
exist in physical space, how can it be the e cient cause of the motions of particles
in physical space? In such a model, there could be no physical contact between the
substance and the particles, and hence no physical conditions for the exercise of its
causal power: such a substance would have to exercise its power necessarily, rather
than contingently, and its causal influence would have to reach between two disparate
realms [Esfeld et al., 2017, p.133-34].1 In such a world, any active powers to bring
about change would exist beyond physical space, and the physical world would be
passive and epiphenomenal; its particles reduced to being merely a decoration of the
wave function [Brown and Wallace, 2005].
This conception of nature would shift the theatre of scientific inquiry from the
physical world to the transcendent realm of an eternal, immaterial, unmoved mover,
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which manifests its power necessarily. Such a metaphysics, however, defies certain
standard assumptions of scientific inquiry I am seeking to uphold for the purpose of
this discussion (cf. AI/I-III).
On the other hand, suppose this substance exists in physical space. In that case,
we face a second sub-dilemma. Either this substance is a localised entity – it exists
somewhere in space – or it is a globalised entity – it exists everywhere in space. If
the substance is localised, then it must be further away in space from some particles
than from others. In that case, the substance must defy the superluminal ban on
signalling in modern physics (SBS), by exercising its causal power to choreograph
simultaneously the trajectories of all of the particles. I have ruled out the possibility
of such causal interactions, for the purpose of this discussion (see Chapter 3). If the
substance is globalised, however, we might think of it as being a structure or field-
like entity that is simultaneously in contact with all of the particles in space [Hubert
and Romano, 2018]. In that case, the substance would not require a superluminal
mechanism, nor need it manifest its power necessarily: the condition of it exercising
its power is that it is in physical contact with all of the particles.
Nonetheless, if the particles that compose the objects of scientific inquiry are
endowed merely with the passive powers to have their velocities changed by a global
substance, which is not itself composed of particles, in what sense do causal relations
have any place in the world of scientific inquiry, which (according to Bohmians) is
composed of particles? Indeed, why should we treat the particles that compose the
various systems that scientists study as if they were concrete and separate entities
that exist apart from this global substance? We might simply apply Ockham’s razor
and treat these particles and systems as epiphenomenal instead (AI/II).2 Since it is
a guiding assumption of this thesis that the objects of scientific inquiry are real and
their material parts are localised within physical space (AI/III), I shall set aside the
possibility that the particles are moved by a transcendent causal power.
ii. An immanent power
The second option is the one I should like to consider further in this chapter: namely,
the possibility that the cosmos itself, inclusive of all of the particles, has a non-local
and irreducible power to choreograph their trajectories through space, because that
is the nature of this concrete, material cosmos. To claim that the cosmos itself
has such a power would be to make an informative claim in which we would learn
something about an object of scientific inquiry that rules out other possibilities: if
the cosmos itself has such a power, then the distribution of particles is not caused
by something that transcends the physical cosmos, nor is it simply imposed upon
the cosmos by our own conceptual practices. Rather, it is essential to the cosmos,
not merely accidental to its existence, that the particles of which it is composed
should follow certain kinds of trajectories. In that case, a law of nature describing
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those trajectories might be said to express the essence of this cosmic power.
§6.3. Power monism proposed
The core of my metaphysical model – the second of three models that I propose in
this thesis – may be laid out in four axioms:
Cosmic power monism
PM1: There are power-atoms, which exercise causal powers to change their veloc-
ities in response to their spatial configuration.
PM2: There is a cosmic power, which grounds the causal powers of the power-
atoms at each moment of time.
PM3: There is a cosmic substance composed of power-atoms and the cosmic
power, which has the power to choreograph the power-atoms’ trajectories.
PM4: The power-atoms are the substrate of all physical change; it is the distances
between them that change.
The primitive ontology consists of the power-atoms introduced in the previous model
(see Chapter 5), and a new primitive element I shall call a cosmic power. I call
this model cosmic power monism (‘power monism’, for short). By identifying the
collection of power-atoms with the particle configuration of Bohmian mechanics,
and by identifying the element of cosmic power as the truthmaker for the lawfulness
of the Schrödinger equation, the power monist aims to supply a supervenience base
for the Bohmian law of motion, thus providing an ontology of nature that can
accommodate non-local quantum phenomena (see Chapter 3).
i. Matter and form
Like the power structuralist, the power monist considers physical systems to con-
sist of self-individuated power-atoms, which have powers to change their velocities.
These powers are stimulated according to the spatial configuration of the power-
atoms, which is explicated in terms of their distance relations. The power-atoms
instantiate a structure of distance relations because they have powers to change
their velocities, which brings about change in their distance relations.
For Bohmian power structuralists, the spatial configuration of the power-atoms
was su cient to fix the velocity profile of the configuration from moment to moment:
each power-atom had an essential multi-track causal power, where each track of each
power was holistically individuated by the total configuration. For power monists, by
contrast, the primitive ontology includes an additional entity – namely, the ‘cosmic
power’ – which plays an essential role in grounding the powers of the power-atoms.
This model modifies my original conception of power-atoms in two respects.
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First, the powers of the power-atoms are not essential to the power-atoms:
rather, they are accidental powers which change with time. What is essential to
the power-atoms is their potential to bear causal powers. Secondly, the velocity
powers of the power-atoms are not fundamental features of nature. Rather, they are
grounded in the cosmic power. I shall refer to a power-atom with powers as an ‘em-
powered’ power-atom, which I shall regard as a physical object. (It is a referent of
Bohmian mechanics.) This grounding relation is distinct from causal relations, such
as the causal relation that may exist between one configuration and another: since
the powers of the power-atoms are derivative features of the power-atoms, which are
grounded in the cosmic power, they jointly depend upon both the power-atoms and
the cosmic power for their existence at each moment in time (see Section 2.3).
In this model, I propose that we think of the cosmic power as a simple and
fundamental particular; cf. [Koons, 2018b]. It is not located in physical space, along
with the power-atoms, since it does not stand in any distance relations, nor is it
the e cient cause of their motion, since they have their own powers to bring about
change. Rather, the cosmic power brings about change indirectly, by grounding the
powers of the power-atoms at each moment of time. In so doing, I shall argue, it
unites itself to all of the power-atoms to compose a single substance, which of its
nature choreographs the trajectories of the power-atoms. If the cosmic power is
conceived as being united with the power-atoms to compose a single substance with
a physical nature – namely, the cosmos – we can conceive of the ‘non-local’ power
that choreographs the trajectories of the particles as an immanent power.
I suggest that power-atoms are analogous to the Aristotelian concept of matter
(see Chapter 1). By supplying a persisting substrate with the potential to bear
causal powers, the power-atoms serve as the material cause of the cosmic whole.
Likewise, I suggest that the cosmic power is analogous to the Aristotelian concept
of substantial form. By grounding the powers of the power-atoms that bring about
change in the particle configuration, the cosmic power acts as the formal cause of
the cosmic whole, conferring a nature upon the cosmic whole that is characterised by
the Schrödinger equation. In this way, power monism supports the anti-physicalist
principle that I proposed as a criterion for Aristotelian hylomorphism (AH3): the
physical parts of the cosmos – that is, the particles with ‘Bohmian dispositions’
– depend for their physical nature upon the ‘substantial form’ of the substance of
which they are integral parts. One might refer to the cosmic power, thus united
with the power-atoms, as the ‘cosmic form’ of this substance.
ii. Substances and entities
Yet how does the cosmic power unite itself to the power-atoms to compose a single
substance? Or, as Lowe puts the question: how are we to ‘justify the judgment that a
new concrete object – an “addition of being” – really has been brought into existence,
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rather than some previously existing things merely being rearranged’ [Lowe, 2012,
p.236]? I do not mean to suggest that by taking several elements and simply adding
another element this unites them to make a single thing. For instance, I do not
think this is achieved simply by adding a special power to unite di↵erent elements
(as in [Rea, 2011]). Such a solution is ad hoc and fails to explain in what way this
plurality of elements is united [Marmodoro, 2013a]. One might be tempted instead to
posit some kind of structure that glues all of the elements together (as in [Jaworski,
2016]). However, a structure in which each element is causally connected might be
counted in many di↵erent ways, according to our explanatory interests, and as such
lacks the metaphysical unity of a substance [Skrzypek, 2017,Marmodoro, 2018b].
This problem may be brought into focus by Aristotle’s famous syllable regress
[Metaphysics VII 17, 1041b, 2531]. As Aristotle pointed out, a syllable like ‘BA’
is something over and above the letters ‘B’ and ‘A’ of which it is constituted, but
merely adding another element would not unify them into a single syllable. Rather,
the syllable would then be composed of three elements, which would themselves
have to be unified. Likewise, the flesh of an organism is not an aggregate of its basic
elements (for Aristotle, ‘earth’ and ‘fire’), since it has powers over and above its
constituents, and simply adding another element of the same ontological standing
would not unify these elements into flesh. What we must add is the unifying principle
that makes the letter to be a syllable, or the elements to be flesh.
According to Marmodoro, such a principle should not be conceived as an entity
in the primitive ontology, to avoid falling into the regress, but as an act of conceptual
individuation, in which the ultimate constituents of reality are ‘re-identified’ within
a whole according to our explanatory interests [Marmodoro, 2018b]. Marmodoro
objects to a ‘plurality hylomorphism’, in which the matter and form of a substance
are metaphysical parts, and endorses an ‘anti-plurality hylomorphism’,3 in which
a substance’s matter is not numerically distinct from its form. I suggest, on the
contrary, that we can understand how a cosmic power that is numerically distinct
from the power-atoms may unite itself to the power-atoms to compose a single
substance, without falling into the syllable regress, if this power is conceived as an
element of a di↵erent ontological standing that grounds the nature of the composite.
We might get a handle on this solution by considering an analogy suggested by
Koons.4 Suppose I imagine a 3-4-5 Pythagorean triple. The imagined triangle is
a compound containing four entities: my act of imagination, and the three lines of
the triangle, which are each of distinct lengths. On the one hand, there is clearly
a di↵erence between the unique way in which my act of imagination is part of the
imagined triangle, and the way in which each of the distinct objects imagined (the
lines) are parts. On the other hand, all four of these elements are distinct and disjoint
parts of a single whole. The two sorts of elements composing this whole – namely,
my act of imagination, and the three di↵erent lines – are not of the same ontological
standing, since my act of imagination explains why the lines of the triangle exists
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in the first place. Analogously, I propose that the cosmic power is united with the
power-atoms by being the formal cause of the cosmic whole, which confers upon the
matter of the cosmos a single essence or permanent nature.
As Anne Peterson points out, objections to plurality hylomorphism, such as those
of Marmodoro, contain unstated Quinean assumptions about the univocal nature of
being and unity, whereas for Aristotle ‘there is no such thing as just being or just
unity; these terms are equivocal’ [Peterson, 2018, p.3]. If there is no unity that is not
‘unity under some category of being’, the only way to ignite a metaphysical conflict
between unity and plurality within a hylomorphic composite is to ‘undermine unity
under the category of being at hand’ [p.6]. In this case, the relevant category is that
of substance, and hence Marmodoro’s objection to plurality hylomorphism reduces
to the objection that a unified substance cannot be composed of other substances.
However, Aristotle deploys his distinction between actuality and potentiality to
distinguish matter and form from substance: matter is only potentiality for actuality,
not the substance itself, whereas form ‘is related to a substance as the actuality of
that substance – its essence, or that which makes it what it is’ [p.8] (see Section
1.3).5 Likewise, I claim that power monism is able to resist anti-pluralist objections.
First, in deploying grounding relations between fundamental and derivative beings,
the power monist plainly rejects a univocal notion of being in favour of Aristotle’s
‘equivocal’ notion of being (see Section 2.3), and is at liberty to reject a univocal
concept of unity as well. Secondly, power-atoms and the cosmic power are analogous
to Aristotle’s concepts of matter and form in the relevant respects. Neither of these
elements is a physical substance. The power-atoms are not physical substances
because they lack causal powers apart from the cosmic power. The cosmic power is
not a physical substance because it confers a physical nature upon the power-atoms,
transforming them into the integral parts of a single whole.
Marmodoro’s brand of anti-plurality hylomorphism also contains corpuscular-
ian assumptions about the physical world that power monism rejects. According
to Marmodoro, the world consists of primitive power-tropes, like spin and charge,
which are intrinsic properties of particles picked out by our best physics. I have
argued that these features are not intrinsic properties of particles nor elements of
the primitive ontology (see Chapter 5). For Marmodoro, a hylomorphic substance
can only be generated if its physical constituents are, so to speak, dissolved into a
unity, where this subjective transformation is a↵ected by ‘a holistic re-individuation
of the constituents of the structure, in accordance with either sortal or mass indi-
viduation principles’ [Marmodoro, 2018b, p.66]. For power monists, however, there
are no fundamental microphysical powers that would have to be re-individuated to
generate a powerful whole (see Chapter 5). The physical powers of the whole – in
this case, the cosmic whole – are not fundamental but grounded.
A structure in which one element grounds the physical nature of all the other
elements has di↵erent properties from a structure of entities with their own physical
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natures. A structure consisting of physical entities that are causally interacting with
one another may exhibit novel behaviour, but it is still an aggregate that can be
counted in di↵erent ways. However, the metaphysical structure within which the
cosmic power and the power-atoms are united, according to power monists, is not
a causal structure in which every element is related to every other element as an
e cient cause. Rather, the cosmic power is uniquely and asymmetrically related
to all of the power-atoms by being the metaphysical ground of their causal powers
at each moment of time. The cosmic power thus serves as the principle of unity of
the cosmic whole, by conferring upon the cosmos a single nature, whilst being an
element of a di↵erent ontological standing than the physical parts that it unites. It
is an entity in its own right.6 I shall classify it as a metaphysical power.
iii. Laws and powers
It is in virtue of the existence of this cosmic power, and the cosmic substance that
it generates, that power monism can specify truthmakers for the laws of nature that
are robust against the objections to power structuralism and Super-Humeanism
(see Sections 5.3-5.5). I suggest that this model does so, first, by identifying the
cosmic power as the truthmaker for the lawfulness of the Schrödinger equation, and
secondly, by identifying the empowered power-atoms with the physical particles to
which the Bohmian law of motion refers.
I consider a law to be a general explanatory principle that supports counter-
factuals. The relevant conception of lawhood in this case, however, is neither the
Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws, nor the Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley account. I
have argued that the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account cannot supply a primitive ontology
approach to quantum mechanics with a truthmaker for the lawfulness of its laws that
exists independently of our preferences and practices: this combination is suscepti-
ble to the argument from scientific realism (see Section 5.5). I have also argued that
the Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley account is incompatible with a primitive ontology
approach to quantum mechanics, because it conceives laws as unchanging relations
that necessitate regularities between universal properties. This account cannot ac-
commodate a law of motion that includes a wave function that changes with time,
if the wave function is not part of the primitive ontology, since the properties of the
wave function cannot stand in necessitation relations (see Section 3.5).
Power monism, however, adopts an Aristotelian-essentialist account of laws, in
which laws are real but grounded in powers [Bird, 2007, chp. 9]. (For an eliminativist
view of laws, which admits powers instead of laws, see [Mumford, 2005].) For
Humeans, like Esfeld, the laws are fixed ‘at the end of the world’ by the Humean
mosaic of local matters of fact; there is no part of that non-modal mosaic that fixes
what is physically possible for any other part. For powerists, by contrast, physical
modality is not grounded in anything that is non-modal, but in nature’s powers to
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bring about change by natural necessity (see Section 2.4).
Power monism also expands the category of laws to include both causal andmeta-
physical laws. Following Scha↵er, I take metaphysical explanation to be ‘backed by
grounding relations’ and distinct from causal explanation [Scha↵er, 2017, p.303] (see
Section 2.3). Just as a causal explanation requires laws of nature to connect causes
to e↵ects, to unify natural phenomena and make them intelligible, so metaphysical
explanation requires laws to connect grounds to what is grounded, for the purpose
of metaphysically unifying that which is grounded. Unlike Scha↵er, I take the law-
fulness of laws to depend upon powers.
The existence of fundamental powers in the world embeds both causal and meta-
physical explanation within an irreducibly directional (or ‘teleological’) context that
is absent from a purely nomological description (see Chapter 2). Nonetheless, powers
in nature are empirically specifiable because their manifestations have nomological
profiles: the powers of the power-atoms, for example, co-manifest according to the
Bohmian law of motion, which is individuated by their velocity profile v . However,
the Bohmian law of motion depends on the wave function  , which is subject to
change in time. According to power monism, the wave function is not a physical
entity that causally interacts with the particles, nor a nomological entity that su-
pervenes upon their distribution in space and time. Rather, the wave function may
be conceived as a set-theoretic entity that individuates a metaphysical law in which
initial distributions of power-atoms are paired with potential trajectories:
hQ0,Q(t) i, hR0,R(t) i, hS0,S(t) i, . . .
This law of nature is not something over and above nature’s basic constituents (as
in Maudlin’s primitivist conception of laws [Maudlin, 2007]), nor does it merely
describe a regularity observed in physical space (as in Esfeld’s Super-Humean meta-
physics [Esfeld and Deckert, 2017]). Rather, it expresses the global and intrinsic
power of the cosmic power to impose a dynamical structure upon any particles with
which it is united, which is irreducible to a single distribution of properties in phys-
ical space. This structure can be represented in configuration space, however, as a
series of wave fronts which push any particles in physical space along trajectories
that are perpendicular to surfaces of constant phase. In this way, the wave function
may be said to represent the dependence of the powers of the power-atoms upon
the cosmic power, at each moment of time,7 without itself being an element of the
primitive ontology. As Kim observes: ‘The ontological contribution of dependence
relations lies exactly in this fact: they reduce the number of independent events,
states, facts, and properties we need to recognize’ [Kim, 1994, p.68].
Power monism thus rejects both the Humean characterisation of the wave func-
tion o↵ered by Super-Humeans in terms of a ‘best systems’ account of the particle
configuration, in which the wave function is a nomological entity that supervenes
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upon the total configuration of matter points for all time, and the dispositional char-
acterisation suggested by power structuralists in terms of a structural disposition
of the total configuration of power-atoms, in which the disposition of each configu-
ration changes as a brute matter of fact. In this model, the Schrödinger equation
represents a metaphysical law of nature, and the wave function is a set-theoretic
entity that individuates this law, whilst the Bohmian law of motion represents a
causal law of nature, which expresses the intrinsic power of the cosmic substance to
choreograph the trajectories of the particles that compose it.
iv. Physical properties
Like the Super-Humean and power structuralist, the power monist rejects the notion
that microphysical properties, like mass and charge, are fundamental properties of
particles (or fields). There is a significant di↵erence, however, in the way these
models depict the grounding of physical properties. For the power monist, the
cosmos manifests a power to choreograph the trajectories of the particles, and the
powers of the power-atoms are grounded in the cosmic power. Together, the power-
atoms and the cosmic power compose a single substance with a physical nature.
Power monism thus a↵ords an alternative conception of property determination:
Hylomorphic property determination
HPD: The physical properties of a system are jointly grounded by the power-
atoms composing the cosmos and its cosmic power.
This is a staunchly hylomorphic conception of the nature of physical properties:8 the
properties of being positively or negatively charged, for instance, are not intrinsic
to the matter (power-atoms) of the cosmos: the motion of a power-atom through
physical space may be positron-like in one part of the cosmos but electron-like
elsewhere. Rather, physical properties belong to the cosmic whole: the cosmos
is positively-charged-here-and-negatively-charged-there. (Power monists need not
accept the dichotomy between ‘global’ and ‘intrinsic’ supposed, for example, in
[Dorato and Esfeld, 2015], since they consider the cosmos to be a unified substance.)
Like the power structuralist, the power monist embraces an abundant ontology
of causal powers, since the powers of the power-atoms are continually changing.
Unlike power structuralists, however, the power monist insists on a sparse ontology
of metaphysical powers: namely, the cosmic power, of which there is only one.
However, power monism does not reduce to strict ontological monism, since the
matter and form of the cosmic substance – the power-atoms and the cosmic power
that together compose the cosmic whole – are numerically distinct from one another.
§6.4 The problem of extrinsicality 111
v. Advantages of power monism
Power monism, like Super-Humeanism and power structuralism, supports a solution
to the problem of non-locality by providing a supervenience base for the laws of
Bohmian mechanics. However, power monism o↵ers explanatory advantages over
both of its rivals. On the one hand, by adopting an ontology of power-atoms,
it enjoys the same advantages as power structuralism: it can avoid the ‘symmetric
worlds’ argument, the ‘temporal dilemma’, and the ‘persistence dilemma’ that a✏ict
Super-Humeanism (see Chapter 4). On the other hand, by including a cosmic power
in its primitive ontology, in addition to the power-atoms, it avoids the additional
problems I raised for Bohmian power structuralism (see Chapter 5).
First, power monism avoids the ‘cyclic cosmos’ objection (See Section 5.3). This
di culty arises because quantum mechanics permits two identical particle configu-
rations at di↵erent times to support non-identical velocity profiles. If all the mani-
festations of the power-atoms are ‘encoded’ within multi-track powers that are stim-
ulated by their spatial configuration, it is impossible for two identical configurations
to manifest non-identical velocity profiles. However, according to power monism,
the velocity powers of the power-atoms are not hard-coded into the power-atoms,
but are grounded in the cosmic power from moment to moment.
Secondly, power monism evades the ‘small world’ objection (see Section 5.4).
This di culty arises due to the fact that, if laws are merely descriptions of regular-
ities, then it is metaphysically impossible for a world with only a few particles to
support the lawfulness of the Schrödinger equation. For the power monist, however,
a small world with only a few power-atoms would still contain a cosmic power, and
the cosmic power is the truthmaker for the lawfulness of the Schrödinger equation.
Thirdly, power monism deflates the ‘argument from scientific realism’ (see Sec-
tion 5.5). At the heart of this criticism is the concern that the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis
account, when combined with a primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics,
leads to a subjectivist view of lawhood that is incompatible with scientific realism
(AI/I). However, according to power monism, the cosmic power is both the truth-
maker for the lawfulness of the Schrödinger equation and an element of the primitive
ontology, which exists independently of any scientists, hence the lawfulness of the
laws of nature does not depend upon our preferences and practices.
§6.4. The problem of extrinsicality
Power monism a rms the fundamental significance of two scales in determining
the physical properties of nature: the microsopic scale, which is the scale of the
power-atoms, and the cosmic scale, which is the scale of the cosmic substance.
The chief concern with power monism that I wish to raise here is an implausible
modal consequence regarding macroscopic entities, like scientists, which it shares in
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common with power structuralism and Super-Humeanism.
i. Argument
The argument derives from an objection posed by Hawthorne against Humeanism
[Hawthorne, 2004], but applies more generally to any metaphysics that implies the
thesis of extrinsicality, which is the claim that the causal facts pertaining to any
spatiotemporal region must be extrinsic to that region. To illustrate his claim,
Hawthorne asks us to consider a region R in which the intrusion of a bullet into
the body of an organism is followed by the death of the organism. According to
the thesis of extrinsicality, this region is only extrinsically a region in which the
intrusion of the bullet into the body caused the death of the organism.
To give some precision to this claim, I shall follow Lewis in stipulating that a
region R has a property P intrinsically just in case R has P , and every possible
duplicate of R also has P . Conversely, I shall say that R has P extrinsically just in
case R has P , but it is not the case that every possible duplicate of R has P [Lewis,
1983, pp. 356-357]. I shall following Hawthorne in defining a causal profile P to
be a property that is individuated in terms of a set of causal facts S about what
causes what. Necessarily, an object O has the causal profile P if and only if all the
members of S are true of the object O. We are to think of P as ‘the property of
being such that all the members of S are true’ [Hawthorne, 2004, p.354].
The thesis of extrinsicality amounts to the claim that all possible regions have all
of their causal profiles extrinsically [Pallies, 2019, p. 140]. If the thesis of extrinsi-
cality is true, then an intrinsic duplicate of any region, such as an intrinsic duplicate
R0 of the region R, will not necessarily have any of the same causal profiles. R0
might contain a perfect duplicate of the entire country in which the organism was
shot. Nonetheless, it need not be the case that the intrusion of the bullet into its
body is causally connected with the death of the organism in R0, because R does
not possess any intrinsic causal profiles.
According to Hawthorne, Humeanism implies the thesis of extrinsicality, because
‘the causal facts pertaining to any subregion of the world are extrinsic to that
region, supervening on the global distribution of freely recombinable fundamental
properties’ [Hawthorne, 2004, p.351].9 (The laws of nature are prior to the causal
facts, and supervene upon nothing less than the entire Humean mosaic of non-
nomological facts.) Likewise, power monism implies the thesis of extrinsicality,
despite rejecting Humean conceptions of laws and causality. According to power
monism, the causal powers of the objects of scientific inquiry, which are composed
of power-atoms, are grounded in nothing less than the entire cosmos, which has the
power to choreograph the trajectory of all of the power-atoms. Hence the causal
profiles of any sub-region of the cosmos will be extrinsic to that region.
Hawthorne insists upon a connection between consciousness and intrinsicality:
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it is plausible that an intrinsic duplicate of a region wholly containing a conscious
being – say, the physicist Erwin Schrödinger – will contain a being that possesses the
particular qualitative properties that characterise his conscious life. (For an opposing
view, see [Sider, 2003].) Granted this premise, Hawthorne seeks to make trouble for
the thesis of extrinsicality by arguing that there is a necessary connection between
having a conscious life and having a causal profile: namely, there is some causal
profile such that no being could instantiate this conscious life without instantiating
that causal profile. The conjunction of these two theses contradicts the thesis of
extrinsicality. This suggests the following argument against power monism:
Argument from extrinsicality:
i. Necessarily, an intrinsic duplicate of a region wholly containing Schrödinger
will contain a being with his conscious life L.
ii. There is some causal profile P such that a being instantiates the causal profile
P just in case that being instantiates the conscious life L.
iii. If power monism is true, then it is possible that an intrinsic duplicate of a
region wholly containing Schrödinger does not contain a being that instanti-
ates the causal profile P .
iv. Therefore, if power monism is true, then it is possible that an intrinsic dupli-
cate of a region wholly containing Schrödinger does not contain a being with
his conscious life L (by ii. and iii.).
v. Therefore, power monism is false (by i. and iv.).
The first premise appeals to strong intuitions: Hawthorne claims that to deny the
intrinsicality of consciousness would be to throw into doubt our grasp of the con-
cepts of intrinsicality and duplication. Indeed, one way in which two regions might
fail to be intrinsic duplicates can be spelled out in terms of consciousness as fol-
lows: if a spatiotemporal region wholly contains a conscious being, and some other
spatiotemporal region does not contain a conscious being, then these two regions
cannot be intrinsic duplicates. I shall allow that the first premise is more plausible
than its denial.
The second premise, which posits a necessary connection between having a con-
scious life L and having a certain causal profile P , may be supported by three
considerations suggested by Hawthorne. First, it seems plausible that there are es-
sential causal relations between some phenomenal states and some attentiontional
acts. Suppose, for instance, that Schrödinger is su↵ering from acute dyspepsia and
is taking bicarbonate of soda to mitigate his symptoms. It seems reasonable to
suppose that an intrinsic duplicate of a region wholly containing his phenomenal
life will contain a being that is attending to feelings of dyspepsia, since it is highly
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implausible that a being might duplicate the phenomenal life of Schrödinger, includ-
ing his feelings of dyspepsia, whilst failing to attend to any part of it. Secondly, it
seems plausible that there are some essential causal relations between the tempo-
ral parts of region that supports a conscious life. Suppose the parts of that region
are conceived as temporally instantaneous – that is, as lasting only for the merest
instant of time. Hawthorne suggests that, for an instantaneous being, ‘there would
not be enough time for the flame of consciousness to flicker’ [p.355]. In other words,
it seems implausible that consciousness should be intrinsic to arbitrarily small slices
of a region occupied by a conscious life L. It is more plausible that the consciousness
of the life in this region depends upon those temporal parts being causally related
in a suitable way. Finally, it seems plausible that certain phenomenal states are
essentially constituted by causal powers. For example, Hawthorne suggests that
phenomenal colours are disposed to produce certain similarity verdicts, such as the
verdict that red and orange are more similar to one another than red and blue.
Such speculations will strike some philosophers more favourably than others.
Here is another consideration, for those who think some kind of functionalism o↵ers
the best account of the mind. Suppose we grant that decoherence theory establishes
correlations between the brain states of scientists, which are composed of particles,
and the directions of pointers on their measuring devices, which are also composed of
particles. Yet suppose that the macroscopic mental states of a scientist performing
an experiment, which are functionally realised by microscopic particles, are not
intrinsic either to the brain of the scientist, or the spatiotemporal region in which
the experiment is being performed. In that case, we would have positive reason to
doubt whether the scientist’s mental states, which are extended over nothing less
than the entire cosmos, successfully track their localised brain states in the right
way, such that their conscious beliefs and perceptions regarding their measurements
are determined by the environment of the laboratory. This poses a worry for the
Bohmian solution to the measurement problem. (I shall explore such worries in
Chapter 8). I shall allow, then, that we have some reasons for upholding a necessary
connection between having a conscious life and having a causal profile.
The third premise articulates a corollary of power monism, which implies the
thesis of extrinsicality. This claim requires some careful handling, since power-atoms
do not have intrinsic physical properties, like positive or negative charge. Rather,
an empowered power-atom may move in an electron-like-way in one spatiotemporal
region, and in a positron-like-way in another, according to its ever-changing powers
within the cosmic whole (of which it is an integral part). Nonetheless, I suggest that
we can make sense of the notion of an intrinsic duplicate, in the context of power
monism, if it is understood in terms of trajectories: an intrinsic duplicate of a region
is one in which the relative motions of the particles in both regions are identical.
Granted the truth of the first three premises, the conclusion logically follows by
deduction: certain causal facts are intrinsic to a spatiotemporal region containing
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a conscious being like Schrödinger, whilst power monism requires all causal facts
to be extrinsic to any region. We thus obtain a contradiction. On the one hand,
an intrinsic duplicate of a region that wholly contains Schrödinger should contain
Schrödinger’s conscious life. On the other hand, power monism, is committed to
the thesis of extrinsicality, hence it permits the possibility of an intrinsic duplicate
of a region that wholly contains Schrödinger yet fails to contain a being who shares
his conscious life. This argument applies equally to Super-Humeanism and power
structuralism. The best line of attack is to undermine the third premise.
ii. Profile-preserving laws
The first line of response that I shall consider attempts to avoid the iceberg of
extrinsicality by emphasising the role of local regularities over and above global
regularities. Brian Weatherson has argued, in defence of Humeanism, that some
spatiotemporal regions are such that all of their possible duplicates have su ciently
similar laws to support the causal profile of a conscious life [Weatherson, 2007].
According to Weatherson, it is false that a Humean conception of laws implies that
all of the causal facts pertaining to a region must be extrinsic to that region. Whilst
conceding that a region containing a conscious being like Schrödinger must possess
certain properties intrinsically, Weatherson argues that the best-systems theory of
laws is more sensitive to local patterns than it is to global patterns. ‘If the parts are
large and isolated enough... Much better to say that patterns obtaining within such
a region are su ciently simple and informative to count as laws’ [p. 141]. In that
case, if we accept the best-systems theory of laws, we can allow that some regions
have their causal profiles intrinsically, such that their intrinsic duplicates have the
same causal profiles. This argument cannot save power monism, of course, but it
might give Super-Humeanism and power structuralism an advantage, since they rely
on a Humean conception of laws.
Daniel Pallies has argued, however, that in a Humean world ‘every possible region
has duplicates such that wildly di↵erent laws pertain to those duplicates’ [Pallies,
2019, p.146]. For example, let us consider the smallest spatiotemporal region in
the actual world containing Schrödinger. Suppose we understand Weatherson to be
claiming that every possible world containing a duplicate of the Schrödinger-region
will have region-restricted laws such that its Schrödinger-region has the same causal
profile as our Schrödinger-region. Pallies notes that we can generate counterexam-
ples by considering what happens at the edges of such a region. In our world, some
electron-like motions of particles, just inside the Schrödinger-region, are constantly
conjoined with electron-like motions of particles, just outside the region, such that
the repulsion predicted between two electrons by Coulomb’s law is observed. In
other possible worlds, however, those correlative motions will not be conjoined: it
will be false that electrons inside the Schrödinger-region repulse electrons outside of
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that region. These worlds will diverge with respect to their region-restricted laws.
Alternatively, suppose we understand Weatherson to be claiming that every
world containing a Schrödinger-region will have global laws that preserve the causal
profiles of every Schrödinger-region. We still have reason to demur. Consider a
possible world in which, for every abstract pattern of relative particle motions, up
to some arbitrary number of particles, there is some set of particles in the world
which realise that pattern of motion. Such a world will contains arbitrarily many
Schrödinger-regions. Yet in such worlds, Pallies suggests, a Humean best-systems
account of laws, in which laws are merely axioms or theorems in a true deductive
system, will favour a much simpler law than those associated with the Schrödinger-
region in our world: namely, ‘for every abstract pattern of fundamental property and
relation instantiations, there is some set of objects which realizes that pattern.’ [p.
144]. If Humeans allow themselves to consider global patterns, then, as it seems that
they should, they must allow that global patterns ‘may defeat local patterns’ [p.145],
such as those patterns that obtain in the Schrödinger-region of the actual world. I
conclude that Super-Humeanism and power structuralism enjoy no advantage over
power monism in dealing with the problem of extrinsicality.
iii. Substance pluralism
A power monist might contemplate a parallel move, however, by allowing the possi-
bility of local metaphysical powers in nature, in addition to the cosmic power, which
unite themselves to the power-atoms of particular regions to compose localised sub-
stances with intrinsic causal powers. If Schrödinger is such a substance – that is, a
macroscopic entity composed of both power-atoms and a local metaphysical power
– then an intrinsic duplicate of a Schrödinger-region that contains the conscious life
L will necessarily instantiate the causal profile P .
The di culty with this proposed modification lies in finding a coherent way in
which to reconcile the local contributions of these ‘conscious-zone’ powers with the
non-local and deterministic contribution of the cosmic power, and the existence of
a cosmic substance that contains all of the power-atoms with localised substances
that contain sub-sets of power-atoms. The di culties to surmount concern both the
physics of the quantum dynamics and the metaphysics of substances.
First, in order for Bohmian mechanics to be true, such a world would have to
be governed by Bohmian laws. Since the Bohmian law of motion is both universal
and deterministic, however, there would have to be determinism at the level of any
conscious-zone powers. Yet all of the Bohmian particles are quantum-entangled with
one another, so the trajectories of the particles comprising a localised substance
would still be choreographed by the universal wave function, and their velocities
would still depend upon the positions of all the other particles. It seems the only way
for a conscious-zone power to confer an intrinsic profile upon a region would be for it
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to violate the Bohmian law of motion. Secondly, the cosmic whole is a metaphysical
substance which contains only integral and potential parts. A substance cannot
contain physical substances as parts and still be a unified whole.
A more exotic possibility exists that is compatible with determinism: these meta-
physical powers might influence the trajectories of the particles by acting upon the
particle configuration retroactively and changing its initial conditions. Yet they
could not do so by uniting with a local collection of power-atoms to compose a sub-
stance like Schrödinger and grounding its causal powers, but would have to causally
influence power-atoms that are not part of the matter of Schrödinger. Such a world
would not contain localised substances with intrinsic causal powers, nor local regions
with intrinsic causal profiles. It seems, then, that ‘local’ metaphysical powers have
no place in a Bohmian cosmos, since they would have to violate either determinism
or locality in order to make a di↵erence to the trajectories of the particles.
Suppose, then, we abandon the Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics,
with its deterministic Schrödinger dynamics, and adopt the GRW interpretation de-
veloped by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber [Ghirardi et al., 1986], which introduces a
nonlinear stochastic mechanism for the spontaneous localisation of the wave func-
tion (see Section 3.4). We might also adopt the GRWm primitive ontology of quan-
tum mechanics put forward by Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti, in which the parti-
cles are replaced with a gunky matter field distribution in physical space, and the
Schrödinger-evolution and collapse of the wave function correspond to expansions
and contractions in its matter-density [Allori et al., 2008,Ghirardi et al., 1995].
Nonetheless, whilst these spontaneous contractions can be understood as the
manifestations of causal powers [Dorato and Esfeld, 2010], this move does not suc-
ceed in pinning causal profiles to spatiotemporal regions. After all, the powers to
contract the global distribution of matter density are not intrinsic to any localised
physical systems, or the spatiotemporal regions in which they exist. Rather, the col-
lapse mechanism proposed in the GRW model produces random ‘hits’ on the wave
function that occur universally for microscopic particles, which do not depend upon
the local context of the physical system. It is not su cient, then, to deny global
determinism in order to ‘make room’ for regions with intrinsic causal profiles. We
must allow the local context of a system to make a di↵erence to its micro-physics.10
§6.5. General remarks
In this chapter, I have put forward a primitive ontology of quantum mechanics,
called power monism, which accommodates non-local quantum phenomena by sup-
plying a supervenience base for Bohmian mechanics. This model di↵ers from power
structuralism in the following respect: in addition to providing an ontology of power-
atoms that have the power to change their velocities, which are the referents of the
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Bohmian law of motion, this model includes a cosmic power that grounds the causal
powers of the power-atoms, and in so doing supplies a truthmaker for the lawful-
ness of the Schrödinger equation. By adopting an Aristotelian-essentialist account of
laws, in place of the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account, this model overcomes the problems
with power structuralism (see Chapter 5).
However, I argued that power monism is vulnerable to the problem of extrinsi-
cality, which banishes intrinsic consciousness from any spatiotemporal region of the
cosmos. This problem applies equally to power structuralism and Super-Humeanism.
At the root of this problem, I suggest, is the fact that these metaphysical models
uphold a radical form of cosmic holism, in which the only entity in nature with
an intrinsic causal profile is the cosmic substance itself. In view of this di culty, I
propose a third desideratum to guide the construction of another primitive ontology:
Desideratum: Local substances
DD/IV: All things being equal, we should prefer metaphysical accounts in which
nature contains local substances with intrinsic causal powers.
If the world consists of a single set of fundamental constituents whose micro-physics
are determined by a universal wave function (MM/II), however, and the properties
of every physical system are quantum-entangled, how are we to distinguish local
substances with intrinsic causal powers? In the following chapters, I will argue
that we have good reason to think there are systems in nature which have intrinsic
properties that are not quantum-entangled, and will discuss a metaphysical model
that adopts an alternative Schrödinger dynamics, in which the evolution of the wave
function depends upon the local context of individual quantum systems.
Notes
1Barring a fundamental randomness in the exercise of powers, which would not fit well with a
deterministic Bohmian picture.
2This objection is analogous to one of Aristotle’s objection to Platonism (see Chapter 1).
3To use Peterson’s terminology in [Peterson, 2018].
4Personal correspondence.
5Emphasis added.
6In scholastic terminology: it exists ante rem, and not post rem.
7We might think of this abstract form of dependence as being analogous to how the motions of
balls on curved surfaces depend upon the geometry of the surface.
8Hylomorphism is a portmanteau of the Greek words for matter (hyle) and form (morphe). For
a discussion of contemporary forms of staunch vs. faint-hearted hylomorphism, see [Koons, 2014].
9Disputed in [Weatherson, 2007] but defended in [Pallies, 2019].
10I consider an alternative context-dependent quantum dynamics in Chapter 7, and a metaphys-
ical model that includes an ontology of local substances in Chapter 9.
Part III
The paths to power pluralism
In Part I, I discussed how the ‘hylomorphic’ conception of nature, in which sub-
stances are composed of matter and form, was replaced by a micro-monist conception
of nature, in which matter consists of a set of fundamental constituents described
by the same micro-physics. In Part II, I discussed the challenge posed by the phe-
nomenon of quantum-entanglement to the classical micro-monist conception of the
world as consisting of particles (or fields) with intrinsic physical properties. The
quantum revolution has given rise to the problem of non-locality, which is the chal-
lenge of explaining the non-local measurement outcomes of the EPR experiment,
given the ban on superluminal signalling in physics (Chapter 3).
I considered three quantum micro-monist models that seek to address this prob-
lem by providing a supervenience base for the Bohmian interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics: a Humean model, called ‘Super-Humeanism’ (Chapter 4), a semi-
Humean, called ‘power structuralism’ (Chapter 5) and a ‘neo-Aristotelian’ model,
called ‘power monism’ (Chapter 6). According to these models, the world consists
of an arrangement of fundamental constituents – microscopic particles – governed
by the laws of Bohmian mechanics, which lack any intrinsic physical properties. Yet
each model seeks to improve on the previous model by conceptualising the nature
of matter in a di↵erent way: for Super-Humeans, the Bohmian particles are ‘mat-
ter points’, which are nothing over and above the distance relations in which they
stand; for power structuralists, the particles are ‘power-atoms’, which have powers
to change their velocities; for power monists, the causal powers of the power-atoms
are grounded in a ‘cosmic power’ that transforms them into a cosmic substance.
Among the various objections I raised against these models, I argued that: Super-
Humeanism cannot provide an ontology of persisting particles, and is inconsistent in
its conception of time and change; power structuralism cannot accommodate worlds
with small numbers of particles or cyclic patterns of expansion and contraction,
and the attempt to combine the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis view of laws with a primitive
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ontology approach to quantum mechanics is incoherent. Power monism avoids these
problems, replacing the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account with an Aristotelian-essential
conception of laws in which the cosmic power is the truthmaker for the Schrödinger
equation. Nonetheless, all three models su↵er from the ‘problem of extrinsicality’,
which excludes intrinsic consciousness from the physical world.
In Part III, I shall consider a second challenge posed to micro-monists by the
emergence of thermochemical phenomena in complex quantum systems. I shall argue
that the quantum micro-monist models that I considered in Part II fail to accommo-
date properties like temperature and chemical entropy, and should be replaced by
a ‘micro-pluralist’ model in which the quantum micro-physics is context-dependent.
I shall also argue that a micro-monist world in which the only measurable prop-
erties are determined by a universal wave function is a world in which the sci-
entific image lacks empirical content. Finally, I shall outline a new metaphysical
model called ‘power pluralism’, which introduces an ontology of thermochemical
substances, where each substance is composed of a ‘matter field’ and a ‘substantial
power’. This hylomorphic ontology is immune to the problems I have raised for
micro-monist models. This part of my thesis consists of three chapters:
Chapter 7 Matter without microscopic constituents 121
Chapter 8 Saving the manifest image 143
Chapter 9 Substantial powers 163
Chapter 7
Matter without microscopic constituents
Physicists don’t know what deep explanatory structure of the microworld
to be realists about.
– Roger Jones, Realism about what?
§7.1. The quantum revolution in macroscopic systems
In Part II, I considered the ‘quantum revolution’ in microscopic physics, and the
problem of non-locality to which it gave rise, which challenges the classical micro-
monist conception of the world as consisting of microscopic particles (or fields) with
intrinsic physical properties. I discussed a number of metaphysical models that at-
tempt to accommodate the phenomenon of quantum entanglement by adopting a
primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics, in which the world is composed
of a distribution of primitive matter without intrinsic physical properties whose ar-
rangements in three-dimensional space (or four-dimensional spacetime) are governed
by a law of nature, such as the law of motion specified by Bohmian mechanics.
Nonetheless, in this chapter I will argue that all of the ontologies that I have
discussed so far undermine the possibility of scientific inquiry, since they fail to
account for the macroscopic objects upon which scientists depend to perform their
experiments. Clearly, it is not just any world in which scientific inquiry is possible.
Since scientists cannot directly perceive many of the things they purport to describe,
they must engage in practices in which they manipulate and observe the behaviour
of macroscopic instruments. In order for scientists to manipulate these instruments,
however, they must be solid objects of a certain temperature range that can be
grasped by the hand, and in order for scientists to observe the positions of pointers
that register their measurement outcomes, they must be colourful objects that can
be distinguished visually. I shall describe such objects as having thermochemical
properties in virtue of their instantiating ‘chemical structures’, which are metastable
structures of chemical bonds and molecular constituents.
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Assumption of inquiry: Reality of scientific instruments
AI/IV: The world contains macroscopic instruments that instantiate chemical
structures over the time-scale of an experiment.
In a primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics, like Super-Humeanism or
power monism, the properties of a sub-system enter into the account through the
dynamical role they play in specifying how its matter is distributed, and the mea-
surement outcomes of a scientific experiment are constituted solely by the positions
of the matter composing the measuring device. Yet we have good reason to doubt
whether the thermochemical properties of the macroscopic objects that scientists
depend upon to discern the outcomes of their experiments are reducible to the mi-
croscopic properties of a single quantum system with a universal wave function, such
as a global system of particles governed by the laws of Bohmian mechanics.
In what follows, I shall argue that such ‘classical’ properties do not merely play
a dynamical role in specifying regularities in a distribution of matter, such as the
positions of the particles composing the pointer on a measuring device. They also
play a kinematic role in specifying the macroscopic boundary conditions of any model
of a system that has empirical content, in which quantum and ‘classical’ observables
can be defined. To discuss this claim further, however, and its implications for the
primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics, we will need to consider the
dynamical and kinematic structure of quantum models in a little more detail.1
§7.2. The problem of emergence
i. From pioneer to generalised quantum mechanics
A quantum model of a microscopic or macroscopic system has three basic compo-
nents: (Q,S,D). Its observables Q are variables that can in principle be measured
in an experiment, such as functions of position and momentum (which embody
a quantum statistical algorithm). Its states S are functionals of the observables
that specify their expectation values (which are long-run experimental averages).
Together, these two components comprise the system’s kinematics (Q,S). The dy-
namics of the system D is given by a law that specifies the expectation value of the
observables at a particular time, given the initial state of the system.
In the ‘pioneer period’ of quantum physics, spanning the 1930s and 40s, quantum
models were primarily constructed using a Hilbert space approach (for an overview
of this epoch, see [Primas, 1983], chp.3). In this model, the observables of a system
are represented by a set of bounded self-adjoint operators B(H) defined in a single
Hilbert space H, whilst the states of the system correspond to density operators ⇢t
that determine their expectation values, which are comprised of vectors spanning
the Hilbert space. Famously, these states admit superpositions, and these operators
– such as those corresponding to position and momentum observables – do not
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commute with one another. Any interactions between a physical system and a
measuring device significantly disturb the quantum state. The quantum dynamics is
specified by a unitary operator defined on the Hilbert space with a fixed Hamiltonian
function, which sums the kinetic and potential energies of the system. For example,
in the Bohmian interpretation introduced in Chapter 3, a universal wave function for
the cosmos is defined in a single Hilbert space, and a Hamiltonian may be derived for
a global configuration of N particles, which is idealised as applying in all contexts.2
In the era of quantum chemistry, which began in the 1950s, a new form of ‘gen-
eralised quantum mechanics’ was developed that departed from the single-Hilbert-
space-approach (concerning the era of quantum chemistry, see [Primas, 1983, chp.4]).
This involves constructing an algebra A for a quantum system using the canonical
observables B(H). According to this approach, these abstract ‘observables’ comprise
the self-adjoint part of a C*-algebra, and the ‘state’ corresponds to a linear mapping
directly from observables to expectation values (instead of via a density function).
Significantly, the states in an algebraic model can be disjoint from one another, ad-
mitting no superpositions, and a core of ‘classical’ (or ‘global’) observables can be
defined which commute with one another (of which more later). These ‘classical’
observables are exceptions to the superposition principle, and comparatively unper-
turbed by measurement interactions. (I shall refer to this algebraic approach to the
quantum mechanics of infinite systems as QM1, following [Ruetsche, 2011].)
Although the algebraic approach is more general than the single-Hilbert-space-
approach, a quantum theory in ‘applied physics’ that deploys a standard Hilbert
space representation can be expanded to support functions of classical variables by
taking a ‘continuum limit’, in which some parameter of the original model is taken
to infinity. For example, in the ‘thermodynamic limit’, a system with N particles
and volume V is replaced by one in which the parameters N and V are taken to
infinity, whilst the density N/V is kept constant. This procedure furnishes a model
in which thermodynamic quantities, such as pressure and energy, can be represented
as closed functions of thermodynamic variables, such as temperature and density.
Significantly, in this departure from the quantum mechanics of the pioneer era,
thermochemical systems are treated as infinite quantum systems, in the sense that
they have infinite degrees of freedom and contain an infinite number of sub-systems.
This fact has significant implications for the physical content of infinite quantum
models viz a vis finite quantum models, and this is the salient point to which I wish to
draw attention for the purpose of this discussion. In what follows, I shall argue that
infinite quantum models support states and observables that are not reducible to
the states and observables of finite quantum models, and that physical systems have
boundary conditions that contain irreducible macroscopic content. More broadly,
I shall argue that, whilst macroscopic systems are governed by the same laws as
microscopic systems, the entities and properties of such systems are metaphysically
irreducible to the entities and properties of microscopic systems.
124 7 Matter without microscopic constituents
ii. Interpretation and possibility
It is widely supposed among analytic philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein and
Lewis that to interpret a physical theory is to identify the set of worlds that are
possible according to that theory. On this view, a possible world is to be understood
as a complete and internally consistent possible state of a↵airs, whilst a physical
theory contributes to our knowledge of nature by permitting some of these states of
a↵airs and excluding others. It is also widely supposed that the basic laws specified
by a physical theory determine the set of possible worlds that it permits: they are
those complete states of a↵airs that are consistent with its laws.
The fundamental ontology of a theory T explains what the world would have
to be like for T to be possible. According to micro-monists, as I have called them,
the task of interpreting a theory is a matter of fixing upon a fundamental set of
microscopic constituents and picking out their possible arrangements according to
its laws (see Section 1.5). The total set of possible arrangements of these constituents
constitutes the microscopic state space within which the microscopic constituents
of every physical system evolve. Having identified these fundamental constituents,
propositions that refer to reality can in principle be evaluated as true or false,
just in case they can be understood as referring to possible arrangements of these
constituents. On this view, as Ruetsche observes, ‘everything that is physically
possible must be possible in the same way’ [Ruetsche, 2011, p.3]:
Unimodal possibility
MM/III: What is physically possible, according to some theory T , is determined
by the set of physically possible worlds W in which the laws of T are true.
The notion of laws, in this case, is to be understood in the narrow sense of the laws
of physics specified by the theory T , rather than the broad sense of laws that govern
physical entities in general. Likewise, the notion of possibility is to be understood
in the narrow sense of what is possible regarding the arrangements of the physical
constituents to which T refers, rather than the broad sense of what is possible in
nature. In short, the assumption of unimodal possibility may be a rmed coherently
by both reductive physicalists, who insist that everything is metaphysically reducible
to the arrangements of physical constituents, and non-reductive physicalists, who
insist that the ontologies of the ‘special sciences’ have some degree of autonomy. The
assumption of unimodal possibility is narrowly concerned with the causal closure of
their physical constituents within the microscopic state space in which they evolve.
iii. Reduction and emergence
According to micro-monists like Super-Humeans, the objects of scientific inquiry
are composed of microscopic constituents. From a reductionist standpoint, whilst
macroscopic systems may be more conveniently described by theories that invoke
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properties like temperature and chemical entropy, they are essentially just more
of the same. This claim can be supported and made more precise by adopting
something close to Ernst Nagel’s account of reduction [Nagel, 1961, pp. 353-354],
such as the Nagel-Scha↵ner model. Whilst this model is not without critics, it has
been staunchly defended as o↵ering the best account of a successful reduction, and
it qualifies Nagel’s original account in a number of significant ways. (For a recent
exposition and defence, see [Dizadji-Bahmani et al., 2010].) Consider the following
two theories: Tf , is some candidate fundamental theory, and Tt is some other theory
that is a target for reduction. According to this account:
Nagelian-Scha↵ner reduction
NSR: Tt is reduced by Tf just in case the laws of T ⇤t are derivable from the laws
of T ⇤f , and the terms of T
⇤
t are associated via bridge laws with terms of T
⇤
f ,
where (a) T ⇤t is an analogous (or approximate) version of Tt, and (b) T
⇤
f is derivable
from Tf by means of auxiliary assumptions. The Nagelian-Scha↵ner model recog-
nises that exact derivability is an unrealistic requirement: it su ces that the laws
deduced from the fundamental theory should be analogous to, or approximate, the
laws of the targeted theory. Likewise, the ‘auxiliary assumptions’ required to derive
T ⇤f from Tf are typically taken to be idealisations and boundary conditions that
have no ultimate significance concerning what is possible according to the reducing
theory. Having obtained T ⇤t as an analogous version of Tt, and T
⇤
f from Tf by ap-
propriate idealisations and boundary connections, they can be connected by bridge
laws. The bridge laws that enable the derivation of T ⇤t from T
⇤
f constitute rules
of translation which connect the vocabulary of T ⇤t to that of T
⇤
f . For Scha↵ner, a
bridge law can be characterised as a ‘reduction function’, which o↵ers a statement
to the e↵ect that some term we of T ⇤t is coextensional with some term wf of T
⇤
f , and
specifies the functional relationship between the magnitudes of the terms.
For my purposes, the dispute between a reductionist and an emergentist con-
cerning whether macroscopic thermochemical systems are metaphysically reducible
to microscopic systems can be caste as a dispute over whether the laws governing
macroscopic thermochemical systems are reducible to the laws governing micro-
scopic systems. I shall refer to this simply as reduction. An emergentist will seek
to frustrate the reduction of theories that invoke properties like temperature and
chemical entropy to microphysical theories that do not. I shall follow Jessica Wilson
in distinguishing two basic schemata for emergence [Wilson, 2015]:
For strong emergentists, a failure in reduction is explained by the emergence of
novel, ‘higher-level’ powers, in addition to the ‘lower-level’ powers of their emergence
base, which influence the ‘lower-level’ properties of the microphysical constituents
comprising the emergence base [O’Connor and Wong, 2005]. Strong emergentists
deny a unimodal conception of physical possibility by a rming the reality of top-
down causation, which modifies the basic dynamics of the microscopic constituents.
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For weak emergentists, by contrast, the powers of higher-level physical entities are
regarded as a subset of the powers of the lower-level constituents of their emergence
base [Bedau, 1997]. The failure in reduction, in this case, may be attributed to our
epistemic limitations. Weak emergentists, like reductionists, however, maintain a
unimodal conception of physical possibility, a rming the supervenience of higher-
level laws and properties upon lower-level laws and properties.
Reductionists, on the other hand, have argued that higher-level powers can only
serve as physical causes if they are reducible to lower-level powers, in which case,
they are not emergent [Kim, 1999]. It has also been argued that weak emergence
is not (necessarily) incompatible with reduction [Butterfield, 2011b]. Significantly,
debates between emergentists and reductionists are typically characterised by the
micro-monist assumption that the emergence base is composed of a set of microscopic
constituents which can be described in terms of a single semantic interpretation of
our best physics (MM/II). I wish to call this assumption into question, by looking
more closely at how quantum models of macroscopic physical systems are described
in practice.
iv. The Stone-von Neumann Theorem
The assumption that nature is composed of a single set of microscopic constituents
that can be described by the same fundamental micro-physics is not metaphysically
innocent, nor is the unimodal conception of physical possibility that it entails a
truth universally acknowledged among philosophers of physics. To get a grip on the
di culties that arise for these micro-monist assumptions, in the context of gener-
alised quantum mechanics, we must discuss the ideas of ‘concrete representations’
and ‘unitary equivalence’. (For details, see [Ruetsche, 2011, chps. 2-3].)
An infinite quantum system that is described in terms of a C* algebra supports
a continuum of concrete Hilbert-space representations, where a concrete represen-
tation, ⇧(A) : A ! H, is a morphism from the C* algebra of the model A into
the algebra of bounded operators defined on a Hilbert space H. This representation
makes available an ‘operator topology’ which defines the convergence of infinite se-
quences of quantum operators by using the inner product of the Hilbert space. The
generation of such topologies is of interest to our discussion, because they permit
the definition of ‘classical’ (or ‘global’) operators as limiting cases, which support
state-dependent ‘classical’ observables that do not admit superpositions.
Unitary equivalence in quantum mechanics is widely considered to be the stan-
dard of physical equivalence among philosophers of physics. If two concrete represen-
tations are unitarily equivalent, there must be some unitary operator that transforms
one representation into the other, such that both representations determine the same
expectation values for the various observables which they define. Representations
which are mutually transformable in this way are empirically indiscernible. How-
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ever, the additional structure furnished by QM1 divides finite quantum systems
from infinite quantum systems in a remarkable way.
On the one hand, finite quantum systems admit one concrete irreducible Hilbert-
space representation. The Stone-von Neumann Theorem establishes that any pairs
of distinct representations of the Weyl relations, which encode the algebraic structure
that any quantum theory must realise, will be unitarily equivalent to the irreducible
‘Schrödinger representation’, since there is a unitary operator that transforms one
into the other [Ruetsche, 2011, chp.2]. This in turn implies that we can define a
Hamiltonian for a finite system that uniquely specifies the dynamics. These two
ways of representing a finite quantum system have the same empirical content.
On the other hand, infinite quantum systems admit infinitely many concrete
Hilbert-space representations, which fall outside of the scope of the Stone-von Neu-
mann theorem [Ruetsche, 2011, chp.3]. In this case, for any pair of distinct rep-
resentations in this continuum, with Hilbert spaces H1 and H2 respectively, there
is no unitary operator that will transform a vector in one Hilbert space, p 2 H1,
into a vector in the other space, q 2 H2. In other words, we cannot get from a mi-
crophysical state p to a microphysical state q by a continuous series of microscopic
changes connected by the laws of quantum mechanics, since the state spaces within
which those laws operate are not physically equivalent. Nonetheless, it turns out
that such unitarily inequivalent representations of quantum systems are necessary
for empirically adequate descriptions of di↵erent kinds of physical behaviour.
For example, when a material undergoes a phase transition, certain ‘classical’
properties of the material undergo change – typically, discontinuous change – due
to some change in their external conditions. An iron bar that is at thermal equilib-
rium, above a critical temperature T   Tc, exhibits a paramagnetic phase, in which
it experiences no net magnetization. Below this critical temperature, however, it
exhibits a ferromagnetic phase, in which it experiences spontaneous magnetization.
This ferromagnetic phase is a quantum phenomenon that is explained in terms of
the quantum spin of the particles and the Pauli exclusion principle. Significantly, at
the critical temperature both the ferromagnetic and paramagnetic phases are real
possibilities for this physical system, but they require inequivalent representations.
Let’s take two more examples. First, consider the behaviour of helium at a critical
temperature. It may exhibit a fluid phase with finite viscosity, or a superfluid phase
with vanishing viscosity. (The superfluid phase is characterised as a Bose-Einstein
condensation, which can be modelled using quantum mechanics.) Second, consider
the behaviour of mercury at a critical temperature, in which it exhibits either a solid
phase with finite electrical resistance, or a superconducting phase with vanishing
electrical resistance. (The superconducting phase is characterised by the Meissner
e↵ect, which is a quantum e↵ect involving the ejection of the magnetic field from
the interior of the superconductor.) In fact, both kinds of systems in equilibrium
at critical temperatures have a variety of phases available to them, which require
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inequivalent representations.
However, as Ruetsche points out, the statistical physics of finite systems identifies
their equilibrium states with unique Gibbs states [Ruetsche, 2011, p.3], implying that
the phase available to a system at temperature T is unique for all T . This is contrary
to what we observe in experiments. In order to o↵er an empirically adequate account
of phenomena like phase transitions, then, we require the additional topological
structure introduced in QM1 for infinite quantum systems, which admit infinitely
many concrete Hilbert-space representations. We require this much richer variety of
representations in order to define all the states and observables of di↵erent complex
physical systems. According to Ruetsche, it is ‘only in the thermodynamic limit
[that] can one introduce a notion of equilibrium that allows what the Gibbs notion
of equilibrium for finite systems disallows: the multiplicity of equilibrium states at
a finite temperature implicated in phase structure’ [p.3].
v. Taking limits in physics
The problem of emergence that realists face is that certain thermochemical phenom-
ena observed in macroscopic (or mesoscopic) systems are inexplicable in terms of the
states and observables of finite quantum mechanical models. This di culty arises
in the face of any attempt to reduce a theory of infinite quantum systems, which
admit infinite degrees of freedom, to a theory like Bohmian mechanics (discussed in
Part II), which admits only a finite number of degrees of freedom. For Bohmians,
the measurement statistics of any experiment are explicable in principle in terms of
a set of N particle positions and a wave function defined in a single Hilbert space:
({Q1 . . .QN}, ).
This problem may be brought into focus by considering the practice of taking a
limit. The limits of variables are taken in physics for various reasons. For example,
for a system of massive charged particles in a gravitational field, one might take
the limit G ! 0, where G is the gravitational constant, in order to isolate the
contribution of charge to the forces between them. Alternatively, one might impose
spatial boundary conditions on an electromagnetic field E(x) by simply requiring the
magnitude E(x) ! 0 as x ! 1, for the sake of mathematical convenience. Limits
may also be taken, however, to introduce new structures into a mathematical theory.
The di culty for microphysical reductionists is that, in order to model ther-
mochemical phenomena in macroscopic (or mesoscopic) systems, a continuum limit
must be taken (such as the limit N ! 1), in order to introduce the new mathe-
matical structures that are required to represent physical possibilities that cannot
be captured by any finite microscopic model. Yet in order to o↵er a microscopic
reduction of such systems, this limit must be regarded (implausibly) as merely an
idealisation or approximation for mathematical convenience, which has no bearing
upon the system’s physical possibilities, and no ultimate explanatory significance.
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§7.3. Beyond reduction and emergence
i. Extranomic possibilities
According to the Nagel-Scha↵ner model of reduction, it is su cient to establish that
a macroscopic thermochemical system is governed by the same Schrödinger dynamics
as a microscopic quantum system, in order to reduce a macroscopic system to a
set of microscopic constituents. According to the unimodal conception of physical
possibility (MM/III), the microscopic constituents of nature evolve in a universal
state space determined by physical laws. These claims are intelligible, I suggest, for
a world made of microscopic constituents, like the world of classical mechanics, in
which there is a global configuration of particles and fields with definite properties
at all times. If such entities are not grounded in anything more fundamental, but
exist without further explanation, it makes sense to ignore parochial concerns, such
as the boundary conditions of a physical system, and adopt a unimodal conception
of physical possibility, which heeds only what is universal in space and time.
But the quantum mechanics of infinite systems, such as the instruments upon
which scientists depend to conduct experiments, presents us with a di culty. On
the one hand, given the problem of emergence (Section 7.2), we have good grounds
for rejecting the unimodal conception of physical possibility upon which both re-
ductionists and weak emergentists depend. On the other hand, given the fact that
thermochemical systems can be modelled as infinite quantum systems (Section 7.1),
we have good grounds for rejecting the claim that thermochemical systems are gener-
ated by structural forces that emerge at higher levels and modify the basic dynamics.
I intend to explore a third way of understanding the ontological status of thermo-
chemical properties that is neither reductionist nor emergentist, but recognises that
quantum mechanics requires a plurality of interpretations in di↵erent settings in
order to discharge its explanatory duties [Ruetsche, 2011, p.11-3]. According to
Ruetsche, quantum mechanics admits two stages in its interpretation.
The first stage is the domain of primordial possibilities, which is circumscribed
by the space of algebraic states SA in the theory of QM1, in which the self-adjoint
elements of SA correspond to quantum observables that can be measured in all phys-
ical systems. At this stage, a quantum theory may be said to have indeterminate
physical content concerning the potential states and observables of physical systems.
However, this first stage leaves the truth values of propositions concerning the ac-
tual state and observables of a physical system undefined. We cannot construct an
empirically successful theory if we stop at this stage. I shall call the second stage
the domain of concrete potentialities, which concerns the behaviour of nomological
machines (to adopt Cartwright’s terminology). It is only in the context of a nomolog-
ical machine that an empirical theory acquires determinate content regarding actual
states and observables of a system. This is achieved by adopting an appropriate
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Hilbert space representation of the C* algebra, ⇧(A) : A ! H, which specifies a
W* algebra of actual observables of a particular system that can be measured em-
pirically, and includes ‘classical’ observables defined as infinite limits of convergent
sequences of quantum observables. These ‘classical’ observables comprise a core of
physical magnitudes that are not quantum-entangled, which are only defined within
the boundary conditions of the particular system.
According to this two-stage approach to interpretation, it would be a mistake,
on the one hand, to collapse the notion of concrete potentialities into the notion
of primordial possibilities. In so doing, we would undermine the empirical force of
quantum mechanical explanations that scientists have contrived for a wide range of
phenomena. It would also be a mistake, on the other hand, to conflate the primor-
dial possibilities of nature with the concrete potentialities of a single nomological
machine, by privileging a single semantic interpretation of quantum mechanics. In
so doing, we would undermine the application of quantum mechanics to a wide range
of phenomena and curtail its explanatory successes. In short, we have good reason to
doubt whether the concrete potentialities of a system are fixed universally, indepen-
dently of its local context. Hence we have good reason to look for modal information
in the local boundary conditions of quantum systems, which micro-monists assume
to have no significance concerning what is physically possible.
ii. Macroscopic boundary conditions
For a textbook example of a microscopic system whose state space may be seen,
on closer examination, to depend upon macroscopic content that is contained in
its boundary conditions, consider the case of the van der Waals force between two
dipoles at positions r1 and r2, where each dipole is comprised of electrons in motion
around a positive ion, and each has an overall neutral charge. I choose this example
because intermolecular bonds have sometimes been described as being nothing but
a sum of van der Waals forces that is too large to compute in practice. The famous
Casimir-Polder expression for the energy of a dipole-dipole system, which can be





which depends upon the microscopic polarisabilities of the two dipoles, ↵1 and ↵2,
that describe their linear response to the electromagnetic field, and upon the dis-
tance d between them [Casimir and Polder, 1948]. It is su cient for my purposes to
note that this interaction energy can be derived using a quantum mechanical model
of the system whose dynamics are characterised by a Hamiltonian function, and that
it determines a mechanical force which arises from ‘quantum fluctuations’ that occur
within the system even at zero temperature. These fluctuations polarise the other-
wise neutral dipoles and cause them to attract one another. (For an introduction
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to quantum fluctuation forces, see [Simpson and Leonhardt, 2015].)
However, standard text-book expressions of the van der Waals force involve a
number of significant approximations which have to be dropped in more general
theories of fluctuation-induced forces, and tacitly depend upon assumptions about
the macroscopic environment of the system, which are explicit in models that make
more realistic predictions. For example, the Casimir-Polder expression assumes the
idealised geometry of free space, but a more general expression can be derived for an
environment with an arbitrary geometry, from which the Casimir-Polder expression
may be recovered as a limiting case. This more general expression may be defined in
terms of the Green function of the electromagnetic field G(!, r, r0), which represents
the electric field response at position r to a dipole source located at position r0, os-
cillating at frequency !. The interaction energy takes the form of a summation (or
integration) over the micro-forces induced by fluctuations of the field at all electro-
magnetic frequencies. The Green function employed in more sophisticated models
represents the scattering of the electromagnetic field by the materials comprising the
surrounding environment. This scattering a↵ects the micro-forces experienced at a
given point in space, which determines the strength of the dipole-dipole interaction.
However, in addition to scattering the fields, the surrounding materials serve as
a heat sink that absorbs the fields, and are characterised by thermal properties.3
As electromagnetic waves propagate through these materials, they displace electro-
magnetic charges, and in so doing, they induce electric currents in the materials.
Significantly, the dispersive (scattering) properties of a material are directly related
to its dissipative (absorbing) properties:4 for macroscopic media they are typically
modelled by complex-valued electric permittivity ✏(r,!) and magnetic permeability
µ(r,!) functions, in which the real part of the function quantifies the way the field
is dispersed by the medium, and the imaginary part the rate at which it is absorbed.
In order to represent the phenomenon of absorption within the theory of quantum
electrodynamics, which is necessary for producing realistic predictions of Casimir
forces, physicists have modelled this heat sink as an infinite continuum of oscilla-
tors, which must have uncountably many more degrees of freedom than the electro-
magnetic field (see [Philbin, 2010], then [Horsley and Philbin, 2014]). For the sake
of empirical adequacy, there must be one oscillator for every possible frequency, at
every point in space, and each of these oscillators must make an infinitesimal contri-
bution to the dispersive and dissipative properties of the material, as characterised
by its electric permittivity and magnetic permeability functions.
However, the energy does not flow out of the electromagnetic field and into the
materials without coming back again. In fact, the materials heat up, then radiate
the energy they have absorbed, thus contributing to the surrounding electromagnetic
field. In this environment, the quantum energy levels of the microscopic molecules
comprising the dipole-dipole system are thus permanently ‘dressed’ by the modified
electromagnetic field, due to their interaction with their thermochemical environ-
132 7 Matter without microscopic constituents
ment. In more general theories of fluctuation-induced forces, the assumption of
thermodynamic equilibrium is made explicit, in which the temperature of the total
system is introduced as a ‘classical’ variable that a↵ects both the amplitude of the
fields and the magnitude of the currents. Significantly, this background assumption
applies even in the case of systems at zero temperature.
To put the point in quantum-theoretic terms: in the most general descriptions
of microscopic fluctuation forces, which includes the e↵ects of dispersion and dissi-
pation that are always present in any real physical system, the eigenmodes of the
total quantum system are considered to be in a thermal mixed quantum state. Thus
even for the idealised case of fluctuation-induced forces at zero temperature, such as
the van der Waals force between two dipoles in a vacuum, which can be recovered
from more general theories of fluctuation forces as a limiting case, the ground state
of the total system remains one in which the thermal properties of the materials
and the electromagnetic properties of the fields are inextricably coupled. Funda-
mentally, it is the ground state of a polariton field, in which thermalised matter and
electromagnetic quanta are mixed (for further discussion, see [Simpson, 2014]).
The microscopic state space of an ‘isolated’ dipole-dipole system is thus seen
to depend upon the macroscopic content implicit within its boundary conditions,5
which are characterised by such properties as temperature. It would be question-
begging to infer the reduction of thermochemical systems to aggregates of micro-
scopic particles, by appealing to the reducibility of intermolecular forces to quantum
fluctuation forces, when our best description of these forces is one in which macro-
scopic thermochemical features of the system are already implicated. To accomplish
such a reduction, we would have to demonstrate how to remove these background
features, rather than simply assuming their reducibility, by showing that properties
such as temperature, and phenomena like dissipation, can be consistently repre-
sented within a finite quantum model. I have already suggested some reasons,
however, for why a thermochemical system cannot be modelled as a finite quantum
mechanical system (see Section 7.2). (For more reasons why heat sinks or heat baths
cannot be represented by many-body wave functions, see [Drossel, 2017].)
§7.4. Argument from emergence
The metaphysical models I discussed in Part II all adopt a unimodal conception
of possibility (MM/IIII): specifically, they assume that the physical possibilities
of nature consist of the possible arrangements of a finite set of basic constituents
(MM/II). In order to motivate the construction of a new metaphysical model, which
dispenses with this micro-monist assumption, I shall argue that scientific inquiry
would not be possible in such a world, by drawing attention to the problem of
emergence. This doubt may be formulated using the following argument:
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Argument from emergence:
i. It is possible for scientists to make observations using scientific instruments.
ii. If it is possible for scientists to make observations using scientific instruments,
then there must be macroscopic objects that instantiate chemical structures.
iii. If Super-Humeanism or power monism is true, there are no macroscopic ob-
jects that instantiate chemical structures.
iv. Therefore, if Super-Humeanism or power monism is true, it is impossible for
scientists to make observations using scientific instruments (by ii. and iii.).
v. Therefore, Super-Humeanism and power monism are false (by i & iv.).
The first and second premises of this argument constitute a precondition for engaging
in scientific inquiry, reiterating the instrumentation assumption upon which such an
inquiry depends (AI/IV). Since scientists do not directly perceive many of the things
they purport to describe, they must rely upon macroscopic instruments, which are
solid objects that fall within a certain temperature range, and colourful objects
that can be discerned visually from their surroundings. Apart from the existence of
macroscopic objects with the necessary chemical structures to support these physical
interactions, scientists can learn nothing about the properties of microscopic objects,
such as the positions of particles.
The third premise is supported by the considerations I o↵ered above. Namely, in
order to facilitate cogent theorising about chemical structures, scientific models must
refer to properties like temperature and chemical entropy, which are not fundamental
features of particles, and must model objects with thermochemical structures as
infinite quantum systems, which have macroscopic boundary conditions. However,
the Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics deployed by Super-Humeans and
power monists stipulates the existence of a global configuration of particles with
finite degrees of freedom, and the states and observables of thermochemical systems
are irreducible to the states and observables of this global system of particles. This
gives us reason to doubt whether chemical structures exist in a Super-Humean or
power monist world. The conclusion follows by deduction from the premises.
This argument gives us another reason to think Super-Humeanism and power
monism are false. To refute this argument, Super-Humeans and power monists will
have to attack the third premise. A Super-Humean might do so either by denying
the claim that a macroscopic object instantiates novel thermochemical properties, or
a rming the claim that novel thermochemical properties of a macroscopic system
can be described in terms of a single interpretation of quantum mechanics. To
consider how these strategies might be advanced, I shall focus in what follows on
the phenomenon of phase transitions.
In an infinite quantum model, the two phases on either side of a phase transition,
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1 and 2, are described using unitarily inequivalent representations which demand
di↵erent semantic interpretations, I1 and I2. These phases are empirically divided
by a ‘classical’ macroscopic observable, such as the temperature T . In order to over-
come the demand for multiple interpretations to explain these emergent phenomena,
which threatens the unity of nature at the microscopic scale, the Super-Humean
must insist that infinite quantum models somehow misrepresent the dynamics of
thermochemical systems, or misconstrue the nature of ‘classical’ observables.
i. Eliminating emergence
The first strategy seeks to reduce the explanatory burden produced by the problem
of emergence by denying that such phenomena as phase transitions are really pos-
sible. For example, Leo Kadano↵ argues: ‘Since a phase transition only happens in
an infinite system, we cannot say that any phase transitions actually occur in the
finite objects that appear in our world’ [Kadano↵, 2009]. In so doing, micro-monists
withhold any physical significance from those ‘classical’ observables that certain suc-
cessful scientific practices seem to be measuring, such as temperature and chemical
entropy, and deny that there are any emergent phenomena for them to explain. This
strategy might be epitomised by the expression, ‘nothing is di↵erent’.
However, this approach dispenses with any pretense of empiricism and comes
at a high theoretical cost. First, it seems absurd to deny that water can exist in
the di↵erent phases of solid, liquid and gas, for example, because our preferred
interpretation of quantum mechanics cannot accommodate the macroscopic observ-
ables scientists rely upon to distinguish its di↵erent phases. Secondly, by denying
that such phenomena exist to be explained, it significantly reduces the explanatory
virtues of quantum mechanics that realists depend upon in order to justify their
realism. The problem with eliminativism is that it acknowledges too few of the
observables that are needed to distinguish phenomena that quantum mechanics is
widely supposed to explain, and in failing to do so, undermines the motivation for
adopting the eliminativist strategy in the first place [Ruetsche, 2011, chp.6].
ii. Weakening emergence
The second strategy seeks to shoulder the explanatory burden produced by the prob-
lem of emergence by admitting the possibility of thermochemical phenomena like
phase transitions, whilst denying that such phenomena involve transitions between
microphysical states that demand di↵erent semantic interpretations. For example,
Jeremy Butterfield claims that reduction and (weak) emergence can be ‘reconciled’
by regarding the continuum limit to be nothing but an idealisation [Butterfield,
2011a,Butterfield, 2011b]. Whilst ‘classical’ observables, like temperature, may de-
rive some physical significance from systems that have large numbers of particles,
the di↵erent interpretations of a system’s phases, I1 and I2, merely approximate
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what could in principle be represented by a finite model with a single interpretation
If , which demands no such change: ie. I1 ⇡ If ⇡ I2. Nonetheless, taking the ther-
modynamic limit introduces new mathematical structures, which grants a certain
autonomy to those systems to which they are applied. In this case, ‘less is di↵erent’.
However, this approach also comes at a theoretical cost. First, by privileging a
single class of unitarily equivalent representations, it fails to capture the widely ac-
cepted phenomenon of symmetry breaking involved in the occurrence of phase tran-
sitions. Secondly, by withholding physical significance from the continuum limit,
it undermines the construction of any rigorous models of those macroscopic prop-
erties and relations that are constitutive of universal thermochemical phenomena,
and hence fails to support the explanatory agenda of quantum mechanical theories
of thermochemical systems. The problem with this attempt to secure emergence is
that it acknowledges too few of the states that are needed to characterise phenomena
that quantum mechanics is widely supposed to explain [Ruetsche, 2011, chp. 6].
iii. Strengthening emergence
The third strategy, which may appeal to a powerist, is to increase the explanatory
resources available by admitting the ‘strong emergence’ of higher-level powers, in ad-
dition to the lower-level powers that characterise the emergence base. For O’Connor,
a property or power P is an emergent property of some composite O just in case
P supervenes upon the properties of the parts of O, P is not a property of any
of its parts, P is distinct from any structural property of O, and P causally influ-
ences the behaviour of its parts [O’Connor, 1994]. Strong emergence thus supports
the emergence of higher-level entities and properties that exercise a form of top-
down causation that changes the physical dynamics, in which the ‘causal influence
[of a higher-level entity] is irreducible to that of the micro-properties on which it
supervenes’ [p.97]. This strategy boldly proclaims that ‘more is di↵erent’.
Yet this approach to thermochemical phenomena also comes with a number of
theoretical costs. For instance, it is unclear how supervenient downward-acting pow-
ers are supposed to arise from the microscopic constituents of the quantum system
upon which they depend, and how these higher-level powers are supposed to factor
into or modify the fundamental quantum dynamics to produce novel phenomena.
It is also unclear how positing additional structural forces, besides the fundamental
forces of physics, could shed any light upon the change in the interpretation of the
micro-physics, between I1 and I2, or how it might illuminate the significance of the
thermodynamic limit. The problem with this attempt to secure emergence is that
it is unclear how it is supposed to be applied [Bedau, 1997, pp.376-77].
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§7.5. Grounding emergence
I propose to adopt a di↵erent strategy to any of the preceding. Following Primas
and Ruetsche, I shall take the use of the continuum limit as introducing addi-
tional representational content concerning the properties of physical systems, rather
than being a way of approximating the behaviour of macroscopic systems [Primas,
1983,Ruetsche, 2011]. However, instead of arguing that macroscopic systems have
higher-level causal powers that somehow emerge from their microscopic constituents,
in addition to the lower-level powers they are supposed to possess, I shall argue
that microscopic systems are grounded in di↵erent macroscopic systems, and evolve
within irreducibly ‘classical’ boundary conditions. This strategy, which I shall call
‘micro-pluralism’, is epitomised by the expression, ‘the micro-physics is di↵erent’.
i. A hierarchical quantum state
As Ruetsche observes, ‘there is something extremist’ about the idea that the in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics should be fixed solely by general principles of
metaphysics and epistemology, without reference to how scientists explain quantum
phenomena in practice, and the attempt to hold onto this interpretation ‘come what
may’ [Ruetsche, 2011, p.4]. As we have seen, the infinitely many representations per-
mitted by QM1 fall outside of the scope of the Stone-von Neumann theorem, yet
these physically inequivalent representations are necessary for formulating empir-
ically adequate accounts of the behaviour of macroscopic systems, including the
macroscopic instruments that scientists depend upon to perform experiments. How
can we reconcile this plurality of inequivalent representations with scientific realism?
According to George Sewell, the additional structure introduced by taking the
continuum limit in the theory of infinite quantum systems can be given a hierarchical
interpretation, where the Hilbert space in which the quantum state of a system is
defined corresponds to the (essential) macrostate of the quantum system, whilst the
vector that is defined in this Hilbert space corresponds to its (accidental) microstate
at a given moment [Sewell, 2014, pp.4-5].6 In this schema, two vectors that belong
to the same irreducible representation are microscopically distinct but macroscop-
ically equivalent, whilst two vectors belonging to inequivalent representations are
macroscopically distinct: they are essentially di↵erent physical systems.
The microscopic wave function of pioneer quantum mechanics, which features in
GRW theory and the Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics, is a projec-
tion of a vector (quantum state) defined in a Hilbert space | i 2 H onto the finite
configuration space of N quantum particles,  (x1,x2, . . . ,xN) 2 RN . The wave
function determines the quantal properties of this finite system of particles that can
be measured in an experiment. However, from the standpoint of QM1, there is
more information about the state of an infinite system, which is not carried over
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into the microscopic wave function. As noted earlier, a Hilbert space representa-
tion makes available an ‘operator topology’ that defines the convergence of infinite
sequences of quantum operators in the continuum limit. This permits a core of
‘classical’, macroscopic properties to be defined, within the boundary conditions of
a nomological system, that characterise the system’s essential macrostate.
With this in mind, let us return to the example of a phase transition in an infinite
quantum system. I shall take the di↵erent interpretations of a system’s phases, I1
and I2, to indicate a real change in the essential macrostate of a quantum system,
allowing for the existence of di↵erent kinds of ontic systems that require unitarily
inequivalent Hilbert space representations. These systems can be distinguished in
practice by certain ‘classical’, thermochemical properties that they instantiate at
the macroscopic (or mesoscopic) scale. Since these systems are governed by the
same physical laws, but the state spaces in which they evolve cannot be reduced to
the state space of a single microscopic configuration, I propose the following ‘micro-
pluralist’ conception of the concrete potentialities of a particular system, to replace
the micro-monist conception of the abstract physical possibilities of nature:
Micro-pluralist concrete potentialities
MP/I: The intrinsic potentialities of an ontic system S, according to theory T ,
are determined by the laws of T and its essential macro-state (described by T ).
Following Koons, I propose to take the use of the continuum limit in thermal physics
and quantum chemistry as signifying an ontological di↵erence between finite micro-
scopic and infinite macroscopic systems: ‘If these infinite models are to be genuinely
explanatory, the use of the continuum limit has to be justified in ontological terms,
and not merely as a useful fiction’ [Koons, 2019]. Instead of positing the existence
of strongly emergent causal powers, like O’Connor, however, I shall interpret this
ontological di↵erence in terms of the metaphysics of grounding, distinguishing fun-
damental and derivative states. (For a discussion of grounding, see Section 2.3.)
On the one hand, I shall regard the quantum states of infinite macroscopic (or
mesoscopic) systems to be fundamental ontic states. These ontic systems have in-
trinsic physical properties that are not quantum-entangled, and they require uni-
tarily inequivalent representations in order to model their behaviour. On the other
hand, I shall regard the wave functions of finite microphysical systems – that is,
systems of quantum particles – to be derivative states. These systems have only
extrinsic physical properties, which are determined by the properties of the ontic
system in which they are grounded and their physical boundary conditions.
Adapting Ruestche’s ‘harmony principle’, which constrains the kinematical struc-
ture of QM1, I shall require an ontic system to be one that maintains a dynamical
relationship between a set of quantum and ‘classical’ observables that can be mea-
sured in an experiment, and sustains a continuity relationship in their temporal
evolution [Ruetsche, 2011, pp.139-40]. To satisfy the first criterion, I shall require
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a concrete Hilbert space representation of the C* algebra, ⇧(A) : A ! H, with
a Hamiltonian that is well-defined in the continuum limit. According to this crite-
rion, an ontic system supports law-like relationships between certain state-dependent
‘classical’ observables, which are defined in terms of quantum observables in the
continuum limit. To satisfy the second criterion, I shall require the time evolution
operators to satisfy a temporal continuity condition. This continuity condition will
be violated by certain thermochemical phenomena like phase changes, which require
transitions between unitarily inequivalent representations.
ii. A context-dependent quantum dynamics
If the thermochemical properties of ontic systems are neither epiphenomenal nor
useful constructs, and if the systems they characterise are parts of the same causal
nexus, they should make a causal di↵erence to how these systems evolve. Accord-
ing to micro-pluralists, however, the causal influence of the macroscopic upon the
microscopic is not like the influence of strongly emergent causal powers upon their
emergence bases, which impose structural forces upon the microscopic constituents
of a physical system to modify its normal behaviour. Rather, as George Ellis puts it:
‘the upper levels exercise crucial influences on lower level events by setting the con-
text and boundary conditions for the lower level actions’ [Ellis, 2012, p.1896]. This
context-dependence can be secured by adopting an appropriate quantum dynamics.
I noted earlier that there is no consensus among philosophers of physics concern-
ing the quantum dynamics (see Chapter 3). According to Bell, any realist approach
to quantum mechanics that seeks to explain the existence of definite measurement
outcomes must come to terms with a nomological dilemma: either the quantum
dynamics of standard quantum mechanics is wrong, and the wave function evolves
according to a non-linear Schrödinger equation, or standard quantum mechanics is
incomplete, and there are physical objects, in addition to the wave function, which
evolve according to some non-linear dynamics of their own [Bell, 1987b].
For micro-monists, the choice comes down to two alternatives (according to
[Maudlin, 1995]): either we should adopt something like the GRW theory, or some-
thing like the Bohmian interpretation (see Section 3.4). The GRW theory seizes the
first horn of the dilemma by incorporating a stochastic mechanism which produces
random ‘hits’ on the wave function that occur universally for microscopic parti-
cles, and result in the spontaneous collapse of the wave function. The e↵ects of
this non-linear modification to the Schrödinger equation become significant when a
large number of quantum-entangled particles are involved. The theory of Bohmian
mechanics seizes the second horn of the nomological dilemma by positing a global
configuration of particles whose trajectories are choreographed by the universal wave
function. The guiding equation for the particles depends in a non-linear way upon
the wave function, which evolves according to the standard Schrödinger equation.
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For micro-pluralists, however, who accept the existence of irreducible thermo-
chemical properties, there is no need to follow either GRW theory or Bohmian
mechanics. An alternative ‘contextual’ model of the quantum dynamics is available,
proposed by Barbara Drossel and George Ellis, in which the interaction of a quantum
system with the intrinsic heat bath of a measuring instrument plays a key role in
solving the measurement problem [Drossel and Ellis, 2018]. I shall call it the DEP
model, after Drossel, Ellis and Primas (since it has similarities to Primas’ earlier
proposals for solving the measurement problem [Primas, 1990a,Primas, 1990b]).
As in GRW theory, the DEP model seizes the first horn of the nomological
dilemma, allowing the wave function to become localised with respect to position.
It also distinguishes measurements from localisation events. Unlike GRW theory,
however, the stochastic corrections that achieve these localisations do not occur
universally for each microscopic particle, but depend upon the local context of a
system, which includes the measuring device. In short, the DEP model incorporates
a feedback loop – from the particle, via the intrinsic heat bath of the measuring
device, back to the particle – which introduces non-linear terms in the Schrödinger
equation. These terms are physically motivated: they can be accounted for in terms
of thermodynamics and solid-state physics [Drossel and Ellis, 2018, pp.13-19].
As in Bohmian mechanics, the DEP model relies upon the e↵ects of the en-
vironment upon the measuring process to explain why the outcomes of quantum
experiments conform to standard quantum statistics and Born’s rule for quantum
observables. Unlike Bohmian mechanics, which outsources this problem to decoher-
ence theory, the DEP model does not conceive any part of the environment that is
relevant to the measuring process as a many-body quantum system that is subject
to unitary and reversible time evolution, nor does it apply the Born Rule to certain
‘classical’ observables like temperature. Rather, the heat bath of an instrument is
characterised as having non-zero temperature and only a limited ‘memory’, since it
radiates irreversibly into the heat sink of its surroundings. Consequently, the DEP
model does not leave the quantum system entangled with any part of its environ-
ment beyond the usual time scale of decoherence. According to the DEP model,
the heat bath of the measuring instrument can serve as a bridge between quantum
systems and their ‘classical’ environment, just so long as we are willing to reject ‘the
untestable and implausible claim that the environmental heat bath can be described
by an infinite-precision wave function that is subject to unitary time evolution’ [p.4].
The DEP model does not restore the local dynamical structure of classical me-
chanics, however, in which the properties of particles and fields determine the tem-
poral evolution. The relevant local features, according to the DEP model, are not
the intrinsic properties of microscopic entities, but the intrinsic ‘classical’ properties
of thermochemical systems. Nor does the DEP model support the global kinematical
structure of pioneer quantum mechanics, in which the world is assigned a universal
wave function defined in a single Hilbert space. ‘Quantum theory per se does not
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tell us what Hilbert spaces to use. This requires the classical, macroscopic context’
[p.25]. In other words, these ‘classical’ properties perform a second explanatory role,
besides the dynamical role played by the wave function in specifying the laws of a
physical theory: namely, they specify the macroscopic boundary conditions within
which the evolution of a physical system takes place.
iii. Beyond micro-monism
The primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics considered in Part II, such
as Super-Humeanism and power monism, seek an account of the empirical content
of a physical theory that is exhausted by its statements about a primitive distribu-
tion of matter. They are micro-monist ontologies that fix upon a single semantic
interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of a single set of microscopic con-
stituents, such as the Bohmian interpretation, and specify a law for their temporal
development. The emergence of thermochemical behaviour in macroscopic systems,
however, suggests that the laws of Bohmian mechanics are not true laws of nature,
since thermochemical phenomena are not all described by the same micro-physics,
and any nomological system for which observables are defined has classical boundary
conditions that have irreducibly macroscopic content.
I have suggested a micro-pluralist approach to quantum phenomena instead,
which adopts a hierarchical interpretation of quantum states in terms of both ‘quan-
tal’ and ‘classical’ properties, in which certain macroscopic properties of a system
are irreducible to its microscopic properties. The contextual theory of the quan-
tum dynamics provided by the DEP model, although incompatible with micro-
monism, is compatible with micro-pluralism, which considers microscopic systems
to be grounded in macroscopic systems. Whilst the unitary part of the evolution
is universal, and takes place within a given Hilbert space, the collapse of the wave
function is ‘determined top-down by the local classical context’ [p.24]. For micro-
pluralists who adopt the DEP model, ‘classical’ properties thus play an irreducible
role in specifying the boundary conditions in which the evolution of a quantum
system takes place.
I intend to o↵er a modified version of power monism that is compatible with
micro-pluralism. Before proceeding, however, I wish to note two things. First, the di-
rection of this grounding relation is exactly the opposite of the direction assumed by
classical micro-monists. For classical micro-monists, the world is composed of a sin-
gle set of microscopic constituents, such as particles and fields, which have intrinsic
microscopic properties. According to micro-pluralists, however, microscopic prop-
erties are neither fundamental nor intrinsic physical properties (rejecting MM/I),
but grounded in macroscopic systems. Secondly, the scale at which this relation
of grounding operates is not the cosmic scale of the universal wave function sup-
posed by quantum micro-monists, who consider the physical properties of nature to
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be grounded in nothing less than the entire cosmos. According to micro-pluralists,
the cosmos is not composed of a single set of microscopic constituents which are
described by the same micro-physics (rejecting MM/II), but contains a plurality of
macroscopic systems which evolve in unitarily inequivalent state spaces.
§7.6. General remarks
In this chapter, I discussed the problem of emergence, which is the challenge of
explaining the states and observables of macroscopic thermochemical systems in
terms of the states and observables of microscopic systems (Section 7.2). I rejected
a unimodal conception of physical possibility (MM/III), in which the laws of physics
determine all the possibilities of nature, and argued for a micro-pluralist conception
of concrete potentialities (MP/I), which depend upon both the universal laws of
physics and the essential macroscopic states of individual systems (Section 7.3).
I also o↵ered an ‘argument from emergence’, in which I claimed that scientific
inquiry would be impossible in a Super-Humean world composed of a finite set of
fundamental constituents whose behaviour are governed solely by universal micro-
physics (Section 7.4). This argument applies to all three of the metaphysical models
I proposed in Part II. It supports the claim that we should attribute ontological
significance to the practice of taking the continuum limit to describe thermochem-
ical phenomena, such as phase transitions (Section 7.5). In seeking to obtain an
empirically adequate account of nature, which includes both quantum entanglement
and emergent thermochemical phenomena, it seems we must reject micro-monist
assumptions about the world (MM/I-II). The corpuscularian conception of nature
that arose to prominence in the seventeenth century, from which micro-monism de-
scends (see Chapter 1), has been overturned by the quantum revolution of the last
century. In the light of this discussion, I suggest the following desideratum:
Desideratum: Matter without microscopic constituents
DD/V: Other things being equal, we should favour accounts in which the matter
of di↵erent thermochemical systems is not reducible to a single set of microscopic
constituents that are described by the same micro-physics.
Notes
1For more technical detail, see [Primas, 1983, chp.3-4] and [Ruetsche, 2011, chp.2].
2The wave function  is formed by taking the inner-product of the state vector with the position
operator defined on the Hilbert space.  =  (x1, , xN ) is a complex spinor-valued function defined
in a finite 3N-dimensional configuration space. Although the particle configuration is posited
in addition to the wave function, the extra variables that this introduces are best-described as
manifest rather than ‘hidden’ variables [Maudlin, 1995, p.8], insofar as all measurements come
down to position measurements, and the measurement outcome statistics of an experiment are
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explicable in terms of particle positions, the Bohmian law of motion, and a probability measure
defined in terms of the wave function that is linked with that law [Lazarovici et al., 2018].
3For an introduction to quantum fluctuation-induced forces in dispersive and dissipative mate-
rials, see [Simpson and Leonhardt, 2015].
4The real and imaginary parts are connected by the Kramers-Kronig relations.
5In the case of the Casimir force, as conceived by Casimir, these are boundary conditions
imposed by the materials on the electromagnetic field.
6I have added the words ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’ for the sake of clarity.
Chapter 8
Saving the manifest image
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone,
‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’
– Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass.
§8.1. The Canberra plan
In the previous chapter, I considered the emergence of ‘thermochemical’ phenomena
in quantum systems, and the role of certain ‘classical’ properties in specifying the
physical boundary conditions of any nomological machine for which observables can
be defined. I proposed an ontological division between micro-monists, for whom the
microscopic properties of a system are described by the same micro-physics, and
micro-pluralists, for whom microscopic properties are grounded in di↵erent thermo-
chemical systems, whose temporal development is context-dependent. I argued that
micro-pluralism follows from taking an ontological stance toward the thermodynamic
limit in order to secure the explanatory power of quantum mechanics.
In this chapter, I seek to bolster the case for micro-pluralism, by arguing that
micro-monist ontologies, like Super-Humeanism and power monism, fail to accom-
modate the manifest image (to adopt Sellars’ terminology). In other words, I think
they are unable to recover the world of observation and experimentation, as it ap-
pears to scientists independently of their theoretical postulates, from the ‘scientific
image’ of nature as it is described by quantum micro-monists. In failing to do so, I
shall argue, micro-monists undermine the empirical content of quantum mechanics,
by giving sceptics about semantic realism a positive reason to doubt whether the
descriptions provided by our best physical theories succeed in referring to anything
beyond the world of observation and experimentation.
In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle observes that scientific inquiry must begin
from the objects ‘prior and better known to man’ [Aristotle, Posterior Analytics,
143
144 8 Saving the manifest image
II.2]; that is, from the macroscopic objects of the manifest image. Yet the objects
of the manifest image are not the fundamental elements that are postulated at
the end of scientific inquiry, which are beyond our observational capacities (for
Aristotle, the ‘forms’ that confer upon substances their physical natures; see Chapter
1). Nonetheless, as Maudlin observes, ‘since the behavior of the mesoscale objects
provides the empirical evidence for the physical theory, there must be not merely a
heuristic ascent from the manifest image to the theoretical, but also a more logically
rigorous return from the scientific image to the manifest’ [Maudlin, 2019, p.1].1
In articulating their own primitive ontology of quantum mechanics, Ghirardi,
Grassi and Benatti likewise acknowledge the need for ‘a worldview which can ac-
commodate our [empirical] knowledge about natural phenomena’ [Ghirardi et al.,
1995]. For example, two scientists conducting the EPR experiment must rely upon
the macroscopic pointers on their Stern-Gerlach devices to indicate whether a mi-
croscopic particle is ‘spin-up’ or ‘spin-down’. A primitive ontology approach to
quantum mechanics seeks to account for these macroscopic instruments and the po-
sitions of their pointers, by o↵ering an account of the empirical content of a theory
that is exhausted by its statements about the primitive ontology [Maudlin, 2019].
Yet it would be pragmatically inconsistent to o↵er an account of our macroscopic
measuring devices in terms of a microscopic arrangement of primitive matter which
undermined any reasons for thinking that the objects that scientists perceive, and
the measurement outcomes that they believe, are related to this arrangement in a
principled way. In other words, the possibility of scientific inquiry depends upon
the manifest image representing certain local features of the environment in which
scientists conduct their experiments, and hence it is plausible that any ontology of
nature should impose local constraints on the manifest image:
Assumption of inquiry: Content of the manifest image
AI/V: The manifest image has determinate content and is constrained by objective
local features of the physical environment.
Many micro-monists, like Esfeld, endorse the ‘Canberra plan’ for physics, which
aims to locate everyday concepts of the manifest image, like knowledge, belief, free
will and conscious experience, within the causal nexus of the microphysical world,
by adopting Ramsey Sentence functionalism (for more details, see [Menzies and
Price, 2008]). For Esfeld, the scientific image concerns the set of particles of which
everything is made. This strategy has been subject to criticisms from various quar-
ters [Halvorson, 2019, chp.8]), and Esfeld’s ‘Super-Humean’ endorsement comes with
various qualifications [Esfeld, , forthcoming]). I do not propose to discuss such details
here. My object is to argue that micro-monist approaches to quantum mechanics,
like Super-Humeanism and power monism, undermine this plan, by removing any
local constraints on the manifest image and providing a hostage to the sceptic about
reference.
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§8.2. Realising scientific practices
i. From functionalism to the Canberra plan
Lewis’s functionalist philosophy of mind arose out of the rubble of philosophical
behaviourism in the 1960s. Whilst abandoning the attempt to explicitly define
psychological properties in terms of physical properties, the functionalist project
aimed to show how they could nonetheless remain anchored in the physical world
by being defined in terms of the role they play in a physical theory. For Lewis, it is
Ramsey sentences which best explicate the functional definitions that this project
requires [Lewis, 1970]. Lewis’s recipe consists of two stages.
First, suppose we are seeking a theory of some property in terms of something
we take to be better understood, or with which we are more familiar. In that case,
we should distinguish between the original and familiar terms O, and the new terms
P for which we are seeking an analysis. Suppose O consists of predicates describing
overt physical behaviour, whilst P describes psychological states, and suppose we
have a theory T that consists of a single sentence, P (c) ! O(c), for some constant c.
T may be understood as saying that O(c) obtains whenever P (c) obtains. According
to Lewis’s account, the P -terms ‘stand in specified causal (and other) relations to
entities named by O-terms, and to one another’ [Lewis 1999]. To form the Ramsey
sentence, we replace the P terms in the postulate T (P (c)) with variables over which
the sentence is said to quantify: 9x(x(c) ! O(c)). The Ramsey sentence, 9xT [x(c)],
says there is an n-tuple of entities satisfying the postulate. In other words, there is
a realisation of the theory T .
Second, Lewis o↵ers a way of identifying the referents of functionally defined
terms whose causal roles we assign a priori, such as desires and beliefs, by identifying
them with the physical occupants of their causal roles, which are discovered by
scientists a posteriori. Having obtained the Ramsey sentence for desires and beliefs,
we are at liberty to settle the metaphysics of what underlies our ‘folk psychology’,
by reflecting upon the description of the world o↵ered by physics. ‘The core of the
second stage of Lewis’s program is that what the first stage provides, in e↵ect, is a
non-trivial target for empirical investigation: in this case, investigation of what it
is, in fact, that plays the causal role’ [Menzies and Price, 2008, p.6].
By the 1980s, the connection between functionalism and Ramsey sentences was
well-established [Shoemaker, 1981]. The Canberra plan extends Lewis’s functionalist
programme to incorporate other features of the manifest image, including moral and
aesthetic properties that make up ‘folk morality’ and ‘folk aesthetics’. The goal is
nothing less than a comprehensive naturalism in which all the apparently disparate
features of the world are anchored within the Ramsey sentence of the total physical
theory of the world. In what follows, I will consider how the manifest image is
supposed to be recovered in the neo-Humean world envisaged by Lewis, and will
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consider the di culty of applying this recipe within a primitive ontology approach
to quantum mechanics, which departs from neo-Humeanism in significant ways.
ii. Ramseyfying folk ontology
The analytic functionalism of David Lewis o↵ers an attractive candidate for relating
the scientific image of our best theories to the manifest image of observation and
experimentation [Lewis, 1972,Lewis, 1970]. According to functionalists, all entities
and features of the manifest image, such as the sensible properties of macroscopic
instruments used in an experiment, are reducible in principle to a set of functional
roles which are realised solely by elements of the scientific image, such as the particles
of Bohmian mechanics. According to Lewis, these functional properties are to be
identified with the result of Ramseyfying our ‘folk ontology’ and the ‘special sciences’
in the language of our best physics.
On the one hand, the language of folk ontology refers to the sensible properties
of macroscopic entities, like colour and texture. On the other hand, the language of
quantum mechanics refers to such things as ‘particles’ and a ‘wave function’ defined
in an abstract configuration space. I will deploy a model-theoretic version of Ram-
seyfication, which adopts a model for this restricted language that represents this
fundamental level of reality. By extending an ‘interpretation function’ associated
with this fundamental model, we may obtain a model of an emergent theory that
deploys an expanded language, including terms in which scientists can express their
beliefs about sensible properties. If such a model of an emergent theory exists, we
shall consider ourselves to have good reason for regarding the ontology of this theory
to be derivative. (For an introduction to ‘model theory’, see [Button and Walsh,
2018].) This metaphysical project turns on a critical assumption:
Unimodal realisation
MM/IV: The scientific image of the world is an object in the universe of sets, in
which the manifest image of the world is functionally realised.
Granted this assumption (at least, for now) a fundamental theory Tf may be pre-
sumed to admit a set-theoretic model Mf . To construct this model, we shall adopt
the following general recipe. Since we wish to make reference to dispositions that
may or may not be actualised, this model will be associated with a restricted set of
possible worlds Wf , one of these worlds is designated as the actual world w⇤ 2 Wf ,
and the semantics of dispositions understood in terms of subjunctive conditionals,
such that if   were true,  would be true. Following Lewis’s analysis of counter-
factuals [Lewis, 1973], Wf consists of nested spheres of possible worlds centred on
w⇤. This structure is generated by imposing a relation of comparative similarity
upon the di↵erent possible worlds. Our model must also contain a restricted set of
individuals Df , partitioned into possible worlds, and an interpretation function If ,
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which is used to interpret the predicates, function symbols, and singular terms of
the language Lf , by mapping each of them to sets of entities belonging to Df .
The interpretation function should work along the following lines. For any con-
stant c in the language Lf , I(c) is a function of worlds that maps to individuals in
Df , such that I(c)(w) is a member of Df (w) in the world w 2 Wf . For any n-place
predicate relation between individuals P , in the language Lf , I(P ) is a function of
worlds that maps to sets of n-tuples, such that I(P )(w) is a set of n-tuples of the
members of Df (w). And for an atomic sentence, S(c1, . . . , cn), where (c1, . . . , cn)
are constants in Lf , I(S) is a set of worlds in Wf , where world w 2 Wf belongs
to I(S) just in case the n-tuple (I(c1)(w), . . . , I(cn)(w)) belongs to I(S)(w). Log-
ical connectives can be treated in terms of operations upon sets. For example, for
two constituents of an atomic sentence,   and  , joined by logical conjunction,
I( & ) = I( ) \ I( ). The interpretation of the existential quantifier, I(9x (x)),
is given by the infinite union of the sets I( (c)), for each constant c in the language
Lf , which is saturated with constants. In the case of the subjunctive conditional,
  ⇤!  , we shall require that I(  ⇤!  ) = Wf , just in case there is a sphere ⇠ that
contains at least one possible world in which   is the case, and every possible world
in I( )\⇠ is also in I( ); otherwise, I(  ⇤!  ) = ;. In this way, the interpretation
function can be used to assign truth values to logically complex formulae.
For our purposes, the model Mf = hWf , Df , Ifi represents the most fundamental
level of reality and corresponds to the scientific image of the world. Our goal is to
extend this model to include certain features of the manifest image, which I shall
refer to as emergent. These features must include certain patterns of overt behaviour,
which pertain to experimentalists engaged in their experiments, as well as certain
patterns of brain activity, which pertain to their psychological states in observing
their outcomes. In extending this model, we are seeking to accommodate the kind of
empirical judgement necessary for discriminating between di↵erent scientific theories
on the basis of the observable outcomes of experiments. Such discourse requires an
appropriately expanded language.
We may proceed by extending the restricted language Lf of our fundamental
model to an expanded language Lef for the emergent world by adding whatever con-
stants, function symbols, and predicates are required to signify the various features
of this non-fundamental level of reality. (From this point, I shall use subscripts to
refer to the fundamental level, and superscripts to refer to the emergent level.) Our
goal is to find a theory in which this emergent world is realised within the funda-
mental model. We shall say that a theory of the emergent world T e is realised in the
fundamental model Mf just in case the interpretation function If can be extended
to a new function Ief , defined for the language L
e
f , such that an extended model M
e
f
that deploys this extended interpretation function is a model of T e. This realisation
is e↵ected by providing extensions for all the terms and predicates of the emergent
theory T e. This extension neither modifies the primitive ontology of our fundamen-
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tal theory Tf nor changes its laws: the emergent model M ef = hWf , Df , I
e
fi contains
the same set of possible worlds Wf , and the same set of individuals Df , as the basic
model Mf , which is the model for our fundamental theory.
iii. Lewisan functionalism
It is helpful for comparative purposes to apply this recipe to Lewis’s own brand of
functionalism. In this case, the model with which we must begin is informed by
something like the physics and chemistry that one learns in secondary school, since
Lewis himself famously declared he was ‘not ready to take lessons in ontology from
quantum physics’ [Lewis, 1986, p.xi]. I shall call it ‘school-physics’, for short, and
label this theory Ts phys. As such, a basic model of Ts phys may include local facts
about overt behaviour, including facts about certain motions of bodies caused by
scientists manipulating their instruments, certain compressions and rarefactions of
the air caused by verbal descriptions of their experiments, and certain patterns of
brain activity caused by their perceptions of sensible properties. A model Mf =
Ms phys of the world for the theory Ts phys can generate a set of basic physical facts
about the world, including local facts about the environment of an experimentalist,
⌧s phys, in the language of school-physics Ls phys.
The emergent world, however, includes psychological facts, ⌧ psy, which are not
explicitly contained within ⌧s phys. If we are to regard the psychological properties
of scientists as being functionally realised by the physical properties of particles and
fields, as Lewis did, then the language of Ls phys must be extended to a language that
includes the vocabulary of psychology, Lpsys phys. Significantly, Lewis accepted that,
in addition to the vocabulary of Lpsys phys, we should have a theory of ‘folk psychol-
ogy’, T folk, which specifies inter-level connections between the internal psychological
states of scientists that are described by psychology, and the external behaviours of
scientists and their experiments that are described by school-physics. This theory
generates a set of psychophysical facts, ⌧ folk, which have local constraints that are
represented within the set of basic physical facts, ⌧s phys.
If the facts generated by folk psychology, ⌧ folk, are consistent with facts gener-
ated by school-physics, ⌧s phys, then there exists an interpretation function, I
psy
s phys,
relative to which T folk would be realised in the basic model Ms phys. This func-
tion can be used to define both the set of psychophysical facts, ⌧ folk, and the set
of psychological facts, ⌧ psy. This may be achieved by identifying the interpretation
function with the set of sentences ⌧ psys phys in the language L
psy
s phys that are verified by
the model Ms phys, which includes local physical properties like mass and charge.
If this interpretation function is unique, then we shall allow that a manifest image
of the world with determinate content is realised within the basic model Ms phys.
The theory of folk psychology thus plays an essential role in supporting the content
assumption (AI/V) by ensuring that the psychology of experimentalists is causally
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constrained by local facts about their environments, which are part of the basic
model of reality, Ms phys.
iv. Bohmian functionalism
Suppose that we now replace school-physics as our fundamental theory of reality with
something like the Bohmian description of reality adopted by Super-Humeanism.
In that case, we shall require our fundamental language to be that of quantum
mechanics, Lqm. As before, we require a basic model, Mqm = hWqm, Dqm, Iqmi, that
contains a domain of possible worlds Wqm, one of which is designated as the actual
world. As before, we are seeking an interpretation function that realises the manifest
image of scientists within the basic model of reality, Mqm.
Unlike the previous case, however, we cannot appeal to the theory of folk psychol-
ogy to provide inter-level connections between the physical environment of scientists
and their internal representations. We cannot do so because any candidates for the
physical referents of such a theory would not be local and intrinsic features of an
experimentalist’s environment. Whilst local qualities, like mass and charge, are part
of the neo-Humean supervenience basis, Bohmian micro-monists replace this mosaic
with the single, uniform ‘quality’ of position, and require all the physical properties
of the instruments that scientists depend upon for their observations to supervene
upon nothing less than the global configuration of particles.
However, if Bohmian micro-monists follow Lewis in assuming the local superve-
nience of the psychological upon the physical, they will obtain a surprising result: if
scientists are composed of particles whose physical properties supervene upon noth-
ing less than the global configuration of particles, then their psychological properties
must also supervene upon nothing less than this global configuration. This is sur-
prising because it implies that an intrinsic duplicate of a scientist conducting an
experiment may have entirely di↵erent perceptions and beliefs about the outcomes
of the experiment, even though they conduct their experiments in laboratories that
are intrinsic duplicates and obtain physically identical outcomes. Which of them
should we trust?
The only constraint we may impose on the realisation of an emergent theory
T e that contains psychological facts, in that case, is that the entities filling the
functional roles in this theory must be found in the correct model of the formal
language of the fundamental theory. In other words, there are no local constraints
on the extended interpretation function Leqm in the Bohmian model of the kind that
arose in the realisation of folk psychology T folk in the model of school-physics. This
appears to be the case for any micro-monist primitive ontology approach to quantum
mechanics that removes the sparse natural properties required by Lewis.
Of course, a Bohmian micro-monist might deny the local supervenience of the
psychological upon the physical (in this case, upon the positions of certain particles),
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along with other philosophers of mind, such as Tyler Burge and Martin Davies
[Davies, 1992]. Yet this would be a curious move for anyone who adopts a primitive
ontology approach to quantum mechanics. After all, the motivation for adopting
a primitive ontology was to ensure that the outcomes of quantum experiments are
constituted by local configurations of matter. As Ghirardi and his collaborators
argued: ‘This [choice] is quite natural since the definiteness, the particularity of
the world of our experience, derives from our perceiving physical objects in definite
places, and this is also why the prescriptions for establishing the psychophysical
correspondence usually involve positions’ [Ghirardi et al., 1995, p.6]. To deny the
local supervenience of the psychological upon the physical, however, would be to
deny that observed measurement outcomes are constituted by local configurations
of particles. In that case, what is the motivation for adopting a primitive distribution
of matter that can constitute local measurement outcomes, if observed measurement
outcomes are in any case constituted by nothing less than the entire cosmos?
Moreover, in the absence of any such local constraints, there is no obviously
preferred language to use for describing the emergent domain, which includes scien-
tists and their macroscopic instruments, nor any obviously preferred theory of the
emergent world. The theory and language of quantum mechanics, by themselves,
tell us nothing about the psychological states of scientists regarding their local ex-
periments. Likewise, the theory and language of folk psychology, by themselves,
tell us nothing about the wave function or the particle configuration. Any further
constraints on the emergent world must therefore arise from internal considerations,
such as the logical consistency of our theory of the emergent world, and perhaps
from theoretical virtues, such as elegance and simplicity.
Suppose the Bohmian micro-monist should a rm the local supervenience of the
psychological upon the physical but insist that there are local constraints on the
interpretation function. Contrary to Lewis, they may argue, these local constraints
are not provided by a spatiotemporal distribution of sparse natural properties, like
mass and charge. Rather, these local constraints are provided by the positions of
the Bohmian particles, which constitute an alternative Humean mosaic. A suitable
interpretation function is one in which the arrangement of macrophysical bodies in
the manifest image corresponds to arrangements of microphysical particles in the
scientific image, with respect to the primary geometric ‘qualities’ of position, volume
and orientation. In other words, it is because there is a physical collection of particles
arranged ‘pointer-wise’, in the vicinity of a measuring device in the manifest image,
that observed experimental outcomes depend upon local configurations of particles.
Simply fixing the geometry of macroscopic objects in the manifest image, how-
ever, does not provide a meaningful constraint on the interpretation function. After
all, scientists conducting experiments do not perceive macroscopic instruments as
ghostly geometrical structures: they feel them to be solid objects of a certain tem-
perature, which can be grasped by the hand, and they see them as possessing certain
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colour profiles, which distinguish them from their surroundings. Such objects in-
stantiate chemical structures and have properties like temperature and chemical
entropy (see Chapter 7). Even supposing those thermochemical properties to be
reducible to quantal properties determined by the wave function, none of the prop-
erties that are constitutive of an observed measurement outcome are locally realised
in Bohmian mechanics. All of them depend upon nothing less than the entire global
configuration of particles.
Bohmians might respond that, having fixed the geometry of macroscopic objects
in the manifest image, decoherence theory ensures that the persisting aggregates of
Bohmian particles that occupy the places of macroscopic objects will mirror (to a
significant degree) the behaviour of classical objects described by Newton-Maxwell
physics. In that case, we might be able to form a theory of folk psychology that
specifies inter-level connections between the internal psychological states of scientists
and the external behaviours of the classical-like particle aggregates described by
Bohmian mechanics and decoherence theory. There are reasons to reject this appeal
to decoherence theory, however, which I shall discuss presently.
§8.3. A Putnam-style permutation argument
In what follows, I mean to adapt an argument advanced in Koons’ recent critique
of the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics [Koons, 2017], which I judge
to apply more generally to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics,
such as the Super-Humean model advocated by Esfeld. I shall argue that adopting
this fundamental model of nature results in a radical indeterminacy of meaning that
leaves any names, predicates, and function symbols that feature in the language
of our emergent theory without determinate intensions. This can be demonstrated
succinctly by mounting a Putnam-style permutation argument.
i. A simple permutation
For a simple example of how Putnam’s permutation argument works, let us consider
a model described by Button and Walsh [Button and Walsh, 2018, chp.2]. Here our
theory T consists of just three atomic sentences: ‘Bohr is a cat’, ‘Bohm is a cat’,
and ‘de Broglie is not a cat’. We can formalise this theory by deploying a set of
individuals, D, three constant symbols, {c1, c2, c3}, a one-place predicate C, and the
language of first-order logic, to produce the set: {C(c1), C(c2),¬C(c3)}. A simple
model M can then be constructed which incorporates an interpretation function I
that assigns natural language L to the domain D and the predicate C as follows:
I(D) = {Bohr,Bohm, deBroglie} , I(C) = {Bohr,Bohm} .
According to Ramsey-functionalists, we are to think of the model M as explicating
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a reference relation that tracks our natural language L, and as explicating the truth
of the constitutive claims of our theory T . M explicates reference because the name
‘Bohr’ refers to I(c1), the name ‘Bohm’ to I(c2), and the name ‘de Broglie’ to I(c3),
whilst the predicate ‘is a cat’ picks out the set I(C). Likewise, M explicates the
truth of the sentence, ‘Bohr is a cat’, for example, because M ✏ C(c1).
Putnam has famously sought to make trouble for semantic realism by construct-
ing permutations of such models, which are isomorphic with respect to the way
in which they explicate the truth of sentences, but distinct with respect to the
way in which they explicate reference [Putnam, 1977, Putnam, 1980]. For exam-
ple, consider the isomorphic mapping  (D) which permutes the domain D such
that I( (c1)) = Bohm, I( (c2)) = Bohr, I( (c3)) = deBroglie. This permutation
induces the following rival interpretation:
I 0(C) = I( (C)) = {Bohm, deBroglie} .
The rival model N generated by this permutation function has the same domain
as the original model M , and realises the same set of sentences, but it di↵ers with
respect to interpretation, since these sentences refer to di↵erent elements within the
domain. This raises the question: what fixes reference to the basic constituents
of reality? To put the question more sceptically: why should we suppose that the
original model M picks out the real referents, rather than the permutation model
N? The argument is easily generalised to encompass more complicated theories of
reality, assuming the world can be described as an object in the universe of sets
(MM/IV). If the world can be thus described, then any theory of the world T will
always have a model M with a domain D that represents the collection of all the
actually existing objects in the world.
ii. A trans-world permutation
Let us return to our more complicated model of the quantum world. I have stipulated
that T e is a macroscopic theory of a world that is emergent relative to the model
Mqm, because there is an interpretation function Ieqm that extends Iqm to the language
of T e, resulting in a new model M eqm, such that the theory T
e is realised in M eqm.
It is trivial to prove that, in the absence of additional constraints on the emergent
theory, there are an infinite number of extensions of Iqm that will also produce an
extension of Mqm relative to which T e can be verified.
Following Putnam’s lead, let us take some permutation  (w) of the objects in
D(w) for some world w 2 Wqm, and apply it to the interpretation Ieqm with respect
to the interpretation of all names and predicate symbols at w. The resulting in-
terpretation is also a realisation of T e in the model Mqm. In a similar way, let us
construct a trans-world permutation ⌃(W ), which acts on the objects of every world
in Wqm, resulting in the interpretation Jeqm. The extension of Mqm by J
e
qm will also
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be a model of T e, and so Jeqm will also be a realisation of our emergent theory in
the model Mqm. Yet Jeqm will be scrambled beyond recognition with respect to I
e
qm,
since the system described by the emergent theory will have been realised using an
entirely di↵erent set of entities across possible worlds. This algorithm is not idem-











If functionalists and proponents of the Canberra plan are to confine themselves to
this procedure for generating the manifest image from the scientific image in a world
described by quantum mechanics, it follows that any predicate involving a term in
our emergent language Le, such as ‘Alice measured spin-up’, will lack determinate
intensions in terms of our fundamental language Lqm. This is evident because we can
always find an interpretation function in which our emergent theory of the world is
true, including a theory in which ‘Alice measured spin-down’ instead (cf. [Frauchiger
and Renner, 2018]).
By the same token, it is entirely indeterminate what such a predicate is meant
to be true of, or what it is supposed to be realised by. For example, the intension of
the predicate ‘is a scientist’ in Ieqm may turn out to be the intension of the predicate
‘is a magician’ in a scrambled permutation Jeqm. In the absence of local constraints
on the manifest image, there is no reason why an emergent theory that contains
scientists and their measuring devices should be privileged over an alternative theory
that refers to magicians with magical powers. In fact, there are any number of
fantastic but internally consistent emergent theories (e1, e2, . . .) for which we might
seek an interpretation. For example, the claim that ‘Alain Aspect is conducting
an experiment in Palaiseau’ (using the interpretation Ae1qm) might just as well be
substituted by the assertion that ‘Gandalf is fighting a Balrog in Khazad-dûm’
(using the interpretation Ge2qm). Interpretations are cheap, and without additional
constraints upon the manifest image, we have good reason to suppose that one could
be found in which the ‘alternative facts’ of a fantastic world will turn out to be true.
Indeed, a similar argument was advanced against Bertrand Russell’s theory of
perception by Max Newman in 1928, in which Newman noted that any collection of
things can be organised so as to have a certain structure, provided that there are a
su cient number of them: ‘hence the doctrine that only structure is known involves
the doctrine that nothing can be known that is not logically deducible from the
mere fact of existence, except (“theoretically”) the number of constituting objects’
[Newman, 1928]. For the ‘generating relation’ of the structure of the emergent world
to be nontrivial, Newman concluded, something additional must be known about
reality that sets it apart as a privileged interpretation.
In my earlier example of a classical world described by school-physics, this addi-
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tional knowledge was put forward in the form of the theory of folk psychology, which
imposed local constraints on the interpretation function by establishing inter-level
connections between the subjects of psychological states (described by the emergent
theory) and the subjects of physical behaviour (described by the theory of school-
physics). However, as Koons observes, in a world with a universal wave function
there is no physical constraint on an emergent theory that is not a holistic con-
straint: any behaviour is ultimately behaviour stipulated by the wave function for
the cosmos as a whole [Koons, 2017]. The possibility of advancing a theory of folk
psychology that o↵ers inter-level connections is thus precluded.
iv. Against quantum micro-monism
We arrive, then, at the following di culty. According to the primitive ontology
approach to quantum mechanics, nature consists of a single set of microscopic con-
stituents (MM/II), whose dynamics are determined by a universal wave function. In
the absence of any local constraints upon the manifest image, however, the manifest
image would be without determinate content. Yet if this were the case then – to
put it starkly – we would have no empirical means of discriminating between the
di↵erent ways in which the world might be interpreted by a scientist in a laboratory
or a psychotic inmate of a mental hospital. The scientific image, in such a world,
would be empirically empty. At the root of this problem is the radical holism that
follows from applying micro-monist assumptions to the interpretation of quantum
mechanics. The analytic functionalist cannot o↵er a principled way of relating the
scientific and the manifest image when the total configuration of matter, and the
entire distribution of psychological states, must be related to one another as a whole,
instead of piece by covarying piece. We might encapsulate this dialectic with the
following argument:
Argument from indeterminacy:
i. It is possible for scientists to learn facts about nature from their experiments.
ii. If it is possible for scientists to learn facts about nature from their experi-
ments, then the manifest image must be locally constrained.
iii. If Super-Humeanism or power monism is true, the manifest image is not
locally constrained.
iv. Therefore, if Super-Humeanism or power monism is true, it is impossible for
scientists to learn facts about nature from their experiments (by ii & iii).
v. Therefore, Super-Humeanism and power monism are false (by i & iv).
Once again, the first and second premises of this argument constitute a precondition
for gaining knowledge by scientific inquiry: in the absence of local constraints, the
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manifest image would be without determinate content, and thus scientists would
not learn any facts about nature by performing experiments. The third premise was
adduced in the last two sections: Super-Humeans assume the truth of the Bohmian
interpretation of quantum mechanics, but neither Bohmian particles nor the wave
function qualify as local constraints on the manifest image. In maintaining the as-
sumption of micro-monism, they must deny the existence of certain constraints upon
the manifest image that form part of the conditions of the possibility of scientific
inquiry. The conclusion follows deductively from the premises.
This argument gives us another reason to think Super-Humeanism and power
monism are false, and to doubt the micro-monist assumptions about nature that
they embody (MM/II-IV), which lead to radical holism when applied to the inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics. To refute this argument, micro-monists will have
to attack the third premise. They might do so either by denying the claim that the
theoretical constraints on the interpretation function are insu cient for determin-
ing the manifest image, or by denying the claim that the only constraints on the
manifest image are holistic constraints.
§8.4. More theory, more properties
i. Theoretical constraints
The first strategy seeks to preserve micro-monism and shoulder the explanatory
burden of accounting for the manifest image. It attempts to do so by finding addi-
tional theoretical constraints that we can impose on the extended interpretation of
quantum mechanics to reduce the indeterminacy of the manifest image.
Natural properties and causal constraints
A favoured response to Putnam’s sceptical challenge, advanced by causal theorists
of reference, is that his permuted models ignore the causal relationships that link
our use of language to the world of objects – such as one’s use of the word ‘cat’
to the world of cats. The model that should be favoured by metaphysical realists,
it may be argued, is the one which respects these causal constraints. A micro-
monist, however, cannot appeal to causal connections between objects or events in
the manifest image as independent constraints. Whether or not a causal connection
holds between two objects or events of the manifest image must be settled by the
interpretation function.
Descriptivists, on the other hand, argue that reference obtains in virtue of theo-
retical descriptions of things that exist in the world associating a term of a language
with a basic object or property in the world, and thus require the world to instanti-
ate a structure of basic properties or natural kinds. Lewis, for instance, attempts to
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block spurious permutations by appealing to the existence of sparse natural prop-
erties that are locally instantiated and feature in physical laws [Lewis, 1984]. His
strategy consists, first, of identifying a class of natural properties among the subsets
of the world’s domain, and, second, of denying that just any subset of the domain of
entities picks out a genuine natural property. By enriching the background theory
beyond the theory of bare sets, such that some predicate symbol P must be assigned
to some set M(P ), Lewis intends to make it harder for models to realise sentences.
For example, consider a background theory T0 which has three natural properties:
the empty set, the entire world, and some proper subset of the entire world. Halvor-
son suggests a theory T that is ruled out by this background theory [Halvorson,
2019], which includes the following axiom:
9xPx ^ 9yQy ^ ¬(Pz ^Qz).
This theory cannot be translated into the enriched background theory T0, since its
properties P and Q demand two disjoint proper subsets, whereas the background
theory is furnished only with one. Nonetheless, the appeal to sparse natural prop-
erties will not protect the primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics from
referential indeterminacy for two reasons.
First, it is unlikely that the enriched background theory could be made su -
ciently strong to resist every trouble-making permutation. Halvorson suggests a
background theory that admits a single natural property with actual instances, and
considers a theory which asserts that ‘there are many gods, and there are no elec-
trons’ [p.267]. Since this theory can be translated into the background theory, this
theory, although presumably false, will turn out to be true. Counterexamples for
more complex background theories might similarly be contrived. L.A Paul has ar-
gued that ‘there could be an alternative, equally good, mapping of terms in the
language of the theory to natural properties’, with the result that we obtain ‘radi-
cally di↵erent interpretation for our best theory’ [Paul, 2013, p.191], which can be
blocked only by denying the permutability of natural kinds.
Secondly, primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics, like Super-
Humeanism, strip away any sparse natural properties from the supervenience base.
According to Super-Humeans like Esfeld, physical properties like mass and charge
are merely part of the ‘best system’ of Humean laws that balances simplicity and
strength (see Chapter 4). Likewise, for power monists, such properties are not fun-
damental features of nature, but grounded in the cosmos as a whole (see Chapter
6). Yet the Humean mosaic of intrinsic natural properties, instantiated as point-
instances in spacetime, was not rejected by Super-Humeans and power monists
without good reason: the phenomenon of quantum entanglement suggests the non-
existence of such a supervenience base (see Chapter 3).
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Appeals to simplicity
Similarly, any attempt to favour models that have ‘simple’ interpretation functions,
whatever their merits in the case of Lewisan worlds, are unlikely to prosper in
Super-Humean worlds, in which there is no possibility of interpreting the language
of emergent laws in terms of the language of fundamental predicates that refer to
sparse natural properties (cf. Section 5.5). Any interpretation functions – including
those restricted to interpretations in terms of microphysical properties, like mass
and charge – are going to be extremely complicated in a Super-Humean world, and
there is no obviously objective standard for making comparisons between them.
Decoherence theory
Alternatively, one might dismiss Lewis’s attempt to secure strict local supervenience
as ill-conceived, yet argue that it holds nonetheless for all practical purposes. In
classical mechanics, all the particles exert forces upon one another from arbitrary
distances, yet one can typically ignore the force-fields of particles that are far apart
from each other. In Bohmian mechanics, all the particles are choreographed by a
universal wave function, yet one can obtain e↵ective wave functions through the
process of decoherence. The local supervenience of the properties of water upon
the properties of its molecular constituents, and the local supervenience of mental
properties upon physical properties, for example, might be seen to depend simply
upon the existence of stable conditions that inevitably emerge in their local envi-
ronments. Esfeld has argued that the manifest image can be recovered from the
scientific image, even if there is a principled failure of local supervenience, just so
long as local supervenience holds in practice.2
I alluded earlier to the appeal to decoherence theory as a possible way of con-
straining the extended interpretation function, in order to reduce the indeterminacy
of the manifest image. Bohmian mechanics relies upon the theory of decoherence to
explain how the reduced density matrix of a quantum system coupled to an environ-
ment evolves from a pure state to a mixed state that specifies the correct probabili-
ties for possible measurement outcomes (see Section 3.4). A Bohmian micro-monist
might claim that decoherence theory ensures that persisting aggregates of Bohmian
particles, which occupy the places of macroscopic objects in the manifest image, will
mirror the behaviour of classical objects. In that case, we might use decoherence
theory as a practical constraint upon the extended interpretation function, forming
a theory of folk psychology that connects the psychological states of scientists with
the external behaviours of classical-like aggregates of particles.
However, there are two problems with appealing to decoherence theory in this
way. First, there are empirical reasons why some physicists find decoherence an
unsatisfactory theory of the e↵ects of the environment upon local systems, insofar
as it purports to be a complete theory. As Drossel and Ellis point out, decoherence
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theory relies on ‘the untestable and implausible claim’ that the thermal environment
of a quantum system ‘can be described by an infinite-precision wave function that
is subject to unitary time evolution’ [Drossel and Ellis, 2018, p.4]. In fact, there are
positive reasons to doubt that this is the case [Drossel, 2017]. Secondly, decoherence
theory involves ad hoc assumptions about the classical nature of the environment
that presuppose what micro-monists like Esfeld are seeking to demonstrate. Specif-
ically, ‘decoherence theory must always make assumptions about the randomness or
uncorrelatedness of the degrees of freedom’ of the environment [p.16].
Since we are seeking an independent reason for thinking that aggregates of
Bohmian particles will behave like classical objects, however, as a basis for con-
straining the interpretation function, an appeal to decoherence theory in this context
is viciously circular. Why should we admit the possibility of only those emergent
worlds in which decoherence takes place? Such a metaphysical model would have
to come supplied with a reason for privileging emergent worlds comprised chiefly of
sub-systems that admit approximately classical dynamics, thus reducing the set of
possible worlds in which experimentalists are able to conduct their experiments to a
smaller subset of physically possible worlds than the set of worlds that are consistent
with the laws of Bohmian mechanics.
For micro-pluralists, the existence of classical-like behaviour is unsurprising, since
‘classical’ properties have a role to play in specifying the boundary conditions in
which the quantum dynamics takes place. There is no universal wave function to
choreograph the trajectories of all the particles, as the wave function is subject to
a collapse mechanism that is ‘determined top-down by the local classical context’
[Drossel and Ellis, 2018, p.24]. For quantum micro-monists, like Esfeld, however,
‘classical’ properties have no role to play in the metaphysical model, besides the
role played by physical properties in general, since the quantum dynamics is not
subject to local boundary conditions. According to Esfeld, physical properties enter
the metaphysical model solely through the dynamical role they play in specifying
regularities in the distribution of particles. If decoherence theory cannot be relied
upon to conjure classical-like worlds from the universal wave function, however,
without smuggling in classical assumptions about nature, then micro-monists are
reduced to appealing to the emergence of classical-like worlds as a brute constraint.
Yet even this constraint, by itself, may be too weak to overcome the radical
indeterminacy of the manifest image. Whilst the set of emergent worlds might be
confined to possible worlds that approximate classical (Newton-Maxwell) dynamics,
it will still admit the realisation of any number of fantastic worlds, in which the ob-
jects of the manifest image follow classical mechanics, but are perceived and concep-
tualised in radically di↵erent ways [Paul, 2013]. It seems the necessary constraints
on the manifest image, for the determined micro-monist, can only be obtained at
the theoretical cost of increasingly arbitrary constraints.
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ii. Property dualism
The second strategy I shall consider seeks to reduce the explanatory burden on
quantum mechanics by restricting the type of properties determined by the wave
function, embracing a form of property dualism that includes both quantal and non-
quantal empirical properties. According to this approach, the properties of nature
admit a certain disjointness: there are non-quantal properties that are irreducible to
the positions of particles and the wave function. It is these non-quantal properties
that impose additional constraints upon the manifest image.
Phenomenal properties
A phenomenalist inspired by Russell’s structuralist programme in metaphysics might
conceive of this disjointness in terms of a distinction between structural and intrinsic
properties [Russell, 1927]. Suppose we frame the problem of radical indeterminacy
as being the problem of how scientists can perceive macroscopic objects, like our
measuring devices, in a world made of microscopic particles choreographed by the
wave function. A phenomenalist might seek to solve this problem by treating the
particles as having intrinsic sensible properties, in addition to their positions. Such
‘phenomenal’ properties would be disjoint from any ‘quantal’ properties determined
by the wave function, since their presence in nature would involve no change in any
of the structural properties, such as the relative positions of particles, but would be
correlated with changes in the intrinsic phenomenal experience of experimentalists.
The inclusion of phenomenal properties generates the possibility of local con-
straints upon the manifest image, over and above any holistic quantum constraints.
In a phenomenalist world, the geometrical properties of objects that exist in exter-
nal space and time, described in the physical language of quantum physics, might
be linked with properties of sense-data in phenomenal space and time, described
in terms of phenomenal language. An acceptable interpretation function, in this
case, would be one which assigned a shape and size to an object in phenomenal
space that corresponds to the shape and size of an object in physical space, whilst
the laws of perspective would function as inter-level constraints upon the manifest
image [Koons, 2017, pp.72-4]. This strategy need not require scientists to have in-
dividual particle-detectors built into their heads: it would su ce if large clusters of
particles co-instantiated sensible properties, enabling scientists to perceive macro-
scopic objects, like the instruments they rely upon to perform their experiments.
Yet this approach comes at the theoretical cost of a kind of epiphenomenalism.
By connecting the phenomenal experience of experimentalists to intrinsic properties
that exist over and above any quantal properties, but make no causal di↵erence
to the structural properties of nature (namely, the positions of the particles), the
phenomenalist reduces the experimentalist to a purely passive observer of a world
governed by quantum mechanics. In such a world, the observations of experimental-
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ists, which involve changes in intrinsic properties, seem to make no causal di↵erence
to the actions they perform in their experiments, which involve changes in struc-
tural properties, since for every possible world in which an experimentalist is said to
perform certain actions in an experiment and make observations, there is an exact
physical duplicate in which the same actions are performed but nothing is observed.
Emergent powers
A strong emergentist might conceive the disjointness between quantal and non-
quantal properties to consist instead of a division between ‘higher-level’ and ‘lower-
level’ powers. In this picture, a physical system that is su ciently large somehow
attains higher-level powers that act top-down upon its basic constituents, imposing
structural forces that organise their configuration according to higher-level laws
[O’Connor, 1994, O’Connor and Wong, 2005]. If such properties are intrinsic to
localised objects, they might impose local constraints upon the manifest image.
However, this emergentist programme also comes with theoretical costs, as I
have noted (see Section 7.4). For instance, a strong emergentist account of how
large systems make a causal di↵erence to the behaviour of their basic constituents is
committed to the existence of additional forces in nature, besides the four fundamen-
tal forces (namely, the gravitation force, the electromagnetic force, and the strong
and weak nuclear forces), which operate according to di↵erent and more complex
laws. Whilst standard concerns about the violations of mass-energy conservation
entailed by this approach may not be insurmountable, we have good reason to think
the strong emergentist programme over-complicates nature’s laws. The quantum
revolution in chemistry and thermal physics has furnished scientists with infinite
quantum models of macroscopic (and mesoscopic) systems that describe thermo-
chemical phenomena, which are characterised by simple laws (see Chapter 7).
§8.5. Hierarchical constraints
All of the responses so far share a common assumption: they all accept that the
manifest image of observation and experimentation is ultimately to be explained in
terms of the behaviour of a single set of microscopic constituents that are governed
by the same micro-physics (MM/II), apart from the exercise of hypothetical, higher-
level causal powers, which may modify their behaviours under certain conditions.
In the previous chapter, however, I proposed a micro-pluralist approach to nature,
which rejects the radical holism that results from supposing the physical world to
be characterised by a universal wave function.
A micro-pluralist conception of nature o↵ers an alternative way of conceiving the
disjointness between the quantal properties of microscopic systems and the ‘classi-
cal’ properties of macroscopic systems, which neither demands the existence of addi-
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tional physical forces, nor collapses the practice of scientific observation into passive
epiphenomenalism. According to micro-pluralists, the disjointness of certain ‘clas-
sical’ properties is manifest by the fact that they are not quantum-entangled, but
have a role to play in specifying the boundary conditions in which the quantum dy-
namics of a system takes place. The quantal properties of nature, according to this
approach, are grounded in ontic macroscopic systems, which have intrinsic ‘classical’
properties like temperature and chemical entropy. These ontic systems have distinct
wave functions defined in unitarily inequivalent Hilbert space representations, and
evolve according to the quantum mechanics of the DEP model.
Significantly, by recognising the context-dependence of microscopic representa-
tions of quantum mechanics, micro-pluralism rejects the micro-monist assumption
that the world is an object in the universe of sets (MM/IV). According to micro-
monists, a set of possible worldsW1i corresponds to a single semantic interpretation
I1i of quantum mechanics, which describes di↵erent arrangements of the same set
of microscopic constituents. According to micro-pluralists, however, the concrete
potentialities of quantum systems are jointly determined by laws and their essential
macroscopic states (MP/I) (see Section 7.5). It is only within the boundary condi-
tions of a nomological machine that we can construct a set-theoretic model with a
single domain of microscopic entities, M1i = hW1i, D1i, I1ii.
Yet as Halvorson observes: if ‘we reject that assumption’ – namely, the assump-
tion that the world is an object in the universe of sets (MM/IV) – ‘Putnam’s paradox
simply dissolves’ [Halvorson, 2019, p.268]. The problem with micro-monism is that
it abstracts away from essential, macroscopic natures of physical systems, which
determine the context and boundary conditions in which the micro-physics takes
place. According to the micro-pluralist, however, we can think of the natures of on-
tic systems as imposing local constraints upon the manifest image, securing a world
of natural kinds that are not subject to Putnam-style permutations. In Chapter 9,
I shall put forward an ontology that is compatible with a micro-pluralist approach
to quantum mechanics.
§8.6. General remarks
In this chapter, I considered the Canberra plan for physics, which extends Lewis’s
functionalist philosophy of mind to incorporate other features of the manifest im-
age. I discussed the claim that the manifest image is realised within a set-theoretic
model of our best physics (Section 8.2), and observed how this claim becomes more
doubtful in the context of quantum micro-monist ontologies, like Super-Humeanism
and power monism, which remove any local constraints from the manifest image.
I advanced my case against quantum micro-monism using a Putnam-style per-
mutation argument that leads to scepticism about reference (Section 8.3). On the
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one hand, it is plausible that the manifest image is constrained by local features
of their environment (AI/V). On the other hand, micro-monists assume the macro-
scopic world of the manifest image to be realised in the structural properties of the
microscopic world (MM/IV). However, quantum micro-monists, like Super-Humeans
and cosmic power monists, cannot supply the necessary local constraints.
I considered some ways of tightening up the background theory to impose further
constraints on the manifest image, and noted how the primitive ontology approach to
quantum mechanics undermines such attempts (Section 8.4). I then considered the
possibility that some properties are ‘disjoint’ from the quantal properties determined
by the wave function, including strong emergentist and phenomenalist strategies.
Finally, I suggested that local constraints arise from taking a micro-pluralist stance
toward the thermodynamic limit, in which the microscopic properties of a system
are grounded in macroscopic systems with essential natures (see Section 8.5). In the
light of this discussion, I suggest the following desideratum to guide the construction
of a more adequate metaphysical model:
Desideratum: Macroscopic grounding constraints
DD/VI: Other things being equal, we should favour metaphysical accounts in
which the world is not an object in the universe of sets, but contains entities with
intrinsic natures that impose local constraints on the manifest image.
Notes
1Maudlin refers to this problem as ‘Aristotle’s challenge’ [p.2].
2Personal correspondence with Esfeld.
Chapter 9
Substantial powers
Big fleas have little fleas upon their backs to bite ’em,
And little fleas have lesser fleas, and so, ad infinitum.
– Augustus De Morgan, Siphonaptera
§9.1. Beyond micro-monism
In Part II, I considered the challenge posed to classical micro-monism by the ‘quan-
tum revolution’ that occurred in the 1930s and 40s (see Chapter 3), and discussed
a number of metaphysical models that seek to respond it, beginning with Super-
Humeanism (see Chapter 4), which adopts a primitive ontology approach to quan-
tum mechanics, and ending with power monism, which modifies the Super-Humean
model in various ways (see Chapter 6). The goal of a primitive ontology approach
to quantum mechanics is to explain the empirical content of quantum mechanics in
terms of statements about a primitive distribution of matter in three dimensional
space (or four-dimensional spacetime). This distribution is governed by a law of
nature that determines its temporal evolution.
In Part III, however, I argued that the era of quantum chemistry and quan-
tum statistical physics, which began in the 1950s, has produced more trouble for
metaphysicians who seek a realist description of the microscopic world. This trouble
a↵ects quantum micro-monist ontologies, like Super-Humeanism and power monism,
which assume that the task of interpreting a physical theory is simply a matter of
settling upon a single semantic interpretation of quantum mechanics, in terms of
some set of fundamental microscopic constituents, and picking out their possible
arrangements according to its physical laws (see Section 7.2).
Suppose we attempt to accommodate the phenomenon of quantum entanglement
by adopting Bohmian mechanics and postulating a finite configuration of particles
choreographed by a universal wave function, accepting the theoretical cost of denying
163
164 9 Substantial powers
the intrinsicality of consciousness (as argued in Section 6.4). Even so, there are
thermochemical phenomena that occur at higher scales, such as phase transitions,
which demand quantum models that admit physically inequivalent representations,
in order to define all their states and observables (see Chapter 7). This is a problem
for scientific realists who accept micro-monism, since it suggests, as Roger Jones puts
it, that ‘physicists don’t know what deep explanatory structure of the microworld
to be realists about’ [Jones, 1991, p.191].
Suppose we attempt to preserve a primitive ontology of microscopic constituents
that compose every physical system, by claiming that such infinite models are merely
‘approximations’ of the underlying microphysics, accepting the theoretical cost of
reducing the explanatory power of quantum mechanics and weakening the epistemic
grounds for scientific realism (as argued in Section 7.5). Even so, this will not save
scientific inquiry from the radical indeterminacy of the manifest image in a holistic
world with a universal wave function (see Chapter 8). This is a second problem
for scientific realists who accept micro-monism, since it implies that the theory of
quantum mechanics cannot be supported by observation and experimentation.
In this chapter, I aim to o↵er a basic outline of a hylomorphic ontology of quan-
tum mechanics that incorporates both the phenomenon of quantum entanglement
and thermochemical phenomena, but abandons micro-monist assumptions about na-
ture in favour of micro-pluralism. In so doing, I am seeking to o↵er a micro-pluralist
alternative to the primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics, in which
quantum states admit a hierarchical interpretation in terms of both microscopic
and macroscopic properties. In order to advance beyond the primitive ontologies
I have discussed so far, such as Super-Humeanism and power monism, this meta-
physical model must explain how irreducible thermochemical systems arise within
nature with properties like temperature and chemical entropy, and how they causally
influence the evolution of each other’s distributions of matter.
§9.2. Macroscopic substances
In order to accommodate thermochemical systems such as our measuring devices,
I shall introduce a set of macroscopic objects into my metaphysical model to serve
as the subjects of ‘classical’ properties like temperature and chemical entropy (see
Section 7.5). I considered earlier two di↵erent ways of introducing objects into an
ontology of nature (see Section 2.3): for neo-Kantians, facts about physical objects
and their properties are grounded upon facts about our preferences and practices; for
neo-Aristotelians, by contrast, the physical world contains fundamental substances
that exist independently of our preferences and practices, and derivative entities
that are grounded in substances.
Hans Primas, for instance, seems to be taking a neo-Kantian approach to quan-
§9.2 Macroscopic substances 165
tum mechanics in his characterisation of ‘exophysics’ as a perspective in which the
world contains objects we can describe as open quantum systems, versus the funda-
mental reality of ‘endophysics’ in which the world consists of a closed holistic system
concerning which we can make no predictions [Primas, 1990a, Primas, 1990b, Pri-
mas, 1994]. For a follower of Primas, the operation of generating exophysics from
endophysics depends upon the arbitrary and selective character of our explanatory
interests in choosing to attend to some features of the world rather than others.
Hence the objects of scientific inquiry are not fundamental but constructed, since
they ontologically depend upon our preferences and practices.
I mean to adopt a neo-Aristotelian approach instead, which draws upon Aris-
totle’s doctrine of hylomorphism for inspiration, but deploys contemporary meta-
physical tools (see Chapters 1 & 2). In tandem with Koons, I shall consider the
fundamental physical entities in nature to be substances that have essential ther-
mochemical properties. Koons proposes that the essence of each thermochemical
substance is represented by a topology on the abstract C*-algebra that generates
a concrete W*-algebra of observable properties for the whole substance, whilst the
ontic states of an interacting substance are represented by normalised positive lin-
ear functionals defined on its W*-algebra (for more details, see [Koons, 2019]). For
Koons, then, the appropriate representation of a quantum system is not arbitrary,
but context-dependent: it depends upon the ability of scientists to distinguish what
is essential to an ontic system from what is accidental.
A neo-Aristotelian approach toward thermochemical substances, in which ther-
mochemical substances are fundamental, is not incompatible with a restricted neo-
Kantian approach, in which there are other kinds of entities that are grounded (in
part) in our preferences and practices. Nonetheless, a neo-Aristotelian approach
that includes fundamental substances o↵ers a number of advantages over an unre-
stricted neo-Kantian approach. As Koons points out, by ontologically committing
to thermochemical substances that exist independently of our preferences and prac-
tices, it ‘avoids the threat of regress or circularity that looms over Primas’s picture:
the experimenter, whose interests and choices determine the perspectives, must have
a perspective-independent existence’ [Koons, 2019]. Moreover, the decision to priv-
ilege thermochemical substances is not arbitrary, in my view, since scientific inquiry
depends upon the existence of instruments that have chemical structures (see Sec-
tion 7.4). Furthermore, the collapse of the wave function can be explained in terms
of their chemical structures, according to Drossel and Ellis [Drossel and Ellis, 2018].
However, an ontology of nature that includes thermochemical substances faces
the challenge of explaining how these transitory entities may be supposed to arise
in nature. A thermochemical substance, such as a pool of water, for example,
can hardly be supposed an eternal feature of nature on empirical grounds. A neo-
Kantian might explain how such objects arise in terms of changes in the subjects
who construct them. A neo-Aristotelian who adopts a hylomorphic approach to
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quantum mechanics, however, must o↵er an objective account of the generation and
corruption of thermochemical substances in terms of the primitive ontology.
§9.3. Power pluralism proposed
In what follows, I propose a metaphysical model called ‘substance power plural-
ism’ (power pluralism, for short), which o↵ers a hylomorphic ontology of quantum
mechanics that is compatible with the contextual quantum dynamics of the DEP
model (discussed in Section 7.5). The core of this final model – the third metaphys-
ical model that I have proposed in this thesis – subsists in five axioms:
Substance power pluralism
PP1: There is power-gunk,1 which has the passive metaphysical power to be ac-
tualised as matter fields in which every point has a matter-density.
PP2: There are substantial powers,2 which have active metaphysical powers to
actualise matter fields from the power-gunk.
PP3: There are substances, each composed of a matter field and a substantial
power, which have causal powers to change their distribution of matter-
density and to ‘exchange’ matter-density with other substances.
PP4: Power-gunk is the substrate of substantial change in nature, whilst sub-
stances are subject to generation and corruption.
PP5: Substances are the substrate of accidental change in nature, whilst matter
fields are subject to change in their distribution of matter-density.
This metaphysical model develops the primitive ontology of power monism in two
significant ways: the power-atoms are replaced with ‘power-gunk’, and the cosmic
power is replaced with a plurality of ‘substantial powers’. In the exposition that
follows, I shall focus on how this ontology compares and contrasts with the Super-
Humean model (see Chapter 4) and the power monist model (see Chapter 6).
i. Matter and form
The primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics is motivated by the claim
that there is ‘something new in quantum non-locality’ that calls for a break with
the classical micro-monist conception of nature in which physical properties are
fundamental and intrinsic features of particles (or fields) [Esfeld, 2017]. Instead,
a primitive ontology approach posits the existence of a fundamental substrate of
primitive matter that has ‘no [intrinsic] physical properties at all’, but whose spatial
arrangement evolves according to a universal law of nature [Esfeld et al., 2017, p.135].
For Super-Humeans, this substrate consists of matter points: it is the distance
relations between them that change (see Chapter 4). For power monists, it consists
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of power-atoms, which have causal powers to change their distance relations (see
Chapter 6). Both Super-Humeans and power monists agree, nonetheless, that the
macroscopic world is functionally realised in the microscopic world (MM/IV), which
consists of a single set of microscopic constituents (MM/II). Both Super-Humeans
and power monists embrace the Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics, in
which these constituents are choreographed by a universal wave function.
In the hylomorphic ontology that I wish to propose, however, the primitive sub-
strate of change is power-gunk, which is field-like, rather than atomic, consisting of
gunky particulars that are potentially the matter of di↵erent substances. In addi-
tion, there are primitive substantial powers, whose manifestations carve the physical
world into actual substances with numerically distinct ‘matter fields’. The power-
gunk underlies all of the matter fields, but is not identical to any of them, whilst the
temporal development of each of these matter fields is context-dependent. I shall
consider each of these metaphysical claims in turn.
First, power pluralism, like the GRWm model [Allori et al., 2008], embraces
a gunky conception of matter to fit a stochastic modification of the Schrödinger
dynamics, in which the wave function evolves according to a non-linear Schrödinger
equation and is subject to spontaneous localisation. Although a ‘collapse dynamics’
precludes the possibility of permanent particles following continuous trajectories
through space, both power pluralism and the GRWm model follow in the tradition
of attributing position a privileged role in the description of nature.3 In both models,
the spread of the wave function is understood in terms of a spatially extended matter
field, the probability of its localisation in terms of the matter-density in that region,
and its ‘collapse’ as a contraction of matter-density within a region.
Secondly, power pluralism, unlike the GRWm model, does not admit the exis-
tence of a single distribution of matter-density, but posits a plurality of numerically
distinct matter fields, each of which is a constituent of a distinct substance. Power
pluralists reject the existence of a single matter-field, because power pluralists reject
the GRW theory of the quantum dynamics, in which localisations are produced by
random ‘hits’ on the wave function that occur universally for microscopic particles,
and embrace the DEP theory instead, in which localisations depend upon ‘the clas-
sical, macroscopic context’ [Drossel and Ellis, 2018, pp.25]. Power pluralists deny
that the ‘classical context’ of every quantum system can be described in terms of
the same micro-physics. To obtain empirically adequate descriptions of phase tran-
sitions, for example, we require a plurality of unitarily inequivalent representations
of quantum mechanics, which have di↵erent microphysical content (see Section 7.2).
Thirdly, power-gunk is not identical to any particular matter field, since power-
gunk has no actual matter-density nor physical properties, but only the potential
to have matter-density and physical properties. An actual matter field is elicited
from the power-gunk by a substantial power, which unites itself to the matter field
it elicits to compose a substance by grounding the causal powers of the substance
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(concerning this conception of metaphysical union, see Section 6.3).
Power-gunk is analogous, in this respect, to the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept
of matter I described earlier (see Chapter 1), which conceives the nature of matter as
potentiality for substance. By providing a substrate of change and the potentiality
for substance, power-gunk serves as the material cause of a substance. Likewise,
substantial power is analogous to the Aristotelian concept of substantial form. By
uniting itself to the matter field that it elicits from the power-gunk, a substantial
power acts as the formal cause of a substance, conferring an essential physical nature
upon the substance as a whole. According to power pluralism, it is the essence
of a physical substance, together with its local environment, that determines the
particular context in which the context-dependent micro-physics takes place.
Power pluralism thus endorses a type of plurality hylomorphism, in which the
matter and form of a substance are numerically distinct from one another, but
compose a metaphysical unity (see Section 6.3). The power-gunk underlying the
matter field of a substance is not nothing, nor is it part of a noumenal realm of
which we can say nothing, nor does it derive its being from the subjective act of
abstracting it from a substance. In this model, the physical matter fields of two
substances are distinct from one another in virtue of the prior distinctness of the two
parcels of metaphysical power-gunk that they actualise.4 The nature and number
of the substances are thus constrained in two ways: first, the substantial powers fix
for all time the repertoire of potential substances; secondly, the power-gunk imposes
a restriction on the total quantity of matter-density that is actualised at a given
moment. Together, the power-gunk and the substantial powers ground all of the
primordial possibilities of quantum mechanics (see Section 7.3).
ii. Substances and entities
A primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics seeks to account for the mea-
surement outcomes of scientific experiments, such as the EPR experiment (see Sec-
tion 3.2), and more generally the macroscopic objects upon which scientists depend,
by o↵ering an account of the empirical content of a physical theory that is exhausted
by its statements about the primitive ontology [Maudlin, 2019]. A Stern-Gerlach
device, for example, is observed to register ‘spin-up’ or ‘spin-down’ in an EPR ex-
periment because it contains a parcel of matter arranged pointer-wise in space.
In the world of Super-Humeanism or power monism, the only object in nature
that may be said to have properties independently of any other object is the cosmos
itself, which is a single substance with a finite number of integral parts. For Super-
Humeans, the integral parts are matter points, which are holistically individuated
by the distance relations in which they stand. For power monists, the integral parts
are power-atoms, whose powers are grounded in the power of the cosmos as a whole.
Both metaphysical models imply that the causal profiles of any macroscopic objects
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of scientific inquiry must be extrinsic to them, since such objects are composed
merely of integral parts of the cosmic substance (see Section 6.4).
Similarly, in the hylomorphic ontology I wish to propose, the empirical content
of a physical theory is exhausted by its statements about the matter fields of fun-
damental substances. However, the macroscopic instruments upon which scientists
depend to perform their experiments must have chemical structures that instantiate
properties like solidity, so they can be picked up and manipulated, and manifest dis-
tinct colour profiles, so they can be distinguished visually from their surroundings.
In power pluralism, the thermochemical properties of macroscopic (or mesoscopic)
entities, which explain their solidity and colourfulness, are irreducible to the micro-
physical properties of any finite set of microscopic constituents (see Section 7.5). In
fact, di↵erent quantum systems have di↵erent ‘classical’ properties, like tempera-
ture and chemical entropy, which are not quantum-entangled with one another, and
these systems are distinguished from one another in an experiment by isolating their
thermochemical powers.
Power pluralists thus reject the cosmic holism of Super-Humeanism and power
monism, which leads to the radical underdetermination of the manifest image (as
argued in Chapter 8). They also reject the claim that any macroscopic object
or spatiotemporal region must have all of their causal profiles extrinsically, which
leads to the expulsion of intrinsic consciousness from the physical world (as argued
in Section 6.4). Both of these problems can be avoided, and the role of ‘classical’
properties in fixing the context of the quantum dynamics a rmed, by taking amicro-
pluralist stance to the thermodynamic limit, in which the microscopic properties of
a physical system are grounded in its essential macroscopic (or mesoscopic) state
(defined in Section 7.5).
Following Koons, power pluralists embrace substance pluralism, regarding macro-
scopic (or mesoscopic) thermochemical substances as the fundamental building blocks
of the physical world [Koons, 2019]. They are fundamental in the sense that there
is no change in the physical world that does involve change in a thermochemical
substance, in accordance with Scha↵er’s ‘tiling constraint’ [Scha↵er, 2010]. The
thermochemical essence of a substance, Koons suggests, is represented in QM1
by a topology on the abstract C*-algebra that generates a concrete W*-algebra of
observable properties for the whole substance. The matter of these substances sup-
port global, macroscopic observables that do not enter into quantum superpositions:
they are not merely swarms of particles, but have metastable chemical structures,
which are not quantum-entangled with their environment. According to this model,
these substances have intrinsic thermochemical properties that are metaphysically
grounded in the substance as a whole. It is only the quantal properties of their
microscopic parts that are quantum-entangled with one another.
Power pluralists thus conceive the world as the domain of multiple substances of
di↵erent physical scales. These substances are not necessary or permanent entities
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that exist without further explanation, but contingent hylomorphic composites that
are subject to generation and corruption. When a substantial power elicits a matter
field from the power-gunk, it unites itself to the matter field that it elicits by being
the formal cause of a substance with an essential physical nature. This composite is a
robustly Aristotelian substance (FS/IV-V), since the physical parts of the substance
depend for their natures upon the whole of which they are part, and it has active
and passive causal powers (of which more presently). When a substantial power
ceases to elicit the matter field of the substance from the power-gunk, it ceases to
unite itself to the matter of the substance, and the substance ceases to exist.
Not every entity in nature is a substance, however, and substantial powers do not
actualise substances at all physical scales. For instance, we have good reason to reject
microscopic particles as substances: the EPR correlations between local observables
in quantum mechanics suggest that particles lack intrinsic physical properties, but
are interdependent entities that belong to a larger whole (see Chapter 3). There are
also physical and metaphysical considerations for rejecting the claim that there is
only one cosmic substance. First, it seems to be possible to isolate thermochemical
systems in nature with ‘classical’ properties that are not quantum-entangled (see
Chapter 7). Secondly, the manifest image would be radically underdetermined if
cosmic holism were true, and the theory of quantum mechanics would be empir-
ically empty (see Chapter 8). Contrary to micro-monism, which claims that the
macroscopic world is composed of the integral parts of a cosmic whole, which per-
sist through all forms of change, power pluralism conceives of microscopic entities as
being integral or potential parts of macroscopic (or mesoscopic) substances, whose
physical properties are grounded in the substances of which they are parts.
iii. Laws and powers
In the primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics, the matter composing
any object of scientific inquiry evolves according to a law of nature, whilst the wave
function enters this metaphysical account through the nomological role that it plays
in the temporal development of the matter. There are two principle ways of spelling
out the notion that the wave function is nomological: namely, by appealing to some
form of Humeanism, such as the ‘best systems’ account of laws, or to some form of
powerism, in which laws are grounded in powers [Esfeld et al., 2017].
Similarly, in this hylomorphic approach to quantum mechanics, the wave function
plays a nomological role in describing the temporal evolution of a matter field. Like
the power monist, the power pluralist adopts a powerist conception of laws, and
distinguishes causal laws that connect causes to e↵ects from metaphysical laws that
connect grounds to what is grounded (see Chapter 6). Power pluralists think of
the Schrödinger equation as a metaphysical law that concerns a grounding relation.
Unlike the power monist, however, the power pluralist adopts the DEP model of
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the quantum dynamics, rather than the Bohmian theory, and posits the existence
of numerically distinct matter fields.
According to power pluralism, the metaphysical grounding relation that concerns
the modified Schrödinger equation holds between the powers of a matter field and
the substantial power. In this model, there are thermochemical substances in nature,
each of which is composed of a matter field and a substantial power. Every substance
has an intrinsic power to change the distribution of matter-density in its matter field,
as well as active and passive causal powers to ‘exchange’ matter-density with the
matter fields of other substances. These powers are grounded bottom-up in the
power-gunk, from which the matter field is elicited, and top-down in the substantial
power, which elicits the matter field of the substance. They change with time
according to the quantum dynamics of the DEP model.
I suggest that the bottom-up component of their grounding is described by the
linear part of the quantum dynamics, which is shared in common with every matter
field that is elicited from the power-gunk. I propose that the top-down component
of their grounding is described by the non-linear part of the quantum dynamics,
which is peculiar to the ‘classical context’ of the particular substance (see Appendix
C).5 For power pluralists, the continual evolution of the matter field of a substance is
the manifestation of its first-order power to change its matter-density distribution,
whereas the stochastic localisation of the matter field is a manifestation of their
second-order powers to ‘exchange’ matter-density between their matter fields, by
changing their first-order powers. We may think of the continual change in the
matter-density of a matter field as involving both formal and e cient causation
(see Section 1.3), and thus involving the exercise of substantial and causal powers.
To see this, consider the case of a transfer of matter-density between the matter
fields of two substances through the exercise of their second-order powers. This
may take place, for example, when a particle from the matter field of a substance
 , such as a photon, becomes part of the matter field of a measuring instrument
⇠, such as a photon detector, which registers this event with a characteristic ‘click’.
(For simplicity, I am treating the photon detector as a substance, rather than an
aggregate.) This ‘exchange’ of matter-density between   and ⇠ is only made possible,
however, by the substantial power of ⇠ eliciting more matter-density from the power-
gunk, and the substantial power of   eliciting correspondingly less. This in turn
requires a change in the first-order powers of both substances that change the matter
density distribution of their respective matter fields.
In the case of the measurement of a particle from a matter field  , the local
environment of   will include a macroscopic instrument ⇠ with a metastable chemical
structure, a finite temperature, and an intrinsic heat bath characterised by infinite
degrees of freedom. As Drossel and Ellis argue: ‘At the micro level, the context for
the interaction is set by a specific metastable structure that allows transitions upon
impact of the particle that is to be detected’ [Drossel and Ellis, 2018, p.19]. We
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may think of this structure as being sustained by the substantial power of ⇠. The
top-down influence of the causal powers of ⇠ upon the matter field of   is reflected
in the formalism by the evolving external potential imposed upon the wave function
by the thermal properties of ⇠ [p.17] (which are not defined in the Hilbert space in
which the wave function of   is defined).
We may think of the matter field equation (borrowed from the GRWm model),
as describing the manifestation of the first-order power of a substance to change
the distribution of matter density m (x, t) in its matter field (see Appendix C).
This power is grounded in the substantial power of the substance, and is subject
to change in accordance with the metaphysical law that describes the grounding
relation between the substantial power and the powers of the substance. The matter
field of the substance at time t, and its matter field at time t0 > t, are united as the
temporal parts of a single substance in virtue of this metaphysical law, which links
all the potential distributions of matter density elicited by the substantial power (cf.
Section 6.3). The substantial power is thus the principle of unity of the substance.
iv. Microscopic and macroscopic properties
In the primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics, the primitive matter of
which all physical systems are composed lacks any intrinsic physical properties. The
properties that feature in any physical theory that describes interactions between
di↵erent sub-systems enter into the metaphysical account solely through the dy-
namical role they play in describing local regularities in the distribution of matter.
For Super-Humeans and power monists, who adopt the Bohmian interpretation of
quantum mechanics, physical properties like mass and charge are neither intrinsic
properties of microscopic systems nor elements of the primitive ontology.
However, in the hylomorphic alternative I am proposing, certain macroscopic
‘classical’ properties have an additional role to play in fixing the boundary condi-
tions in which the quantum dynamics takes place, as described in the DEP model
(see Section 7.5). This physical disjointness between the quantal and ‘classical’
properties of a system allows us to accommodate the emergence of thermochemical
phenomena in macroscopic systems, like phase transitions. Nonetheless, power plu-
ralists are able to o↵er a metaphysically unified approach to quantum mechanics by
adopting a hierarchical interpretation of the quantum state, in which a Hilbert space
corresponds to the (essential) macrostate of a quantum system, whilst a vector that
is defined in this Hilbert space corresponds to its (accidental) microstate [Sewell,
2014, pp.4-5]. In so doing, the power pluralist rejects the quantum micro-monist
claim that the physical world, as a whole, is characterised by a universal wave func-
tion, but does not reject the requirements of scientific realism (AI/I-V).
The universal wave function that features in the Bohmian interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, for instance, is a projection of a vector defined in a single Hilbert
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space onto the finite configuration space of N quantum particles. This wave function
determines the quantal properties of the particle system that can be measured in
an experiment. However, as I argued in Chapter 7, there is more information in the
hierarchical quantum state of an infinite quantum system. The quantum mechan-
ics of infinite systems, QM1, makes available an ‘operator topology’ that defines
the convergence of infinite sequences of quantum operators, which permits a core
of ‘classical’, macroscopic observables to be defined that characterise the system’s
essential macrostate.
The fact that an ontic system has certain macroscopic, ‘classical’ properties,
in addition to the quantal properties of the system of particles with which it is
associated, implies there is more to being a matter field than the way in which
it relates to space and time in a quantum experiment. A quantum experiment
involves a finite number of microscopic measurements, in which a system relates to
the measuring device as a set of discrete quanta, such as photons that register with
a ‘click’ in a photon detector. For power pluralists, however, matter also cooperates
as a continuum in a plurality of di↵erent ways. This peculiarity is reflected in
the formalism, I suggest, inasmuch as two wave functions,  2 H1 and   2 H2,
which characterise two distinct matter fields, may determine identical distributions
of matter-density, m (x, t) = m (x, t), yet belong to unitarily inequivalent Hilbert
spaces. These distinct Hilbert space representations may support disjoint sets of
macroscopic observables in the continuum limit. It is because matter composes in a
plurality of ways – as many, I suggest, as the number of kinds of substantial powers –
that substances have such ‘classical’ properties as temperature and chemical entropy.
A themochemical substance, however, is not exhausted by its physical charac-
terisation. On the one hand, the second-order powers of a substance to ‘exchange’
matter-density with other substances are physical powers that can be isolated in an
experiment. Their role is reflected in the ‘boundary conditions’ that are imposed
upon the evolution of a quantum system via the feedback loop in the DEP model.
On the other hand, the first-order power of a substance to change its distribution
of matter-density is a metaphysical power of self-regulation, and this distribution of
matter-density cannot be measured directly. It is not possible to measure the quantal
properties of a system without significantly disturbing them, since any measurement
of any part of a quantum system will involve a localisation in the wave function of
the system as a whole. Whilst it is the second-order powers of a substance, which
are not quantum-entangled with its environment, that make quantum systems em-
pirically distinguishable from one another, the physical powers of a substance to
‘exchange’ matter-density with other substances are unintelligible apart from the
metaphysical powers of substances to change their distributions of matter-density.
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v. Accidental and substantial change
In the primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics, all change in the physical
world consists of the change in the spatial distribution of matter. There is one way
that the world is at a given moment (specified by its arrangement of matter) and
there is one set of ways in which it might be (consisting of its possible arrangements
of matter). For micro-monists, like Super-Humeans or power monists, the world is
conceived as a single nomological machine, and all change is determined by its laws.
In the hylomorphic approach I am advancing, by contrast, ‘there’s a single way
the world is, but . . . there isn’t a single set of ways it might be’ [Ruetsche, 2011,
p.353]. Power pluralists reject micro-monism, and its unimodal conception of physi-
cal possibility (MM/III), because thermochemical phenomena cannot be adequately
represented in a single microscopic state space (see Chapter 7). They adopt a micro-
pluralist interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which the world consists of di↵er-
ent kinds of nomological machines that are modelled using physically inequivalent
representations. For example, when a quantum system undergoes a phase transition,
such as a ferromagnet that experiences spontaneous magnetisation, it composes a
di↵erent nomological machine, W1i ! W1j, in which one set of observables and
dynamics, defined in an appropriate Hilbert space, are discontinuously replaced by
another set of observables and dynamics, defined in a unitarily inequivalent Hilbert
space. This change is not determined by its laws (see Chapter 7).
According to power pluralists, there is both accidental and substantial change
in nature. Accidental change occurs with the exchange of matter-density between
substances, and the change in the distribution of matter density in their respec-
tive matter fields. It is the accidents of the substances that change. Substantial
change takes place, however, when a substantial power begins or ceases to elicit
a matter field from the power-gunk. This change is heralded by the emergence
of novel thermochemical phenomena, such as phase transitions, in which one sub-
stance is succeeded by a numerically distinct substance with di↵erent causal powers.
A substance may thus be said to have both an accidental and a substantial form
(cf. Chapter 1). Its accidental form is represented by a wave function  , which is
determined in part by its interactions with other substances through the feed-back
mechanism described by Drossel and Ellis. The substantial form of the substance is
represented by the Hilbert space H in which this wave function is defined,  2 H.
§9.4. Advantages of power pluralism
By replacing the power-atoms of power monism with power-gunk, and enriching the
primitive ontology to include substantial powers, power pluralism gains a number
of advantages over rival models, such as Super-Humeanism and power monism.
First, power pluralism is able to solve the problem of extrinsicality, which is the
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problem of accommodating the intrinsicality of consciousness in a world governed
by quantum mechanics (see Chapter 6). This problem arises for primitive ontology
approaches to quantum mechanics because it is plausible that a macroscopic entity
with intrinsic consciousness has an intrinsic causal profile, yet a quantum-entangled
world seems to be a world in which no macroscopic entity has an intrinsic causal
profile. Power pluralism is able to solve this problem, however, because it supports
an ontology of thermochemical substances, which are not quantum-entangled with
their environments. These substances have intrinsic causal profiles in virtue of their
possessing essential casual powers (DD/III). (Like Koons, I shall regard an organic
entity to be a type of thermochemical substance.)
Secondly, power pluralism is able to solve the problem of emergence (see Chapter
7), which is the problem of explaining thermochemical phenomena in macroscopic
quantum systems in terms of the states and observables of microscopic systems. This
problem arises for primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics because
they conceive the world as a finite quantum system with a single wave function,
whilst these states and observables are only defined for infinite quantum systems
that have irreducible boundary conditions. Power pluralism is able to solve this
problem, however, because it rejects micro-monist interpretations of quantum me-
chanics, which posit a finite set of microscopic constituents that evolve within a
single microscopic state space, and adopts a micro-pluralist conception of quantum
mechanics, in which di↵erent systems may evolve in unitarily inequivalent state
spaces (DD/IV). According to power pluralists, the fundamental building-blocks of
reality are substances with intrinsic thermochemical properties.
Thirdly, power pluralism is able to circumvent the problem of radical indetermi-
nacy, which is the problem of explaining how the scientific image can have empirical
content when the manifest image is radically underdetermined by the microscopic
quantum world (see Chapter 8). This problem a↵ects primitive ontology approaches
to quantum mechanics because the content of the manifest image must be con-
strained by local features of the environment (to avoid Putnam-style permutation
arguments that lead to scepticism about reference), but a world made of matter
without physical properties lacks any such constraints. Power pluralism is able to
circumvent this problem, however, since it does not require the manifest image to be
functionally realised by the microscopic world (MM/IV). According to power plu-
ralists, we can think of the intrinsic natures of fundamental substances as imposing
local constraints on the manifest image (DD/V).
§9.5. Arguments from naturalism
This outline of my new ontology is doubtless subject to many points of clarification,
and will require further development. One substantial objection that I should like
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to anticipate, however, is the claim that it is not su ciently naturalistic. I shall
consider two ways of forming this objection, which I shall then refute. The first line
of attack takes a Quinean-Lewisan stance that might be formulated as follows:
Argument from naturalism (I):
i. If naturalism is true, then every entity in the ontology must be a referent of
one of our best scientific theories.
ii. If power pluralism is true, then at least some of the entities in the ontology
are not referents of any of our best scientific theories.
iii. Therefore, if naturalism is true, power pluralism is false (by i. and ii.).
I take the first premise to be motivated by something like Quine’s famous dictum:
‘to be is to be the value of a variable’ [Quine, 1948]. The elements of a naturalistic
ontology, according to this recipe, must be restricted to those entities over which
our ‘best theories’ quantify (once they are properly interpreted). Our best theories
are conceived as those theories that are most successful in explaining natural phe-
nomena. The second premise may be advanced by pointing out that the elements in
the primitive ontology of power pluralism are not the referents of any physical the-
ory. The conclusion follows from the premises: for type-I naturalists, this failure of
reference must disqualify such elements from being members of a natural ontology.
Nonetheless, I think such strictures are misguided. Following Ruetsche, I have
argued that QM1 requires two stages in its interpretation to enable its explanatory
power: the first-stage is universal and pertains to the potential states and observables
of every system in nature, but it does not explain what scientists actually observe.
The second-stage refers to actual entities and pertains to what scientists actually
observe, yet there are a plurality of ways of o↵ering second-stage interpretations and
the truthfulness of their content is context-dependent. The suggestion that nothing
belongs in nature besides those things that appear as the referents of a successful
physical theory amounts to the demand for a single second-stage interpretation of
quantum mechanics. This requirement, however, impairs the explanatory power
of quantum mechanics, which admits multiple semantic interpretations, and in so
doing undermines the assumption of realism (see Chapter 7).
I think we should reject the first premise as scientifically outmoded: the Quinean-
Lewisan tradition misconceives the unity of nature, conflating primodial and physical
possibilities and mistaking the natural world for a single nomological machine. I have
argued that this leads to the radical underdetermination of the manifest image (see
Chapter 8). This first line of attack, then, reflects an idealised conception of physics
that does not reflect scientific practice. A second line of attack might be advanced,
however, in the spirit of the Stanford School of the philosophy of science, which
o↵ers a rival perspective on nature to the Quinean-Lewisan tradition. It could be
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formulated as follows:
Argument from naturalism (II):
i. If naturalism is true, then it is possible in principle to manipulate the causes
of all natural phenomena (in an appropriate scientific experiment).
ii. If power pluralism is true, then it is not possible even in principle to manip-
ulate the causes of some natural phenomena.
iii. Therefore, if naturalism is true, power pluralism is false (by i. and ii.).
I take the first premise of this argument to be motivated by something like Hacking’s
principle that what is real is what we can manipulate [Hacking, 1983]. A naturalistic
ontology, from this standpoint, should restrict itself to explanations involving entities
that we have some reasonable hope of isolating within a scientific practice. I take the
second premise as following from the power pluralist’s commitment to entities like
substantial powers, which are the metaphysical grounds of substances’ causal powers
to bring about natural phenomena, but do not themselves exist within the theatre
of space and time. The conclusion follows from the premises: type-II naturalists
cannot consistently a rm naturalism and power pluralism.
Again, I find such worries to be misplaced. The fact that we cannot isolate
substantial powers in a scientific experiment does not prevent us from abstracting
them from the various substances with which we are in causal contact, in virtue of
the causal powers that substantial powers ground. In fact, this is the same kind of
conceptual operation in which physicists are engaged when they take the continuum
limit. In taking this limit, certain global observables supported by thermochemical
systems are abstracted from the quantum-entangled local observables of their infinite
sub-systems. The practice of ‘abstracting’ is a necessary conceptual operation for
producing interpretations of theories that have empirical content.
I think we should reject the first premise of the second argument by restricting
Hacking’s principle to the domain of substances that have causal powers. It should
not be applied to the primitive ontology of power pluralism, which supplies the
metaphysical grounds of their causal powers. The Stanford School has exaggerated
the disunity of nature by rejecting the possibility of a metaphysically unified account
of nature. On the one hand, it is true that nature is not a single nomological
machine that is described by the laws of our best physics. On the other hand, it is
possible to provide a unified description of nature in terms of the potentialities of
physical substances, by adopting a two-stage interpretation of quantum mechanics,
and embracing a distinction between causal and metaphysical laws.
In short, I think there is good reason to reject the metaphysical scruples of
both type-I and type-II naturalists. Type-I naturalists are attached to an anti-
quated metaphysical conception of nature, whilst type-II naturalists are unduly shy
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of metaphysics. By adopting a hylomorphic conception of nature, however, in which
substances are composed of both matter (power-gunk) and form (substantial power),
power pluralism is able to distinguish and hold in balance the (metaphysical) unity
and the (physical) disunity of nature, avoiding the extremes of both the Quinean-
Lewisan metaphysical tradition and the Stanford School of philosophy of science.
§9.6. Final remarks
In this final chapter, I have proposed a neo-Aristotelian ontology called power plu-
ralism, which both accommodates the phenomenon of quantum entanglement and
the emergence of quantum systems with thermochemical properties. I advanced a
‘micro-pluralist’ approach to quantum mechanics in which quantum states are ontic
states of macroscopic substances that have intrinsic thermochemical properties (see
Section 9.2). In order to explain how these substances are generated, and how their
quantal and thermochemical properties evolve according to physical laws, I outlined
a new hylomorphic ontology of quantum mechanics (Section 9.3), which consists
of power-gunk and substantial powers. According to this micro-pluralist model,
the world is not composed of microscopic constituents. Rather, macroscopic (or
mesoscopic) thermochemical substances are elicited from a substrate of power-gunk
by substantial powers, which belong to distinct natural kinds. I argued that this
model o↵ers a number of advantages over rival primitive ontologies (Section 9.4): it
accommodates the intrinsicality of consciousness, it explains the emergence of ther-
mochemical phenomena, and it circumvents the problem of radical indeterminacy.
Finally, I anticipated the objection that this model is insu ciently naturalistic,
and suggested how power pluralism o↵ers a via media between the Quinean-Lewian
metaphysical tradition and the Standford School that neither exaggerates nor denies
the unity of nature (Section 9.5).
Notes
1The term ‘power gunk’ was coined by Marmodoro in [Marmodoro, 2015].
2The term ‘substantial power’ was coined by Marmodoro to denote a power that is a holistic
unity consisting of ‘re-individuated’ basic microphysical powers [Marmodoro, 2017]. The substan-
tial powers in power pluralism generate substances in a di↵erent way, since there are no basic
microphysical powers for them to re-individuate.
3As Ghirardi and his collaborators argued: ‘This is quite natural since the definiteness, the
particularity of the world of our experience, derives from our perceiving physical objects in definite
places, and this is also why the prescriptions for establishing the psychophysical correspondence
usually involve positions’ [Ghirardi et al., 1995, p.6].
4Power-gunk is thus close to the scholastic concept of ‘prime matter’, whilst matter fields are
close to the notion of ‘designated’ matter.






§A. The de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory
To derive de Broglie’s version of the ‘Bohmian law of motion’, which describes the ve-
locities of a particle configuration, let us begin with the time-dependent Schrödinger




where  is a wave function defined in an N -dimensional configuration space,  =














We may think of the wave function as a ‘probability fluid’ that is flowing through








The current satisfies a continuity equation,
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where the density ⇢ = | |2. The continuity equation imposes a conservation law
upon the probability density, ⇢, in which the rate of change of the probability of a
particle being measured in some volume V is equal to the rate at which probability
flows into V .
De Broglie proposed taking the wave function as a pilot-wave that supports
a configuration of particles Qi(t), which have definite positions at all times. He
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hypothesised that the trajectories of the particles could be deduced from the prob-
ability current density, where the velocity is the ratio of the probability current j to







The Bohmian equation of motion for the particles is thus of the form:
dQi
dt
= v i (Q1, ...,QN) / Im
 ri 
| |2
The equation of motion can be expressed more concisely by expressing the wave





In the picture this a↵ords, the Bohmian particles are driven by the pilot wave along
trajectories that are perpendicular to surfaces of constant phase. For further details,
consult [Dürr, 2009] and [Allori et al., 2008].
§B. The GRW universal collapse theory
In the GRW theory, proposed by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber [Ghirardi et al.,
1986], a physical system is also assigned an N particle wave function that solves the
time-dependent Schrödinger equation,  =  (Qi, . . . ,QN , t), where Qi 2 R3 and
i = 1 . . . N .6 The wave function, however, is subject to collapse. For any every x in











where Q̂i is the position operator of the particle i, and   is a constant of nature. The
evolution of the wave can be decomposed into two parts. First, it evolves unitarily
according to the Schrödinger equation, from time t0 until some random time T , such
that  (t) = U T (t0) for t 2 [t0, T ], where Ut = exp( i/~Ĥ). Secondly, at time
t = T , the wave function undergoes spontaneous collapse:
 T !  T+ =
⇤I(X)1/2  T
||⇤I(X)1/2  T ||
,
were I is from the set of N particles, {1, . . . , N}, chosen randomly with uniform
probability density, and X is the centre of the collapse, chosen randomly with non-
uniform probability density:
P (X 2 dx| T , I = i) = h T |⇤i(x) T i dx.
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The algorithm is then reiterated for  T+, which experiences a period of unitary evo-
lution, before undergoing spontaneous collapse. For further details, consult [Ghirardi
et al., 1986] and [Allori et al., 2008]. In GRWm theory, proposed in [Ghirardi et al.,
1995], the Schrödinger equation and the collapse dynamics are supplemented by a







dq1 · · · dqN (qi   x)| (q1, · · · , qN , t)|
2.
The field m(x, t) is understood to be the density of ‘matter’ in space at time t,
where each point x in the matter field receives a mass-weighted contribution from
each ‘particle’ (or ith degree of freedom), i = 1, . . . , N , by obtaining a marginal
distribution for each particle i (at qi = x) from the probability density | |2. The
matter field is not particle-like but continuous.
§C. The DEP contextual collapse theory
The DEP theory, as I call it – after Drossel, Ellis and Primas – o↵ers an alternative
model of wave function collapse, in which the interaction of a quantum system with
the intrinsic heat bath of a measuring instrument plays a key role in solving the
measurement problem [Drossel and Ellis, 2018] (cf. [Primas, 1990a,Primas, 1990b]).
I do not propose to discuss any part of it in detail here, but merely to note that the
collapse of the wave function is achieved via a feedback loop, which depends upon
the local environment. Consider the Schrödinger equation for an electron:
i~@ 
@t
= (T + V ) ,
where the potential is due to the external environment. In the case of an environment
that includes a detector, the potential is formed by the ions composing the lattice
of the detector material. However, the potential in which the wave function of the
electron evolves changes, because it depends on the electron charge density:
@V (x)
@t
= f(x, | |2)











This is a non-linear Schrödinger equation. Since the feedback loop involves the heat
bath of the detector, which cannot be described by a process of unitary evolution in
this model, localisations of the wave function can be obtained.
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Philosophical Investigations, 39(3):205–214.
Marmodoro, A. (2017). Power mereology: structural powers versus substantial pow-
ers. In Paoletti, M. P. and Orilia, F., editors, Philosophical and scientific perspectives
on downward causation, pages 110–127.
Marmodoro, A. (2018a). Potentiality in Aristotle’s metaphysics. In Engelhard, K.
and Quante, M., editors, power-structuralism.ox.ac.uk, pages 15–43. Springer.
Marmodoro, A. (2018b). Whole, but not One. In Heil, J., Carruth, A., and Gibb,
S., editors, Ontology, Modality, and Mind Themes from the Metaphysics of E. J.
Lowe. Oxford University Press.
Martin, C. B. (1994). Dispositions and Conditionals. The Philosophical Quarterly,
44(174):1–8.
Massimi, M. (2017). Laws of Nature, Natural Properties, and the Robustly Best
System. Mind, 100(3):406–421.
Matarese, V. (2018). A challenge for Super-Humeanism: the problem of immanent
comparisons. Synthese, 5(1):1–20.
Maudlin, T. (1995). Three measurement problems. Topoi, 14(1):7–15.
Maudlin, T. (2007). The Metaphysics Within Physics. Oxford University Press.
Maudlin, T. (2010). Can the World be only Wavefunction? In Saunders, S., Barrett,
J., Kent, A., and Wallace, D., editors, Many worlds Everett, Quantum Theory, and
Reality, pages 121–143. Oxford University Press.
Maudlin, T. (2019). The Universal and the Local in Quantum Theory. In Philoso-
phers Look at Quantum Mechanics, pages 45–60. Springer, Cham, Cham.
Mayr, E. (2011). Understanding Human Agency. Oxford University Press.
McTaggart, J. E. (1908). The Unreality of Time. Mind, 17(68):457–474.
Menzies, P. and Price, H. (2008). Is Semantics in the Plan? In Braddon-Mitchell,
D. and Nola, R., editors, Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT
Press.
Mill, J. S. (1875). A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. London: Long-
mans.
198
Miller, E. (2013). Quantum Entanglement, Bohmian Mechanics, and Humean Su-
pervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92(3):567–583.
Miller, R. (2019). Not Another Brick in the Wall: an Extensional Mereology for
Potential Parts. manuscript in submission.
Minkowski, H. (1908). ”Raum und Zeit” [Space and Time]. Physikalische Zeitschrift,
10:75–88.
Molnar, G. (2006). Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
Mumford, S. (2005). Laws and Lawlessness. Synthese, 144(3):397–413.
Mumford, S. and Anjum, R. L. (2011). Getting Causes from Powers. Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Myrvold, W. C. (2015). What is a wavefunction? Synthese, 192(10):3247–3274.
Nagel, E. (1961). The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific
Explanation. London: Routledge and Keagan Paul.
Newman, M. H. A. (1928). Mr. Russell’s ”Causal Theory of Perception”. Mind,
New Series, 37:137–148.
O’Connor, T. (1994). Emergent properties. Mind, 31(2):91–104.
O’Connor, T. and Wong, H. Y. (2005). The Metaphysics of Emergence. Mind,
39(4):658–678.
Oderberg, D. S. (2017). The Great Unifier : Form and the Unity of the Organism. In
Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science, pages 211–233. Routledge.
Pallies, D. (2019). Why Humean Causation Is Extrinsic. Thought: A Journal of
Philosophy, 8(2):139–148.
Pasnau, R. (2011). Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671. Oxford University Press.
Paul, L. A. (2013). Realism about structure and kinds. In Metaphysics and Science,
pages 183–198. Oxford University Press.
Peterson, A. S. (2018). Unity, Plurality, and Hylomorphic Composition in Aristotle’s
Metaphysics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96(1):1–13.
Philbin, T. G. (2010). Canonical quantization of macroscopic electromagnetism.
New Journal of Physics, 12(12):123008.
199
Price, H. (2010). Decisions, Decisions, Decisions: Can Savage Salvage Everettian
Probability?. In Saunders, S., Barrett, J., Kent, A., and Wallace, D., editors, Many
worlds Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, pages 369–390. Oxford University
Press.
Primas, H. (1983). Chemistry, Quantum Mechanics and Reductionism. Perspectives
in Theoretical Chemistry. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
Primas, H. (1990a). Induced nonlinear time evolution of open quantum objects. In
Miller, A. I., editor, Sixty-Two Years of Uncertainty Historical, Philosophical, and
Physical Inquiries into the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, pages 259–280. New
York: Plenum Press.
Primas, H. (1990b). Mathematical and philosophical questions in the theory of
open and macroscopic quantum systems. In Miller, A. I., editor, Sixty-Two Years of
Uncertainty Historical, Philosophical, and Physical Inquiries into the Foundations
of Quantum Mechanics, pages 233–258. New York: Plenum Press.
Primas, H. (1994). Endo- and Exo-Theories of Matter. In Inside Versus Outside,
pages 163–193. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg.
Putnam, H. (1977). Realism and Reason. Mind, 50(6):483–498.
Putnam, H. (1980). Models and Reality. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 45(3):464–
482.
Pylkkänen, P., Hiley, B. J., and Pättiniemi, I. (2015). Bohm’s Approach and Indi-
viduality. Oxford University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1948). On What There Is. Mind, 2(1):21–38.
Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and object. MIT Press.
Quine, W. V. (1976). Grades of Discriminability. The Journal of Philosophy,
73(5):113.
Ramsey, F. P. (1978). Universals of Law and Fact. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Rea, M. C. (2011). Hylomorphism reconditioned. Mind, 25:341–358.
Rosen, G. (2010). Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction. In Hale,
B. and Ho↵man, A., editors, Modality Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, pages
109–136. Oxford University Press.
Ruetsche, L. (2011). Interpreting Quantum Theories. Oxford University Press.
Russell, B. (1903). The Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge University Press.
200
Russell, B. (1927). The Analysis of Matter. K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London.
Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson.
Salart, D., Baas, A., Branciard, C., Gisin, N., and Zbinden, H. (2008). Testing the
speed of ‘spooky action at a distance’. Nature, 454(7206):861–864.
Saunders, S. (2003). Physics and Leibniz’s Principles. In Brading, K. and Castellani,
E., editors, Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections. Cambridge University
Press.
Saunders, S. (2006). Are quantum particles objects? Analysis, 66(289):52–63.
Scaltsas, T. (1994). Substances and Universals in Aristotle’s ’Metaphysics’. Cornell
University Press.
Scha↵er, J. (2004). Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties*. Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly, 85(1):92–102.
Scha↵er, J. (2005). Quiddistic Knowledge. Foundations of Physics, 123(1-2):1–32.
Scha↵er, J. (2009). On What Grounds What. In Manley, D., Chalmers, D. J.,
and Wasserman, R., editors, Metametaphysics New Essays on the Foundations of
Ontology, pages 347–383.
Scha↵er, J. (2010). Monism: The Priority of the Whole. Philosophical Review,
119(1):31–76.
Scha↵er, J. (2017). Laws for metaphysical explanation.
Schrödinger, E. (1935a). ”Die gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik.”
Naturwissenschaften 23.49, pp. 823-828. English translation, “The Present Situation
in Quantum Mechanics: A Translation of Schrödinger’s ”Cat Paradox” Paper”. In
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 124, No. 5 (Oct. 10, 1980),
pp. 323-338. Humanitas.
Schrödinger, E. (1935b). Discussion of Probability Relations between Separated Sys-
tems. Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, 31(4):555–
563.
Sewell, G. (2014). Quantum Theory of Collective Phenomena. Dover Publications
Inc.
Shoemaker, S. (1981). Some Varieties of Functionalism. Mind, 12(1):93–119.
Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.
Oxford University Press.
201
Sider, T. (2003). Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 66(1):139–149.
Sider, T. (2018). Ground grounded. Foundations of Physics, 25(498):1–21.
Silva, I. (2019). From extrinsic design to intrinsic teleology. European Journal of
Science and Theology, 15(3):61–78.
Simons, P. (2000). Parts: A Study in Ontology. Oxford University Press.
Simpson, W. M. R. (2014). Ontological aspects of the Casimir E↵ect. Studies in
History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 48:84–88.
Simpson, W. M. R. (2017). Half-Baked Humeanism. In Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives
on Contemporary Science, pages 123–145. Routledge.
Simpson, W. M. R. (2018). Knowing nature: beyond reduction and emergence. In
Torrance, A. B. and McCall, T. H., editors, Knowing Creation.
Simpson, W. M. R. (2019). What’s the matter with Super-Humeanism? Mind.
Simpson, W. M. R. and Leonhardt, U. (2015). Forces of the Quantum Vacuum. An
Introduction to Casimir Physics. World Scientific.
Simpson, W. M. R., Teh, N. J., and Koons, R. C., editors (2017). Neo-Aristotelian
Perspectives on Contemporary Science. Routledge.
Skrzypek, J. (2017). Three Concerns for Structural Hylomorphism. Analytic Phi-
losophy, 58(4):360–408.
Smart, J. J. C. (1995). A Form of Metaphysical Realism. The Philosophical Quar-
terly, 45(180):301.
Smith, A. D. (1977). Dispositional Properties. Mind, 86(343):439–445.
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